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Editorial 
Studies is now in its sixth year of publication. Founded in 197 4 by Sol Worth as the journal of the Society 
for the Anthropology of Visual Communication, Studies was a ground-breaking venture in academic pub-
lication: a scholarly journal devoted to investigation of visual communications. In the Editor's Introduction 
to the first issue, Worth wrote that, in the view of the Society, 
It was felt that despite the inherent dangers of starting a new publication there was, and had been, so much interest shown by so 
many people, for so many years, in the relationship between the study of culture and society and such things as painting, the 
graphic arts, sculpture, dance, movies, photographs, television, and so on, that the time had come to create a common forum 
where scholars and practitioners interested in the visual media and society could come together to show and discuss what they 
were doing. [1974:1] 
We believe that Studies has justified the confidence of its founders. Its high standards and commitment 
to quality have won recognition and respect from a growing audience in a variety of fields and disciplines. 
However, while we are proud of the journal, we have long recognized the budgetary and disciplinary limita-
tions imposed by our original auspices. Consequently, in November 1977, we obtained the agreement of 
the Society's Board of Directors to enter into negotiations with the Annen berg School Press, an activity of 
The Annen berg School of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania, for the publication of Studies. 
These negotiations were successfully concluded last summer. This issue, Volume 6, Number 1, begins 
Studies in Visual Communication. 
Our new auspices will provide us with the funds to initiate triannual issues in our first year and move to-
ward quarterly issues in the near future. We will also have the resources to engage in promotion for the first 
time-to make Studies in Visual Communication visible to the large and varied potential audience who 
have not previously encountered Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Communication. 
The new title will make more apparent our existing commitment to solicit and publish contributions from 
a wide and diverse range of disciplines. We will publish qualitative and quantitative, theoretical and empiri-
cal studies on visual communication, drawing from authors in such fields as communication, anthropology, 
sociology, psychology, art history, film, television, photography, media studies, American studies, history, 
and philosophy. To help us obtain and evaluate high-quality submissions from the many areas of scholar-
ship that focus upon aspects of visual communication, we have enlisted the assistance of a distinguished 
group of Consulting Editors. In addition to the considerable benefit we derive from their advice and guid-
ance, their presence on our masthead serves as a manifest signal of the breadth of our interests and the 
integrity of our standards. 
Among the primary areas of continuing interest to us are the study of human behavior in context through 
visual means; the study of image-producing technologies and other pictorial and visual means of communi-
cation; the analysis of visual symbolic forms from a cultural-historical framework; visual theories, tech-
nologies, and methodologies for recording and analyzing behavior and the relationships among the differ-
ent modes of communication; the analysis of the structuring of reality as evidenced by visual productions 
and artifacts; the cross-cultural study of art and artifacts from a social, cultural, and visual perception; the 
study of the forms of social organization surrounding the planning, production, and use of visual symbolic 
forms; and the use of the media in cultural feedback. 
Studies in Visual Communication will continue the tradition of a refereed journal that offers scholars and 
practitioners a forum to publish innovative and original works which deal with visual communication. In his 
inaugural Editorial, Sol Worth wrote: 
The only genuine justification for a publication is the work which it reports and the work which it encourages-by the example of 
its contents, as well as by providing new work with a place from which it can be seen, used, criticized, and replaced by newer, 
more interesting, and more illuminating work. [1974:2] 
We agree. We also recognize that this position entails a challenge to us, as editors, to provide our read-
ers with the finest examples of scholarship in our field. This is a challenge we accept with enthusiasm and 
confidence. 
Larry Gross and Jay Ruby 
In Memoriam 
(1901-1978) 
. . . everything that hap-
pens ... becomes data 
once the event has 
been noted, written up, 
photographed or tape 
recorded. 
Margaret Mead 
Margaret Mead at mid-career, 1948. (Courtesy of Lotte Jacobi) 
... I have lived through 
all the improvements 
from pencil and note-
book and still photog-
raphy to videotape . 
She told me that Boas had told her that films could be an aid to, but no substitute 
for, discipline, intelligence, and memory. And I remember, too, the evening she and 
one of her godchildren, my daughter (a tiny child), pulled over a stepladder to reach 
the peanut butter on a high shelf: "Your genes are only the final limit to your power." 
And I can't forget the night she called to say she was sending me a stenotype machine 
to help me record body motion. And when it was of little help, we shared the insight 
that machines such as this or typewriters or computers contained no science or po-
etry-but were prostheses no better than the knowledge, the skill, and the precisions 
involved in their use. 
She respected tools and believed that they were to be used whenever they were 
nonintrusive extensions of ourselves. A talented and devoted archivist, she never per-
mitted a film or a tape (or a book) to be a final product. She sacrificed to send cameras 
and film to students in the field and spent long and precious hours with their films when 
they returned. She never forgot that she was an anthropologist and a teacher. Not 
''what are they'' but ''what are they about'' was her demand. 
She was a teacher-and a student-and a human. As she sat and talked with chil-
dren, with students, with the elderly, and with her colleagues, she filled notebook after 
notebook with data, hunches, and arguments to be saved, thought about, reviewed, 
and sometimes published (with credit) later. Although often independent and at times 
seemingly solitary, Margaret Mead was never alone. She collected and appreciated 
other humans. She learned from, taught, and worked with others, for Margaret Mead 
was a very social scientist. 
Ray L. Birdwhiste/1 
Margaret Mead: Anthropologist of Our Time 
Arranged by Rhoda Metraux and Shari Segel 
Growing Up There was a time when meadow, grove, and stream, 
The earth , and every common sight, 
To me did seem 
Apparell'd in celestial light, 
The glory and the freshness of a dream. 
William Wordsworth , 
Ode: Intimations of Immortality from 
Recollections of Early Childhood 
Her first teacher , her grandmother, Martha 
Ramsay Mead . 
~Margaret with her mother, Emily Fogg Mead . 
Margaret Mead: Anthropologist of Our Time 5 
With Richard . her brother, in Nantucket, 1 911 . 
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Professor: Franz Boas. 
Teacher and friend : Ruth 
Benedict. 
With Luther Cressman, 
1918. 
Margaret Mead: Anthropologist of Our Time 
At Barnard: with Leonie Adams 
and Pelham Kortheuer; they 
called themselves ' ' Ash can 
Cats ." 
7 
First field trip : Samoa. 
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Wearing mourning dress at a funeral, Pere Village . (Courtesy of Reo F. Fortune) 
Pere Village, Manus 
1928 
Sepik District 
New Guinea 
1931-1933 
Doll play , a projective tech-
nique, Alitoa Vi llage. 
Arapesh . (Courtesy of Reo 
F. Fortune) 
Margaret Mead: Anthropologist of Our Time 
.& With Reo Fortune in Pere Village . 
(Courtesy of Reo F. Fortune) 
~ Carrying Piwen , about 2 years old . 
(Courtesy of Reo F. Fortune) 
9 
10 
Bali and New Guinea 
The latmul 
1936-1939 
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Wearing festival dress, with children in Bajoeng Gede, Bali . 
(Courtesy of Gregory Bateson) 
.A. With children in Tambunam. 
(Courtesy of Gregory 
Bateson) 
~ In the screen room , 
Tambunam. (Courtesy of 
Gregory Bateson) 
With Gregory Bateson , in 
Tambunam Village (latmul) , 
Sepik District, New Guinea. 
(Courtesy of Gregory Bate-
son) 
Manus again-and again 
Return to Pere Village , 
1953: with Lenore and 
Ted Schwartz. (Courtesy of 
Ted Schwartz) 
In Pere Village , 1964 . ..,.. 
(Courtesy of Lola Roma-
nucci-Ross) 
With Lola Romanucci and ..,.. 
Ted Schwartz and A dan , 
1964 . (Courtesy of Lola 
Romanucci-Ross and Ted 
Schwartz) 
Margaret Mead: Anthropologist of Our Time 11 
12 
Samoa 
latmul, Manus 
With old friends, Tambu-
nam Village , latmul, 1967. 
(Courtesy of Rhoda Met-
raux) 
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.&.Return to Samoa, 1971 . 
<OIIIIIPere Village, Manus, 1971 . 
(Courtesy of Barbara Heath) 
Last return to. Pere Village , 1975. 
(Courtesy of Barbara Heath).,.. 
Margaret Mead: Anthropologist of Our Time 
With Robert Goelet, 75th birthday party, in the 
Hall of the Peoples of the Pacific , December 
1976. (Courtesy of Peter Goldberg) 
~With her granddaughter, Vanni Kassarjian, New 
York, summer 1978. (Courtesy of Beryl Bernay) 
•with Catherine Bateson at Burg Wartenstein, 1973 . 
(Courtesy of Lita Osmundsen) 
13 
~ With Gregory Bateson and 
Malcolm Arth , First Marga-
ret Mead Film Festival, 
AMNH, 1977. (Courtesy of 
Peter Goldberg) 
14 
At Trinity Church, Bucking-
ham, Pennsylvania , 1976. 
(Courtesy of Barbara Heath) 
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Thanks to the human heart by which we live 
Thanks to its tenderness , its joys, and fears , 
To me the meanest flower that blows can give 
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears . 
Wordsworth . 
Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood 
Margaret Mead and the Shift from "Visual Anthropology" to 
the "Anthropology of Visual Communication" 
Sol Worth 
I would like, in this discussion, to explore a shift in how 
certain problems in the study of culture have come to 
be conceptualized. These problems may best be un-
derstood by examining how one label, ''visual anthro-
pology," led to the creation of another, "the anthro-
pology of visual communication.' ' In order to delineate 
and examine some of the arguments, problems, and 
methods involved in this shift it will be helpful for me to 
cite, and to use as my explanatory fulcrum, the work 
as well as the persona of Margaret Mead. 
I am doing this on an occasion meant to honor her, 
but am aware that even that act - as so often happens 
with Dr. Mead- inevitably gets mixed up with a review 
of the history and problems in communications and an-
thropology. I should add that I am aware that, even as 
we try to develop a history in this field, we also are in 
many ways that same history. 
To introduce some of these issues in the history of 
communications study, let me quote from an informant 
whose comments and life history may lay the ground-
work for certain of the problems I will be talking about. 
Some of you may still remember a television series of 
several years ago called The American Family. It con-
sisted of 1 2 one-hour film presentations. One of the 
major participants of that visual event was Mrs. Patri-
cia Loud, the mother of that "American" family. In a 
letter to some of her acquaintances which she sub-
sequently made public, Mrs. Loud wrote: 
Margaret Mead, bless her friendly voice, has written glow-
ingly that the series constituted some sort of break-
through, a demonstration of a new tool for use in sociology 
and anthropology. Having been the object of that tool, I 
think I am competent to say that it won't work .... 
Later in her letter she continues: 
Like Kafka's prisoner, I am frightened, confused ... I find 
myself shrinking in defense, not only from critics and de-
tractors, but from friends, sympathizers and, finally, my-
self .... The truth is starting to dawn on me that we have 
been ground through the big media machine and are com-
ing out entertainment. The treatment of us as objects and 
things instead of people has caused us wildly anxious 
days and nights. But I would do it again if, in fact, I could 
just be sure that it did what the producer said it was sup-
posed to do. If we failed, was it because of my family, the 
editing, the publicity, or because public television doesn't 
educate? If we failed, what role did the limitations of film 
and TV tape play? Can electronic media really arouse 
awareness and critical faculties? Did we, family and net-
Sol Worth (1 922-1 977) was the founding Editor of 
Studies. This paper was presented at a Symposium 
honoring the work of Margaret Mead at the annual 
meeting of the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science, in Boston, February 20, 1976. 
work alike, serve up great slices of ourselves-irre-
trievable slices-that only serve to entertain briefly, to titil-
late, and diminish into nothing? 
Margaret Mead did not photograph, edit, or produce 
this visual event that Pat Loud speaks of. But in ways 
that I will describe she can be understood to be a ma-
jor influence in this and other attempts to show a fam-
ily in the context of television. More importantly, her 
work over the past fifty years can help us to under-
stand many of the questions that Pat Loud's cry of dis-
tress raised for her (Loud 197 4). 
There are, it seems to me, at least three basic prem-
ises which Mrs. Loud's letter forces us to examine. 
First is our deeply held and largely unexamined notion 
that all or most photographs and, in particular, motion 
pictures are a mirror of the people, objects, and events 
that these media record photochemically. Second is 
the questionable logic of the jump we make when we 
say that the resultant photographic image could be, 
should be, and most often is something called "real," 
"reality," or "truth." A third concern, which is central 
to Pat Loud personally, and increasingly to all people 
studied or observed by cameras for television, whether 
for science, politics, or art, is the effect of being, as 
she puts it, "the object of that tool." 
When The American Family was first shown on 
American television in 1972, mass media critics, psy-
choanalysts, sociologists, and historians as well as 
Time, Newsweek, and The New York Times felt com-
pelled to comment. Almost all- except Marga-
ret-expressed dismay, upset, and even anger over 
the series. Many of these strong feelings were no 
doubt occasioned by the films themselves-by the way 
they were advertised and presented as well as by the 
events depicted in them. But much of the upset was 
also caused, I believe, by the fact that Margaret Mead 
said publicly, and with approval, that this notion of de-
picting a family on television was a worthwhile, revolu-
tionary, daring, and possibly fruitful step in the use of 
the mass media. She even compared the idea of pres-
enting a family on television to the idea of the novel, 
suggesting that it might, if we learned to use it, have a 
similar impact upon the culture within which we live. 
Interestingly enough, in October 1976 the United 
Church of Christ, the Public Broadcasting System, and 
Westinghouse Television will present a series titled Six 
Families, in which the same thing that was tried in the 
Loud family series will now be done on a comparative 
basis. It seems that most of the objections of social 
scientists to the Loud family series were that this use 
of "real" people on TV was unethical, immoral, and in-
decent. It made, many people argued, a nation of 
prurient Peeping Toms out of the American people. It 
is of course "the church" which in our society can 
take initiative and argue that an examination of how 
people live, shown on TV, is not only not Peeping Tom-
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ism but the most moral kind of act for a mass medium. 
We will have to see whether social scientists, TV crit-
ics, and newspapers will even notice this second in-
stance of an American family. 
The problem for those who heard or read what Mar-
garet Mead said about this new use of film- whether 
they were academics, newpaper people, or even sub-
jects-was that we were just beginning to understand 
what Bateson and Mead had said in 1942. We were 
just beginning to accept the idea that photographs 
could be taken and used seriously, as an artistic as 
well as a scientific event. We were not ready to ac-
knowledge that we were beyond the point of being ex-
cited by the fact that a camera worked at all. It was, af-
ter all, understood as early as 1900 that photographs 
and motion pictures could be more than a record of 
data and that they were always less than what we saw 
with our eyes. Let us look at how it started. 
The first set of photographs called motion pictures 
was made by Edward Muybridge in 1877, as scientific 
evidence of a very serious kind. He invented a process 
for showing things in motion in order to settle a bet for 
Governor Leland Stanford of California about whether 
horses had all four feet off the ground when they ran at 
a gallop. Our popular myth about cinema and truth 
started here. If the motion picture camera showed 
it-everyone seemed to, and wanted to, believe-it had 
to be so. Edison in the United States and Daguerre in 
Europe invented more capable machines for taking 
motion pictures, and, interestingly enough, the first 
films made with those primitive motion picture cameras 
between 1 895 and 1900 had much of the spirit of what 
is still called ethnographic filming. They presented 
what the early filmmakers advertised as ''the world as 
it really was." Lumiere's first film showed French 
workers in the Peugeot auto factory outside Paris lin-
ing up to punch a time clock. Edison's first film showed 
his assistant in the act of sneezing. Both Edison and 
Lumiere went on from there to depict other "real" and 
''documentary'' scenes of people walking in the street 
bathing at the beach, eating, embarking on a train, and 
soon. 
The issue of reality in film was already being argued 
in 1901 -not by scientists or artists but by film manu-
facturers. The Riley Brothers catalog of 1900-1901 
states: 
The films listed here are the very best quality. They are 
clean and sharp and full of vigor. They are properly 
treated in the course of manufacture and do not leave the 
celluloid. None of the subjects have been "faked." All are 
genuine photographs taken without pre-arrangement 
and are consequently most natural. 
The notion of a systematically made ethnographic rec-
ord of the geographic and physical environment of a 
city-in a style conforming to ideas promulgated by 
Collier (1967)-was also being advertised and sold in 
1901. The Edison catalog for that year states: 
New York in a Blizzard. Our camera is revolved from right 
to left and takes in Madison Square, Madison Square Gar-
den, looks up Broadway from south to north, passes the 
Fifth Avenue Hotel and ends looking down 23rd Street. 
Such a film could have been made with an ethno-
graphic soundtrack on instructions given to modern 
ethnofilmmakers by archivists in the United States and 
several countries in Western Europe. 
We have, it seems, come a long way from the days 
when just being able to make a picture-moving or 
still-of strange or familiar people in our own or far-
away lands doing exotic things was excuse enough for 
lugging a camera to the field or to our living rooms. In 
those earlier times, from 1895 to about 1920, the term 
''visual anthropology'' had not yet been coined. 
People just took pictures, most often to "prove" that 
the people and places they were lecturing about or 
studying actually existed. In some cases, they took 
pictures so that when they returned to their own 
homes they could, in greater detail and with more time 
study what these people and things looked like. Ar-
chaeologists quite early-around 1900-began to use 
this new miracle machine. They found the camera not 
only quicker than making copy drawings of the arti-
facts they uncovered, but more accurate-truer to life 
or to artifact. I believe that it was from the use to which 
archaeologists put photographs that cultural anthro-
pology developed its first, and still extremely impor-
tant, conceptual paradigm about the use of pictures: 
that the purpose of taking pictures in the field is to 
show the "truth" about whatever it was the picture 
purported to be of-an arrowhead, a potsherd, a 
house, a person, a dance, a ceremony, or any other 
behavior that people could perform, and cameras re-
cord, in the same spatial frame. The subtle shift that 
took place when we expanded on the role of photogra-
phy in anthropology and archaeology, from the use of 
a photo of an arrowhead or a potsherd as evidence of 
existence to the use of a photograph of people as evi-
dence of human behavior, is a particularly important 
and unexamined aspect in the history of social sci-
ence, and especially in that of anthropology. 
A conceptual difficulty that we now face is based on 
the fact that the avowals of truth in photography made 
in the 1901 film catalogs now seem self-evident to us. 
In fact, a major problem in thinking about the use of 
photography in social science today is not that photo-
graphs are not true, but that that is not the purpose we 
use them for. One of the clearest expressions of this 
dilemma, and one that shaped much of my own think-
Mead and Visual Anthropology 
ing about the uses of photography in social science, 
can be found in the appendix to Growth and Culture 
(1951 ), by Mead and McGregor, based on the photo-
graphic work of Bateson and Mead in Bali. Mead 
writes: 
Anthropological field work is based upon the assumption 
that human behavior is systematic . . . that in such re-
search the principal tool is consciousness of pattern [and) 
that the anthropologist brings to this work a training in the 
expectation of form. 
Mead then explains how the photographs taken in Bali 
were used. Of some 25,000 still pictures taken by 
Bateson, 4 ,000 were chosen, from which McGregor, 
Mead, and the Gesell group could find a set of pat-
terns derived from a study of photographs- not from 
the photographs themselves-which could then be 
compared with patterns found in the study of American 
children. It is important to emphasize Mead's subtle 
but powerful distinction: the patterns of behavior in 
this case were derived from the study and analysis of 
the photographs, not from the photographs as a magic 
mirror of pattern. Mead states quite clearly: ''These 
photographs are designed not to prove, but to illus-
trate . ... " 
In effect, what Mead has been trying to teach us is 
what one of her teachers, Ruth Benedict, taught her: 
"patterns of culture " are what we are presenting when 
we do anthropology, and taking photographs, or look-
ing or taking notes are tools for articulating and stating 
the patterns that we, as anthropologists, wish to show 
to others. It is that old lesson about culture which we 
seem not to understand as it affects our use of the 
photograph. Somehow our myth system about photos 
helps us to forget that the photo is not the pattern. 
Somehow we tend to think of a photograph not as 
something we use-as evidence, to illustrate pattern, 
to inform ourselves, or to make statements with-but 
as something we call "truth" or "reality." 
One should distinguish between the photo as a rec-
ord about culture and the photo as a record of cul-
ture. One should also distinguish between using a me-
dium and studying how a medium is used. In terms of 
the camera, the distinction I want to emphasize is that 
between the scientists' use of the camera as a tool to 
collect data about culture and studying how the cam-
era is used by members of a culture. This distinction 
is 1 feel, central to understanding the work done with 
th,is medium of communication in the last 80 years. On 
one level the photo is an aide-memoire to the scien-
tist, equ~l to his pencil, notebook, or typewriter. It is 
not- as we now know, from recent work by Chalfen 
(1975), Ruby (1975), and others-merely a bunch of 
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snapshots or home movies made by an anthropologist. 
In the hands of well-trained observers it has become a 
tool for recording, not the truth of what is out there but 
the truth of what is in there, in the anthropologist's 
mind as a trained observer puts observations of "out 
there" on record. Photography as a record about cul-
ture spans the distance from the casual snapshot, 
which reminds one of what a house or an informant 
looked like, to the systematic work of a Mead, a Bate-
son, or a Birdwhistell. And here I must emphasize that 
it is not their photography that is important, but their 
analysis of it. The reason their photographs and films 
are records is that they were taken in ways which al-
lowed them to be analyzed so as to illustrate patterns 
observed by scientists who knew what they were look-
ing for. 
Let us now turn to the second level of analysis: the 
analysis of photographs and films as records of cul-
ture-as objects and events which can be studied in 
the context of the culture within which they were used. 
The photographs and films analyzed in this way are 
understood to be parts of culture in their own right, just 
as conversations, novels, plays, and other symbolic 
behavior have been understood to be. Here I am talk-
ing about looking at how someone takes a photograph 
or puts together an advertisement as well as a movie. 
One is concerned at this level, for example, with find-
ing patterns of moviemaking by anthropologists, phys-
icists, and Hollywood entrepreneurs, by college stu-
dents, by " artists, " by people using 8-mm cameras in 
our own culture as well as by Navajo Indians or mem-
bers of any other group who are making photos or 
movies for purposes of their own. 
Here one looks for patterns dealing with, for ex-
ample, what can be photographed and what cannot, 
what content can be displayed, was actually dis-
played, and how that display was organized and struc-
tured. Was it arranged according to how these people 
tell stories? To how they speak, or to the very lan-
guage and grammar that they use? Recent work by 
one of my students, Earl Higgins, seems to indicate 
that, even among the congenitally deaf, the ''gram-
mar'' and related patterns of their sign language influ-
ence how speakers of American Sign Language struc-
ture films that they make. 
Here again, although Margaret Mead was not the 
first to think of examining photography and films in this 
way, she articulated the ideas and related them to an 
understanding of culture in a larger and systematic 
way. Mead, in the study of Culture at a Distance (Mead 
and Metraux 1953, based on work done in the 40s) 
pulls together the work of a larger group of people who 
were using symbolic events produced by members of 
a culture to find patterns of that culture. 
"Films, " she wrote, "being group products, have 
proved to be more immediately useful for the analysis 
of culture than have individual literary works.'' In this 
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book she included the first set of systematic analyses 
of films by a group concerned with looking for cultural 
forms and the patterns evidenced in them. This work 
provided a cornerstone on which almost all the content 
analysis1 of our current mass media rests. The devel-
opment of the cultural indicator program (Gerbner 
1972, Gerbner and Gross 1976) and the ongoing anal-
ysis of mass media and particularly TV content are the 
fruits, it seems to me, of one direction developed from 
the notion that the photograph, in still or motion picture 
form, can be a record of culture in its own right, to be 
studied for its own patterns within specific cultural 
contexts. 
The term "visual anthropology," coined after World 
War II, became associated with conceptualizations 
keyed to using cameras to make records about cul-
ture. Visual anthropology did not connote the study of 
how cameras, and pictures in general, were used 
within the context of a culture. The term did not seem 
to connote studies that led us to ask what we could 
learn about a culture by studying what the members of 
a society made pictures of, how they made them, and 
in what contexts they made and looked at them. 
The idea of modes of symbolic communication de-
signed to articulate a variety of symbolic worlds is not 
new ro social science. Cassirer, Wharf, and many oth-
ers discussed the idea that symbols and symbol sys-
tems, language, myth, stories, and conversation, as 
well as poems, sonatas, plays, films, murals, and nov-
els, create a multiplicity of worlds. 
Nelson Goodman (1968) addressed himself to this 
line of speculation at a meeting commemorating the 
1 OOth anniversary of Cassirer's birth. He asks a set of 
questions that I would like to use to discuss some of 
the current issues we face in an ethnography of visual 
communication. He asks, ''In just what sense are there 
many worlds? What distinguishes genuine from 
spurious worlds? What are worlds made of? How are 
they made, and what roles do symbols play in their 
making?" I think that it is only recently that we have 
been able to apply these questions to an endeavor we 
call anthropology, to a mode I call pictorial-visual, and 
to a concept that has come to be called communica-
tion. It was Margaret Mead who helped, not only by 
her work but by her teaching and her encouragement 
of the work of others, to integrate those three con-
cepts: anthropology, communication, and the visual-
pictorial mode. 
When in 1963 (Worth 1964) I began to point out 
that films and photographs made by such diverse 
groups as students in college, people in their homes, 
or mental patients in hospitals could be looked at as 
ways in which these different people structured their 
worlds, rather than as "true images" of the world, I 
thought I was merely bringing a truism about drawing 
and painting up to date. Most people who talked 
knowledgeably about pictures in 1 963 accepted the 
fact that Picasso drew the way he did because he 
meant to structure his pictures that way, not because 
he could not draw like Norman Rockwell, or even the 
way he himself drew in other periods. True, Roman Ja-
kobson in 1950 pointed out that most people wanted 
pictures to look like a Norman Rockwell-what we now 
call photographic or snapshot realism- and were dis-
turbed by abstract painting. Jakobson ascribed this 
both to the fact that most people were ignorant about 
the conventions of painting and to the strength of con-
ventions about pictures-when they were known. He, 
himself, it seems, tended to believe that the "natural" 
way to know pictures was to know what they repre-
sented; that to draw abstractly, or in nonrepresenta-
tional or non-Western patterns, was somehow to act 
unnaturally. Interestingly, it was the early Russian film-
makers and film theorists- Eisenstein, Dovzhenko, 
and Pudovkin-who, following the Russian formalist 
linguistic theories, first pointed out that films struc-
tured reality just as speech did; that patterns of im-
ages, like patterns of sounds, were worthy of study. 
But so strong was the myth of photographic reality that 
even a Roman Jakobson could feel that representation 
was the natural way to make pictures. 
For many leading social scientists today, as well as 
for our students, visual anthropology means taking 
photos, photo records, movies, ethnographic movies, 
and film footage-all for research. These labels carry a 
descending aura of science about them. Film footage, 
unorganized but uncut, is considered the most scien-
tific and therefore the truest because it captures ''real 
behavior'' presumably untouched by human eye or 
brain-a pure record. An ethnographic movie or a 
documentary movie is the least scientific, not only 
touched but sometimes, it seems, tainted by human 
consciousness and often damaged as a scientific 
document by something called "art." As recently as 
last year, the chairman of the Department of Sociology 
at Columbia University wrote in The New York 
Times-in shock-that a documentary film about the 
Yerkes Primate Laboratory expressed the filmmaker's 
biased view of the subject, still nai"vely stating that he 
expects something called a neutral, unbiased, objec-
tive view in a film shown on television. The director of 
the laboratory-who gave permission to the filmmaker 
to make a movie to be shown on television- expressed 
anger that the film did not portray the "truth" about 
the laboratory. He too evinced shocked dismay that 
the filmmaker presented his own personal view of what 
he observed in the laboratory-that the act of making a 
movie allowed such a "distortion." 
There is no point, however, in taking a position that 
if film is not "objective truth" there is no use to it. 
Many ethnologists have provided us with stills and mo-
tion pictures which they and others have used to artic-
ulate some of the most important statements about 
culture made in recent years. I am arguing that there is 
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great value in visually recorded data about behavior 
and culture- so long as we know what it is that we re-
corded, so long as we are aware of how and by what 
rules we chose our subject matter, and so long as we 
are aware of and make explicit how we organized the 
various units of film from which we will do our analysis. 
Let us return to Cassirer and Goodman's concept 
that symbolic events produce different works and dif-
ferent worlds. Faced with such a concept, and most 
specifically with the fact that pieces of film- no matter 
how made-are patterned constructions, structured, at 
best, by a trained mind, the truth-seeker through film 
becomes confused, dogmatic, and angry. It is hard 
enough for some people to believe that an analysis is a 
construction, a structuring of reality. Most of us simply 
do not want to face the fact that what we loosely call 
primary photographic data is also a structured event. 
A photograph, just as any picture, is constrained both 
by who made it and how it is made, as well as by what 
it is a picture of. It should be obvious that, just as pic 
tures are not simple mirrors of what is out there, nei-
ther are they artifacts which have no relation what-
soever to what they are pictures of. The ethnographic 
photographer is free to take a picture of anything his 
system allows him to photograph, but he is also con-
strained by the fact that he must point the camera at 
some objects in the world "out there." These things 
out there also constrain what the picture will be like. 
While "out there" does not determine what the photo 
will look like, it is obviously not irrelevant. In one sense 
we want as many different worlds as possible, and in 
another the fact that symbols and signs can best be 
used to construct different worlds poses almost in-
soluble scientific problems. In order to distinguish gen-
uine from spurious worlds we slip into the belief that 
cameras record reality, that reality is true, and that film 
recordings are therefore ''truth.'' 
This fantasy about symbols suffers from the error of 
imposing logic-like or logical-sounding rules upon a 
domain that is governed by a set of rules that may not 
be like those of logic. For example, one basic conven-
tion of logic states that a true conclusion cannot be 
drawn from a ¥alse premise. Researchers who want to 
use film as a record of behavior want it to be the case 
that from a true premise-a picture or photo-
graph-one cannot draw a false conclusion; that is, 
that from "true" films one cannot get "false" data. 
One introductory lecture in logic should be enough to 
make any student see that this is not the case. Unfor-
tunately, false conclusions can be drawn from any-
thing, and getting the "truth" on film, even if it were 
possible, will not guarantee the subsequent analysis or 
the conclusions drawn from it. 
Suppose we agree that pictures and films can be 
used as illustrations of pattern- of how films them-
selves are structured as well as of how people and 
their behavior in films are structured. Suppose we 
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agree that symbolic events produce symbolic worlds, 
and that these worlds are not (for the moment) to be 
thought of as either true or false but rather as commu-
nicative articulations. Suppose we think of a film, 
whether it be footage without editing or footage after 
editing, as the way the maker of the film structures the 
world that he or she presents to us. Our job as view-
ers, then, is first to determine what he means by the 
film he shows us. A mere recording without conscious 
selection, emphasis, and instruction by the filmmaker 
is more often confusing than illuminating. The viewer 
of such a recording ''knows'' that an inanimate cam-
era did not expose the film and decide what to shoot 
and how to shoot it. If the film does not instruct us how 
to interpret it, or if it is not constructed in a way that al-
lows us to use conventional techniques for inter-
pretation in that medium, we most often ignore the 
film, or treat it as an annoyance. Ray Birdwhistell, with 
whom I have watched too few films, has often said to 
me, "I can't stand watching most so-called ethno-
graphic movies. The man who made it won't tell me 
what he's doing. I'd rather look at behavior as it occurs 
and not have to spend all my time trying to guess how, 
when, and for what reasons a filmmaker made a movie 
of it." 
Seven years ago, again led by Margaret Mead, a 
group of researchers interested in both records about 
culture and records of culture met and decided that 
our concerns could best be clarified by founding a new 
organization, with its own journal. Margaret Mead 
helpecJ us to set up the Society for the Anthropology of 
Visual Communication, as part of the American An-
thropology Association, and the National Anthropolog-
ical Film Center at the Smithsonian Institution. 
The kinds of problems that our members study in-
clude all the ones that I have mentioned, for there are 
indeed still not enough systematic records about the 
cultures of the world that can be used to illustrate pat-
terns of culture, as well as the newer ones I will be 
talking about in a moment. 
In developing a history of the shift from visual an-
thropology to the anthropology of visual communica-
tion, and in trying to understand Margaret Mead's role 
in this development, it is most important to understand 
that the study of culture is not accomplished by pitting 
symbolic worlds against one another. Those of us who 
are involved in using photos and films as new tech-
nologies through which we can record cultural arti-
facts and events, and those of us who are involved in 
studying how pictures are put together to make state-
ments about this world, are equally concerned with 
how this particular symbol form-the picture-can be 
of use in the study of culture. We include scholars 
such as Richard Sorenson (1976) and Jay Ruby 
(1975, 1976), who are struggling to delineate theories 
of the photograph as evidence, as well as those who 
are following up on the work that John Adair and I 
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(Worth and Adair 1972) did when we gave movie cam-
eras to Navajo Indians to see how their patterns of 
structuring differed from or resembled ours. Most re-
cently, Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Commu-
nication devoted a complete issue to a study by Erving 
Gottman of values and social attitudes about gender 
that can be derived from an analysis of some 500 ad-
vertising photographs (Gottman 1976). 
Some of us are arguing that it is as silly to ask 
whether a film is true or false as it is to ask whether a 
grammar is true or false. Or whether a performance of 
a Bach sonata or a Beatles song is true or false. The 
confusion about the use of pictures, in social science 
particularly, arises out of the fact that, although sym-
bol systems are designed to articulate many worlds, 
our way of thinking about such systems allows us, 
even compels us in certain contexts, to ask, "Are you 
trying to tell us that all symbolic worlds are equally 
true, equally correct, equally right in their portrayal of 
the 'real world'?'' 
One can indeed ask if a particular grammar is a 
useful description of how people talk. One can ask 
whether that sonata was written by B~ch or whether 
that was a Beatles song. If the notion of a grammar is 
understood to be an articulation, a statement about 
how people talk, one can ask in what ways it corre-
sponds to how people do talk. But this requires that we 
conceive of a grammar, a performance, or a film as a 
statement or a description of and about something. It 
requires that we understand that the grammar or the 
film is not a copy of the world out there but someone 's 
statement about the world. 
Acknowledging this, some of our younger col-
leagues are beginning to study such things as how 
home movies are made as a social event, as well as 
what they mean as a semantic event. We are looking, 
as Chalfen (1975) has done, into how home movies 
and photo albums are displayed and exhibited, to 
whom, and for what social purposes. Ruby has begun 
to study the patterns apparent in the photos that most 
anthropologists make in the field. Here he finds that in 
most cases they are indistinguishable from those 
made by journalists. That, in fact, while their written 
ethnographies do in fact differ from journalists' reports 
or travelers ' letters home, their photographs do not. 
For the most part, anthropologists and (as Howard 
Becker [1974] has shown) sociologists are profes-
sional scientists-verbally only. When it comes to the 
visual mode of articulation and data-gathering, most 
produce ~napshots, documentary films, good (or bad) 
home movies, or "artistic" works. It is 40 years since 
Bate son and Mead took their photographs in Bali and, 
sad to say, in that 40-year period there have not been 
many social scientists who have been trained in what 
they developed. 
The framework of the anthropology of visual com-
munication suggests that symbolic worlds are pat-
terned and amenable to being studied in a larger 
framework than pictures. Primarily, this framework 
helps us to look at pictures as that aspect of culture 
called communication. It suggests that we treat pic-
tures as statements, articulated by artists, informants, 
scientists, housewives, and even movie and TV pro-
ducers. We can ask what the articulator meant, and 
then we can ask whether our interpretation of what 
was meant is good, bad, beautiful, ugly, and so on. But 
by asking whether our interpretation of what was 
meant is true, we are, I am afraid, merely asking 
whether we guessed right. What we should be trying to 
understand is how and why and in what context a par-
ticular articulator structured his particular statement 
about the world. 
Treating film (the camera and celluloid) as a copy of 
the world, rather than as materials with which to make 
statements about the world, forces us into the impos-
sible position of asking whether performance is true. 
Understanding that photos and films are statements 
rather than copies or reflections enables us to look ex-
plicitly, as some of us are now doing, at the various 
ways we have developed of picturing the world. 2 
The parameters along which we deal with state-
ments are many. Anthropology is in some sense a set 
of questions about human behavior. Ethnography is in 
some sense a method by which certain kinds of ques-
tions can be answered. By considering pictures and all 
behavior in the visual mode as possible communica-
tion acts, and by understanding that these acts can 
produce only statements or assertions about the world 
rather than copies of it, we are enabled to consider the 
kinds of anthropology we want to do about the visual 
pictorial forms that we can and do use. In this kind of 
anthropology we want to consider both how the photo-
graph and the film can be used as evidence by the sci-
entist and how people actually have used it as evi-
dence, as document, as entertainment, and as art. 
It is only within this framework that we are able to 
return to Pat Loud 's questions with which I opened this 
discussion. Margaret Mead actually did influence that 
"show," just as she did influence this paper. Craig Gil-
bert, the producer of The American Family, was also 
the producer of Margaret Mead's New Guinea Journal. 
Gilbert spend a great deal of time talking with Dr. 
Mead about films and about culture while he accom-
panied her on her return trip to some of the places she 
studied in the past. He learned from her that one 
American family well observed might reveal or, in her 
words, " illustrate" a pattern about American families. 
The patterns that he observed and the way they are 
structured are his and his cameramen's and editors'. 
The idea of trying to present them on film was learned 
from Dr. Mead. 
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Pat Loud said it "didn't work," that when she saw it 
she felt herself ''shrinking in defense.'' She felt that 
she had been "ground through the media machine" 
and ''treated as an object.'' Then she said she would 
do it again if it did what the producer said it would do. 
Craig Gilbert had told her that by showing one family 
he could show a pattern that might be true of many 
American families. 
We know now that it was not the editing that pre-
vented the programs from ''working.'' We have tried to 
reedit some of that footage. We have invited Mrs. Loud 
to do it herself. It seems to be the case that it cannot 
be done so that it does not look as if it were produced 
as a drama or a soap opera for TV. Because it is on 
TV. And TV does not present the truth any more than 
film does, or than film editors do. It presents, we now 
know, a structured version of what someone saw, pre-
sented in a context-television-of drama, soap opera, 
sporting events, ''news,'' and commercials. We have 
learned how to interpret what we see on TV. If we were 
to study that footage in other ways and not show it on 
television, we might find patterns that would illustrate 
other structures-other worlds. 
Learning how to study something as complex as a 
1 2-hour film put together from 200 hours of film based 
on 400 hours of observation is part of the study we are 
now calling the anthropology of visual communication. 
There are now heated controversies about whether 
Mrs. Loud and her family were fooled, whether (leav-
ing television aside) sociologists and anthropologists 
have the right to photograph real people for their stud-
ies. Again, in 1936, and reported as early as the sec-
ond page of Growth and Culture, Dr. Mead faced this 
question. She wrote, "I have used real names through-
out. The people knew we were studying and photo-
graphing their children; indeed, they often helped set 
the stage for an afternoon's photography. Very cau-
tiously, but quite definitely, they gave us permission to 
live among them and there is no need to blur their con-
tribution by disguise or subterfuge.'' Adair and I fol-
lowed this advice in our own work among the Navajo, 
first getting their permission and then acknowledging 
their great contribution. They were in their own films 
and they wanted to be seen. We can tell what would 
have happened had the press and assembled academ-
ics called them primitive, selfish, cruel. As we have de-
scribed in our book about this project, they themselves 
did not think of their films as the truth about Navajos. 
Their films were true about, as one of them put it, 
"how you tell a story." Those of us interested in the 
anthropology of visual communication are trying to 
find ways to study how people can and do depict man-
kind, oneself, and others in all their diversity. 
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In 1967, I returned from the field with 1 2,000 feet, 
480,000 single frames of exposed film, and 7 movies 
made by Navajo Indians. I was looking for patterns, but 
I was overwhelmed (as so many researchers are when 
they return from the field) by the masses of observa-
tions and possible data I had collected. The patterns 
were far from clear in my mind. I was tired. Dr. Mead 
asked me to show some of the films and talk about my 
research to her class. I did. The next day after break-
fast, she quietly set up the projector, pulled up her 
typewriter, and asked me to start going over the foot-
age with her. I had worked with this material for over a 
year. Margaret Mead began to teach me how to find 
patterns in it. When I finally said something like, "I 
know that, why do we have to keep going over it?,'' 
she replied somewhat tartly, "Sol, you begin with in-
tuition, but you can't rest your case upon it. You must 
build upon it and make clear to others the patterns that 
seem clear to you." 
This paper is my continued attempt to follow that 
advice. Doing the anthropology of visual communica-
tion is an attempt by a large group of students of com-
munication and anthropology to find methods and the-
ories by which they too can make clear the patterns 
that they discover and create. 
Notes 
1 For a more detailed exposition of the relation of content analysis to the 
analysis of culture through pictures, see Editor's Introduction to Erving 
Goffman'c " Gender Advertisements" in Studies in the Anthropology of 
Visual Communication 3(2). 
2 For a specific study of how advertisements picture the world, see 
Goffman 1976. 
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Studying the Home Mode: An Exploration of Family 
Photography and Visual Communication 
Christopher Musello 
Family photographs fill the desk drawers, albums, 
walls, attic chests, and closeted boxes of our homes in 
ways that personal diaries, writings, or documents 
never have and perhaps never will. They are produced 
in this country at a prodigious rate- Wolfman (1974) 
estimated the output of amateur photographs in 1973 
at over 6 billion-and picturetaking is widely consid-
ered an appropriate activity in a broad range of social 
events in the family. As a craft, it is transmitted largely 
on an informal basis through word of mouth and imita-
tion. Its products are employed unself-consciously in 
an ongoing process to meet daily needs, interest, and 
obligations. Family photography is a pervasive and 
sustained form of symbolic behavior producing a vast 
resource of "native documentation." Folklorists, soci-
ologist, psychologists, anthropologists, and others 
have not surprisingly been drawn to these materials 
both as statements about social life and personal ex-
perience and as data of culture (ct. Worth 1972). 
Studies attempting to articulate a system for decoding 
these materials have proliferated, and speculation 
about their functions and significance is quite exten-
sive. Yet actual fieldwork examining the nature and us-
age of family photography and the conditions which 
support and produce it is limited. This paper reports 
on a research project designed to produce a general 
description of family photography as it is pursued in 
daily life and to examine its properties as a form of 
documentation and communication (Musella 1977). 
I have sought here to systematically describe and 
characterize home mode photography1 as a rule-gov-
erned and socially patterned communicative process. 
This is an ethnographic approach to visual communi-
cation, which examines photography as social activity 
and photographs as the symbolic artifacts of that ac-
tivity. From this perspective the researcher examines 
who uses the medium, in what contexts, for what pur-
poses, and under what social and cultural rules, con-
ventions, and restrictions (Worth 1976; Chalfen 197 4). 
Patterns in photographic activity (photographs and 
picturetaking) are sought as well as the interrelation of 
these patterns with context and function (ct. Hymes 
197 4). The research finds its antecedents in Worth's 
ethnographic studies of visual codes (Worth and Adair 
1972; Worth 197 4) and in Hymes' ethnographies of 
communication (1964; 197 4) and subordinates the ex-
amination of film codes and cognitive/perceptual as-
pects of the mediation to the study of the social behav-
ior and activities which produce these forms. Films 
and photographs are regarded as being shaped by so-
Christopher Musella is a Doctoral Candidate in Com-
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photographs and the study of material culture as com-
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cial norms rather than psychological or technical vari-
ables (Chalfen 197 4; 1975a). 
For the descriptive purposes of this study, commu-
nication activities and their artifacts will be analyzed 
through a structure of events and components. These 
descriptive units have been adopted and expanded 
from Chalfen's (197 4) sociovidistic framework to pro-
vide for a more thorough description of still photog-
raphy activities. They include: (1) planning, (2a) be-
hind-camera shooting, (2b) on-camera shooting, (3) 
processing, (4) editing, and (5) exhibition. These units 
are to be described in integral relation to a set of five 
communicational components: (1) participants, (2) set-
tings, (3) topics, (4) message form, and (5) code. Each 
conceptual unit will be explained below. The events 
and components yield a grid of thirty relationships for 
systematic analysis (see Table 1) through which we 
can "delineate the structural qualities of both the sym-
bolic forms per se and the social activity and relation-
ships that surround the production and use of the vi-
sual forms'' (Chalfen 1976:42). 
At the time of this study2 the methodology had been 
applied only to an examination of teen-age filmmaking 
and home moviemaking (Chalfen 197 4; 1975a). In ap-
plying it in this study, my intention has been to provide 
an initial description of home mode still photography 
and an evaluation of its communicational functions, 
both for the particular data it might yield about the 
mode and as a necessary base from which to assess 
its value as a data source. 
A sample of twelve families was used for the study; 
eight of the families completed a full interview sched-
ule averaging five to six hours, while members of four 
families were interviewed for less time. The sample 
size is too small to establish trends or patterns; ac-
cordingly, informants were chosen fortuitously. The 
families were all Euro-American, predominantly middle 
class; all had children, and marriages ranged from 
three to thirty years' duration. Two sources of data 
were relied upon: interviews and observation. The in-
terviews involved two phases: (1) directed interviews 
with the families aimed at characterizing the events 
and components of their photographic processes and 
(2) discussion and analysis of both those images 
which the families had produced and those made by 
others but included in their collections. Family mem-
bers were asked to describe, discuss, and evaluate a 
sample of photographs from each storage and display 
unit, and to explore the distinctions between these 
units, their criteria for evaluating their images, and 
their functions and formal/syntactic intentions in 
shooting particular photographs. Observation focused 
on family interactions in viewing pictures (in all cases 
the parents were observed in the activity, while in five 
cases these occasions evolved into full family events), 
and on the relation of informants' statements about 
their photographs, to what the researcher saw in the 
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Table 1 
The Sociovidistic Framework 
Planning 
Shooting: 
on-camera 
behind-
camera 
Processing 
Editing 
Exhibiting 
Participants 
pictures. This resulted in a survey of photograph col-
lections, with an analysis of who shoots, who the par-
ticipants are, what the settings are, and what the top-
ics and code features are. 
The Events of the Home Mode 
The approach in this study has been to take a detailed 
look at the ways in which individual families integrate 
the photographic medium into family life and experi-
ence. The method is qualitative rather than quan-
titative, and no pretence to sample validity or quan-
titative measures is implied. Nonetheless, in the 
following pages generalizations regarding the nature 
of the mode will be drawn from patterns and con-
sistencies observed in the practices of the families 
studied. As such, the value of these findings will lie 
less in general verifiability (although it is felt that many 
of the findings here will be borne out by further sys-
tematic research) than in implications regarding how 
the mode is employed and in its properties as a com-
municative form. The analysis will begin with a dis-
cussion of the events of the home mode. 
The home mode events include the full range of be-
haviors, activities, or performances surrounding the 
production, organization, and use of family photo-
graphs. Through the description of these events we lo-
cate the photographs within the flow of interpersonal 
interactions and the social contexts from which they 
take their form and significance. 
Settings Topics Message Form Code 
Planning Events 
These events incorporate any activity or performances 
in which decisions are made about when to take pic-
tures, of what to take pictures, and how to take them. 
We are dealing here not only with choices and deci-
sions made in direct anticipation of, or in response to, 
a ''picturemaking'' event, but also with any decisions 
made prior to the event which would affect when 
people are likely and able to take pictures. Factors 
here would include when film is kept on hand, the 
number and accessibility of cameras, when they are 
"brought along," and choice of film. 
A family's "preparedness" to shoot may be consid-
ered a form of planning, be it conscious or not. In 
these terms, most families in this study claimed to have 
film and cameras readily available and to use film 
slowly and keep rolls in cameras for extended periods. 
Choice of camera may also become a factor, particu-
larly as the small automatic-type cameras now popular 
have not only induced many to shoot who would not 
have before but have also permitted many to shoot 
where and when they formerly could not, on hiking 
trips, for example. Most of the families do not own 
flash equipment and resist its perceived difficulties; as 
a result many families' picturetaking was restricted pri-
marily to outdoor settings. Planning in this mode was 
never found to be extensive; rather, choices and deci-
sions were made piecemeal, often without relation to 
one another. 
As to planning in the more formal sense, people 
generally carry a camera only when they have a pur-
pose; few subjects in this sample carried cameras sim-
ply to be prepared for pictures, except perhaps on va-
cations. This planning, however, is of a general nature, 
never more than a broad notion of occasions and sub-
ject matters to be documented. Planning exists to the 
extent that people are predisposed to shoot certain 
things at certain times by their sense of the purposes 
and appropriate uses of photography. Thus, each tam-
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ily stated at minimum that they planned to shoot and 
carried the camera on "special occasions" and 
''whenever the family was going somewhere,'' usually 
listing a repertoire of typical and perhaps necessary 
events destined for the family document. The list uni-
formly included such events as Christmas, birthdays, 
Easter, vacations, and family gatherings. 
Planning thus might extend to occasions and gen-
eral subject matters (most often people), but beyond a 
decision to shoot a great number of pictures to cover 
mistakes or to provide extras for distribution, any plan-
ning regarding specific shots or techniques to be used 
in shooting was rare among home moders. The consis-
tent exception was "traditional" pictures. These in-
cluded both specific repeated pictures and shots of 
traditional events planned for each year at regular in-
tervals, often taken in a fixed setting in a consistent 
format. 3 
Finally, a generalizea, discriminating sensibility 
might also develop over time to condition shooting. For 
as people view their photographs and become aware 
of preferences, interests, and problems in viewing, 
they occasionally develop prescriptive and pro-
scriptive plans for future shooting of similar events. 
Adjustments of this kind include instances where 
people found their collections to be "repetitive and 
boring,'' and reduced shooting, or when they found 
the need for reference points in slide shows and so 
planned the inclusion of street and place signs. 
Planning was limited as a conscious process and 
little time was spent on it. Several subjects stated that 
planning "never works," and most did not even feel 
that it was necessarily desirable. For beyond making 
provision for the coverage of a small structure of 
events and people, value was placed on "catching" 
the unanticipated, the spontaneous, and the candid. 
Planning, therefore, seems largely a matter of routine 
or patterned predispositions and habits in this mode 
that influence the ability to, and likelihood of, taking 
pictures as well as any decisions concerning what and 
when to shoot. 
Shooting Events 
The shooting event is divided into two elements, be-
hind-camera and on-camera, in order to allow for a 
more precise characterization of the message form. 
However, it should be understood that these analyti-
cally distinguished activities constitute aspects of but 
one interactive process. 
Behind-camera events. These events incorporate 
any activities or behaviors not on-camera which struc-
ture the use of the camera. They include camera tech-
niques, the maker's "shooting aesthetic," and all ef-
forts ~o direct subjects being photographed. They also 
include consideration of patterns and tendencies in 
shooting which develop and/or persist over time. 
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Most home moders feel they ''just take pictures.'' 
As with the planning events, and with essentially all 
events of the home mode, primary attention lies not in 
the elements and processes of mediation, but rather in 
the subject matter. In most instances this orientation is 
based on an "understanding" of photography as a 
mechanical and "realistic" form of recording. As fam-
ily photographers' understanding and use of the me-
dium become more complex, they may actively incor-
porate technical/aesthetic considerations and at times 
even aspire to an "artful" depiction of their subjects. 
Indeed, the range of skills evidenced in the use of the 
camera by family photographers may be extremely 
broad, as can their critical vocabulary and their for-
mal/syntactic appreication of the medium. However, 
despite these skills or suggested competence, the 
family photographers in this sample generally set out 
simply to "record" what was before their cameras, 
thus applying a greatly simplified set of standards to 
their shooting while concerning themselves primarily 
with on-camera activities. 
Formal manipulation or evaluation seems essentially 
irrelevant to home moders, although some minimal fac-
tors may be consciously attended to in the service of 
this "recording" process. "Centering" is the factor 
most frequently considered; ''background,'' ''getting 
all of the subject in," "getting detail" in faces, compo-
sition, and proper lighting follow. Although many of the 
family photographers mistrusted their ability to get 
what they wanted, all of them expressed a preference 
for simply shooting ''a lot,'' particularly on important 
occasions. 
Home moders' shooting might nonetheless be char-
acterized by loosely defined ''styles,'' to be seen in 
terms of the relationship between cameraman and 
subject; the distinct expectations for, and efforts in-
vested in, each form of shooting; and the pattern of 
component considerations which influence each. The 
most prevalent style, in this sense, is the posed pic-
ture, even though the families uniformly expressed a 
preference for spontaneous, "natural" images. This 
method was generally prescribed by home moders for 
portraits, "serious and formal occasions," and "spe-
, cia I events,'' but was most often resorted to for the 
control it afforded. Many home moders feel candid 
shooting is simply too difficult and are willing to sacri-
fice "naturalness" for control. As a result, when pos-
ing pictures, most photographers claim to feel a re-
sponsibility for ''the total picture'' including 
background, lighting, composition, and the arrange-
ment or direction of subjects. Yet in most instances the 
pose is used simply to fix the subject without the sub-
sequent effort at formal control. 
The aim of the candid/spontaneous style, by con-
trast, is to minimize the photographer's intrusion 
through shooting discreetly in order to "catch" the 
"everyday," the "typical," and the "natural.,, Control 
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of formal elements is not expected here, and many 
photographers in fact claimed that candid shooting es-
sentially "exonerates" them of responsibility for any 
technical considerations. Luck, timing, and patience 
are generally felt to be the photographer's tools for 
these purposes, and while photographers at times di-
rected subjects to ignore them, they generally relied 
on surprising subjects in one way or another. 
The interactive/spontaneous style of shooting dif-
fers from the candid most dramatically in its intent and 
approach to the subject. The image resulting from this 
style will most often appear to be merely a candid 
shot. But, as opposed to the candid/spontaneous 
style, the photographer actively intrudes with his cam-
era here as an element of, or even to stimulate, an in-
teraction between cameraman and subject. Frequently 
in these events the photograph is of secondary impor-
tance to the interaction that motivated it. As with sur-
prise candid shooting, this approach is directed pri-
marily at close friends or family ("someone who won't 
get mad at me''), and it tends to occur in group shoot-
ing situations or as people are "fooling around" or 
"sneaking up on" or "joking" with one another. This 
is perhaps the least-used shooting approach, but it is 
significant in the shooting of those families who photo-
graph one another most informally, have the least rigid 
concept of the functions and "proper" uses of photog-
raphy, and generally enjoy shooting. In this sense, fur-
ther research may find this style of shooting predictive 
of a particular family orientation to photography. 
These styles of shooting are not presented as origi-
nal or precise formulations, but rather suggest com-
mon strategies employed by home moders when pho-
tographing friends and family. Their significance lies in 
the patterning they establish in the use of the camera 
with respect to the relations between subject and 
photographer; to the expectations they establish in 
photographer and viewer alike for control and "inten-
tionality" on the maker's part; and to the convention-
alized assumptions of the "appropriateness" of the 
different forms for different topics and participants. 
Home moders, for example, would not sneak up on the 
bride and groom at the altar to surprise them with a 
picture. The camera styles affected in behind-camera 
activities, then, are shaped and patterned by social 
convention, and they in turn play an important part in 
broadly shaping what and how home moders will pho-
tograph. 
Figure 1 An Easter photograph. (Courtesy of Sam and Anna 
Fannelli) 
Another patterning of the shooting event is more 
readily seen in the various "shooting routines" family 
photographers establish in the treatment of recurring 
subjects. Easter, for example, is frequently recorded 
in pictures of children with new outfits (Figure 1 ). 
Christmas is recorded through a structure of secular 
events including snapshots of the tree and unopened 
presents and of the children opening the gifts and dis-
playing them (Figure 2). Consistencies in these rou-
tines could be identified in the entire sample of fami-
lies. 
Shooting was also structured at times by explicit or 
implicit attempts to construct narratives documenting 
trips or special events and by a technique consistently 
employed by home moders that might be called "con-
figurational shooting.'' This photographic routine was 
frequently employed at births, weddings, family gath-
erings, and other special occasions (Figures 3a and 
b). It involved posing participants in a number of com-
binations in order to depict a variety of associations, 
relationships, and bonds. 
Finally, this research has suggested that the quan-
tity, techniques, and subject matters of shooting vary 
interdependently over time. It was observed that when 
parents are young they produce the most photographs 
and that shooting will often be at its peak during the 
first years of the first-born's life and taper off after 
three to six years. Picturetaking may then decline 
completely or continue at a minimal level until a resur-
gence occurs as the children reach their late teens, 
and the family begins to travel and/or grandchildren 
arrive. In many cases shooting was at its most informal 
and spontaneous with younger photographers, who of-
ten shot "interactively" and covered a comparatively 
broad range of subjects. With marriage and the birth of 
the first child, shooting most often became increas-
ingly family-oriented and focused overwhelmingly on 
the child. Photography of the first-born is perhaps the 
least structured, as parents shoot continually and 
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Figure 2 An album page of Christmas photographs. (Courtesy 
of John and Arlene Westphal) 
27 
28 studies in Visual Communication 
Figure 3 (a and bJ "Configurational shooting." (Courtesy of 
Richard and Martha Perkins; Donald Gribbons) 
spontaneously, but as the baby grows and successive 
children arrive, shooting may become perfunctory, 
relying heavily on posing. We can also note that with 
the oldest families in this study, shooting of the grand-
children seemed similar, both in intent and technique, 
to the shooting of the first-borns. 4 
While family photographers generally consider their 
shooting spontaneous and responsive to the subjects 
of the moment, their shooting seems to be patterned 
and more rule-governed than they believe it to be. And 
while these photographers attend only minimally to 
formal manipulation of the medium's code elements, 
conventional strategies for using the camera, and 
shared routines and notions regarding how one "ap-
propriately'' takes pictures, serve to structure both 
what and how family photographers photograph. 
On-camera events. As previously mentioned, all 
photographs in which the subject is aware that he or 
she is being photographed represent a collaboration 
between the subject and the image maker. In this anal-
ysis, the on-camera events focus on all those activities 
or behaviors which structure the subjects on-camera, 
including their own efforts to "present" themselves. 
It is overwhelmingly the case with home mode pho-
tography that the ultimate evaluation of a photograph 
will lie in the image's success as a likeness. How the 
image's subjects are presented, how they look, what 
they are doing, and how "funny," "typical," or "ap-
propriate'' their gestures and expressions may be are 
all significant as evaluative criteria. The behaviors of 
the subject and the moments at which they are fixed 
on film constitute, then, a major target of the symbolic 
manipulation in this mode. The shooting technique and 
environment of shooting will function significantly to 
shape these behaviors, but there is as well a complex 
of conventions, expectations, and behaviors attribut-
able to the on-camera event which influence and 
shape the final product. 
Most parents in the sample offered a paradigm for 
age- and sex-related behavioral expectations for chil-
dren vis-a-vis the camera. Young children are consid-
ered easiest to shoot, submitting to almost anything 
until they are three or four years old, when they learn 
to pose themselves. During childhood years kids are 
thought to be impatient but still "appreciative of the at-
tention, '' and boys are considered harder to pose and 
prevent from "mugging" than girls. It is generally 
agreed that children beyond age twelve are the most diffi-
cult and uncooperative subjects. While this model was 
not subjected to any systematic examination in this 
study, it nonetheless assumes significance as a widely 
shared "folk model" of expected and conventional 
sex- and age-typed photographic behavior. It can also 
be pointed out that the pattern of rising difficulty asso-
ciated with the aging of children seems consistent with 
the decline in spontaneous and continual shooting and 
the increasing reliance on posed pictures taken in a 
limited range of special events. 
Adults generally express little enthusiasm for having 
their pictures taken, especially as they gain weight or 
feel that they are showing signs of age. By convention, 
most prefer to be photographed when " looking good" 
and when able to control their presentation. It is not 
unusual for husbands and wives to restrict their shoot-
ing of each other. 
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The most salient and often commented-upon form 
of on-camera behavior is the pose. Many individuals 
frequently pose themselves without direction when a 
picture is to be taken, even if a candid shot is sought 
by the photographer. The positions struck have dem-
onstrated a marked consistency across families and 
contexts in the sample of this study, and it seems plau-
sible that a catalog of poses might successfully be de-
veloped. 5 The origin and nature of these poses as pho-
tographic behavior, and their relation to such 
characteristics as sex and age, bear further analysis. 
In Figure 4, for example, the poses are highly stylized 
and possibly imitative of conventional ''glamor'· poses 
of the time. They seem clearly sexually stereotyped. 
Such poses as seen in Figure 5 are also "stylized" 
and were associated consistently through the sample 
with young males. 
The studio pose represents an additional form of 
on-camera event. It is, however, largely an artifact of 
the photographer's direction and the specific conven-
tions guiding this event. And, finally, in spontaneous 
pictures the subject is granted greater leeway in move-
ment and behavior. "Mugging" is a frequent response 
and, generally speaking, each family has a member 
who consistently jokes and "makes faces" for the 
camera. 
Figure 4 A day at the 
beach. (Courtesy of 
George and Helene 
Dargaty) 
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Figure 5 Ia. b. and cJ An I I on-
camera" motif. (Courtesy 
of John and Arlene 
Westphal; Christopher 
Musella) 
This category, added to Chalfen's framework (197 4), 
incorporates any decisions, performances, and activi-
ties which determine and/ or shape when film may be 
developed, printed, and mounted; what film will be 
processed; and how it will be processed. While these 
events may seem to hold little relevance for film-
making, they must be regarded as a significant aspect 
of the symbolic manipulations inherent in the still pho-
tography medium. Initially, in this event all decisions 
regarding what is processed and how constitute a first 
phase of the editing events, and the decisions inherent 
to selection and manipulation of the printing process 
provide an order of control equivalent to that of the 
shooting event. For these reasons, then, processing 
events may be thought of as a distinct conceptual unit. 
It is one of the distinguishing features of this photo-
graphic genre that the families using it place little or no 
emphasis on processing events. In contrast to the "art 
photographer," for whom these processes are crucial, 
many families' knowledge is very limited here, and the 
processes are often considered largely beyond their 
control. Few of the families studied have ever even 
sought to return prints to processers when dissatisfied 
with results, and much of the time they were unable to 
judge whether deficiencies were the result of their 
shooting or of the processing. 
A number of home moders had, at one time or an-
other, developed and printed their own photographs, 
but these activities were never integrated for any sus-
tained period of time with the family's photography. 
Most often this involvement occurred when the individ-
ual was young, usually before the arrival of children, 
and was almost always adopted as a hobby associated 
with "artistic" photography, as distinct from family 
photography. There were some limited exceptions, but 
in no cases did the family members continue in this 
hobby for more than five years. 
Editing Events 
Editing occurs after processing and before the prod-
ucts are seen or displayed. It may involve accumulat-
ing, eliminating, or rearranging a series or group of im-
ages into a specific order or sequence. This category 
is expanded from Chalfen's (1974) formulation to con-
sider decisions about retaining pictures as well as 
those regarding the groupings, collections, or storage 
devices into which the pictures, slides, and negatives 
are sorted. Analysis must also account for where and 
how the images are stored and examine how they are 
ordered within the various forms of display and stor-
age. 
The editing event was considered important by the 
family photographers. They believed implicitly that the 
accumulation and assemblage of chronologically or-
dered photograph albums and slide trays was desir-
able and should be a steady, ongoing process. There 
was significant variation in attention and activity 
among families in the sample, but their efforts were 
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generally far below their expectations and were fre-
quently a source of disappointment or even embar-
rassment. 
Photographs potentially go through numerous edit-
ing phases in the home mode processes. When pic-
tures and slides are first received, they are "left out" 
for viewing by family members, and at this time a 
rough cut may be made in which "blank" or unrea-
dable images will be discarded. From this point slides 
will often be placed in carousels for storage, but pho-
tographs will most typically be shuffled off to drawers, 
boxes, or some general pool to be sorted in some un-
specified future. A portion of the families studied orga-
nized their collections in an ongoing process, but a 
comparable number had never sorted their photo-
graphic products in any way. For the clear majority, 
however, sorting and organizing were activities which 
had fallen into neglect. As with shooting, young 
couples tended to pay the most attention to these ac-
tivities, and although this could not be examined here, 
it appeared that editing was often taken up again later 
in life. 6 
When and if slides and prints are edited and assem-
bled, decisions regarding inclusion or exclusion in the 
collection will turn primarily on the evaluation of sub-
ject matters. Photographs may be excluded if they are 
repetitive, strongly out of focus, or improperly ex-
posed; only rarely will content be a criterion. Home 
moders value even the least decipherable of their im-
ages ior the moments that they record, and as a result 
even poorly exposed, damaged, or blurred photo-
graphs will often be saved (Figure 6). 
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Although the actual storage units into which photo-
graphs were sorted were varied, the ongoing general 
family album seems to be the predominant organizing 
form, supplemented by a general pool of unsorted 
photographs. How each unit is organized may vary, 
but chronology is the dominant organizing principle. 
Smaller, discrete units might be edited for a specific 
time period or a particular subject (most often vaca-
tions) and then ordered chronologically within this 
theme. One highly favored organizational unit was a 
chronology covering the growth and development of 
individuals and families (Figure 7). Home moders also 
embellished their photography with written narratives 
and often extended their notions of photograph al-
bums to include various types of memorabilia including 
such items as tickets, programs, report cards, and 
certificates. 
As families age and become accustomed to viewing 
and responding to their own slide shows and albums, 
they take more care in deciding what photographs to 
include. As with planning events, then, these decisions 
become more complex as they are informed by a 
sense of what will have meaning and interest for family 
members in the future. This is one of the many mani-
festations of the future orientation which pervades and 
shapes the use of this mode. 
Finally, the criteria for selecting photographs for 
wall displays were more discriminating, both semanti-
cally and formally, than for any other display unit. In 
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Figure 7 A photo 
chronology. (Courtesy of 
John and Arlene Westphal) ~ 
Figure 6 A family album 
favorite . (Courtesy of 
Donald Gribbons)T 
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general, only photographs considered exceptional in 
content and at least competent formally are displayed. 
Most families made a strong distinction between public 
and private display, and though the distinctions vary, 
everyone felt they were "obvious" and could be as-
sumed. Most consistently, families felt public displays 
should include formal portraits of family members, pri-
marily the children or possibly the full family, fre-
quently photographed for some special occasion. Pri-
vate displays for areas such as bedrooms and family 
rooms were more inclusive and varied, and tended to 
include favorite photographs of exceptional personal 
and emotional significance. Once they were displayed 
in this way, " reediting, " or replacement, was rare (ex-
cept by the children), and wall photographs often 
spanned a period of up to ten years. 
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Exhibition Events 
These events include any activities or performances in 
which photographs are shown and viewed in a group 
or individual context. In order to explain the varied 
forms of display and storage of family photographs, it 
is useful to view them along a continuum going from 
exhibition to nonexhibition events, for some elements 
of family collections are stored and never seen, while 
others are on perpetual display. The exhibition cate-
gory must therefore account for patterns of storag~ 
and the accessibility afforded different photographic 
groupings as an index of the type and extent of view-
ing they receive. The researcher is heavily dependent 
here on his informants' reports of what they do; thus 
an accounting of these conditions not only serves to 
describe a systematic behavior but also provides some 
independent insight into what viewing is possible. 
Beyond these considerations an analysis of exhibition 
events must aim at characterizing the nature of all 
viewing events. 
The viewing events are perhaps the culmination, or 
even the very point, of the home mode process. A 
number of broad trends and patterns can be sug-
gested about the ways in which families accomplish 
their viewing activities, and yet even with the small 
sample used here, the extent of involvement and the 
significance associated with these events as a family 
activity vary widely. The relation of these variations to 
family history, as such, seems clearly a matter for ex-
tended research. However, the way in which families 
treated and located their collections seems clearly 
correlated with their viewing practices. As I have al-
ready noted, family collections range from ongoing or-
ganization, with prominent displays of photographs 
and albums, to collections in which all pictures are de-
posited in boxes or barrels and stored out of easy 
reach. Some part of all families' collections is found in 
drawers and closets, but again the extent varies. In 
general in this survey, it has been found that as col-
lections' move from greater to lesser accessibility, 
viewing is less and less a public matter; friends and 
relatives are less likely to be included in these activi-
ties and when they are, viewing will be more selective. 
In addition, as the organization and accessibility of 
collections decline, the events of viewing and using 
family pictures seem to have less and less signif_icance 
either as a family activity or as an important fam1ly re-
source. 
Only a select portion of a family's collectio_n w_as 
generally accessible and acceptable for public VIew-
ing. Most often photographs "left out" for viewing in-
cluded "new pictures" or particular albums-usually 
the most recent general family album, vacation al-
bums, or in the case of young families, baby albu~s. 
Those photo units reserved and stored for essentially 
personal and close family viewing included older fam-
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ily albums, weddings, "army albums," and collections 
which predated marriage. These personal images and 
collections were most often stored away in attics and 
basements. 
The most accessible form of exhibition was, of 
course, the display of photographs on walls, tables, 
television sets, and bookcases. All families displayed 
pictures in this way, either publicly or privately, and it 
seems apparent that the public/private distinction it-
self may assume significance as a point of contrast be-
tween home moders. For some families felt that all dis-
play in public rooms was "inappropriate," while most 
families limited public room display to formal or posed 
images of family members. Those who shunned all dis-
play in parts of the home where visitors might readily 
view them generally placed no similar restriction on 
the exhibition of photographs in the "private" rooms, 
and at times did so quite extensively. In either case, 
we can note that these displays of the home mode of-
ten become fixtures or ornaments to family members 
and frequent visitors, so that they are only rarely no-
ticed or discussed, and are even forgotten. Office pho-
tographs might receive similar attention; however, at 
times they are hung and consciously manipulated by 
home moders for their social value, much as wallet 
photos may be used and displayed in the course of so-
cial interactions. Nearly all the couples in this study 
were found to have photographs in their wallets or pur-
ses though many never showed or even viewed these 
themselves and seemed unsure of their reasons for 
carrying them. Yet these images were ~mployed read-
ily by those families who were most extensively in-
volved with photography and by proud grandparents in 
interactions with others. Photographs were used in 
these contexts either to ''update'' people on family 
members, as a means of introduction, or simply as a 
basis for conversation. 
As indicated earlier, the families which most actively 
and enthusiastically used this mode view photographs 
in a broad range of activities and with a broad circle of 
friends and extended family. However, the dominant 
movement within each family over the years was to-
ward increasingly limited, personal, and immediate 
family use of these images. Family viewing occurs, at 
minimum, as an informal event stimulated by the arrival 
of new prints. Its most organized form typically occurs 
(and is perhaps required) in the viewing of slides. Fam-
ilies described viewing occasions as matters of 
"whim," frequently stimulated by one family member's 
(usually a child's) decision to search out a particular 
photograph or simply to browse through the collection. 
Interestingly, all couples stated that they rarely viewed 
pictures without the children being present; that is, 
parents uniformly conceived of this event as a family 
activity. 
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The actual events of viewing were not examined 
systematically in this research. However, the signifi-
cance placed on viewing photographs, the in-
volvement of family members in sharing pictures, and 
the use of these events as important joint activities 
merit further study. This research suggests, for ex-
ample, that as families view their photographs repeat-
edly a pattern of responses, observations, and inter-
changes develops around particular images. Such a 
patterning suggests, among other things, the con-
struction of a set of shared interpretations, remem-
brances, and identifications around the photograph 
collection. In addition, it seems that the viewing event 
itself may be examined systematically and com-
paratively as a site for the evaluation of intrafamily in-
teraction. For clearly, as families view their photo-
graphs, they respond not simply to the pictures 
presented but also with and for one another. 
The sharing of photographs with friends and rela-
tives was generally quite limited among home moders. 
Few families were found to maintain any kind of tradi-
tional group viewing events, and generally relatives 
were only shown photographs when they visited. Simi-
larly, the viewing of family photographs with friends or 
visitors was almost never a planned event. Viewing 
with friends occurred most often to illustrate or refer-
ence a particular subject, especially when friends had 
shared photographed activity with the family or when 
the family had returned from vacation with ·'inter-
esting" pictures. Most home moders, however, are ret-
icent to show their photographs to friends, fearing to 
bore their guests or perhaps to appear egocentric, and 
many also considered it simply "inappropriate" be-
cause of the personal nature of the pictures. Public 
displays in the form of Christmas cards and birth an-
nouncements were nonetheless approved by all. 
As with all the events examined so far, the exhibi-
tion events also incorporated conventionalized notions 
of appropriateness which contributed to the patterning 
of the process of the home mode. Home moders gen-
erally professed a sense of the great importance of 
family photography and set out to accomplish it in 
ways which were clearly structured by social notions 
of "how you do family photography." Once these pic-
tures are produced, there is a significant variation in 
what families do with them and how they incorporate 
them into family life. 7 Future research must study 
these events comparatively, across social and cultural 
groups, to clarify the nature of the patterns identified 
here and to discern the systematic social influences 
that produce variations in each of these activities. 
The Components of the Home Mode 
It should be recalled at this point that, as the frame-
work set out here is employed in research, the commu-
nicative events and components are to be interrelated 
for the purposes of generating research questions and 
of ultimately characterizing and comparing genres of 
visual activity. The units are being discussed individ-
ually as much as possible in this presentation in the 
hope of providing some understanding of the regular-
ities endemic to each aspect of the home mode proc-
ess. The two final components in the framework (see 
Table 1 ), "message form" and "code," can be dealt 
with briefly. Simply put, the unit "message form" calls 
for designation of the form or means of expression. 
For visual forms the designation refers to the visual 
style under study, in this case home mode, or family, 
photography. 
By incorporating a "code" component, Chalfen 
suggests with regard to film that an examination in-
clude ''description of photographic habits, conven-
tions, or routines (in shooting and editing) and a de-
scription of social habits and conventions,'' including 
patterns of on-camera behavior (Chalfen 1975a:97). It 
is through these patterned manipulations that Chalfen 
feels film styles or message forms will be defined. With 
respect to still photography, however, it seems clear 
that the units of any photographic code remain in-
determinate (ct. Barthes 1975; Sekula 1975; Byers 
1966) and, more pointedly, that family photography 
cannot be distinguished from other forms of photogra-
phy on the basis of formal or syntactic features. 
A code is understood here as "an organized subset 
of the total range of elements, operations, and order-
ing principles correlated with a field of reference that 
are possible in a given mode or family of symbol sys-
tems'' (Gross 197 4:59). Particular codes within any 
given mode are therefore generally to be distinguished 
by their distinctive organization of formal and syntactic 
elements. Two problems stand out in the application of 
this concept to family photography. Initially the analyst 
is confronted with that branch of commercial and/or 
"artistic" photography which either directly imitates or 
otherwise achieves or incorporates formal elements 
associated with the look and ''feel·· of family photogra-
phy. Many of the images of Robert Frank's The Ameri-
cans might be placed in this category, for example, as 
would the work of other artists who manifestly mug the 
snapshot "style" (cf. Greene 1975). On the other 
hand, there are photographers who shoot pictures of 
personal subjects for private use only and demon-
strate a proficiency with their equipment which is not 
ordinarily associated with the family photographer. In 
fact, as indicated earlier, research has suggested that 
home moders can be ranked along a continuum of 
skills ranging from complete incompetence to profes-
sional capability. 
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In the first case (that is, the snapshot aesthetic) the 
photographs may be distinguished from the images of 
the home mode primarily through an awareness of the 
history of their production and use, as well as of cues 
provided by presentation contexts, rather than through 
any evaluation of the formal elements of the photo-
graphs themselves. Similarly, it must be recognized 
that, while the images of the second case might be dis-
tinguished from home mode images because they ex-
ceed common notions of the formal components and 
standards of family photography, they are by definition 
artifacts of the mode precisely because of their usage. 
In both cases, it is not possible to distinguish the im-
ages of home mode from non-home-mode pictures 
solely on the basis of code elements. If a home mode 
genre is to be deciphered , it will be distinguished 
through the examination of the interaction of communi-
cative behaviors, contexts, and artifacts and not 
through a specification of code elements. The code 
category here can thus yield no distinctive information 
in characterizing the home mode. Therefore, observa-
tions concerning formal/syntactic features have been 
incorporated elsewhere in this analysis as they be-
come relevant. 
Participants 
From the beginning of this study, the home mode has 
been partially defined by characterizing its partici-
pants. It is a family medium used in the service of a 
family document, and a restricted pattern of family 
participation is consistently demonstrated; these fac-
tors focus and define the scope of the mode. The sub-
jects are limited to a small network of immediate family 
members, friends, and relatives. 
As to responsibility for shooting, it was found that in 
the majority of families in this study all members had 
used the family camera to some extent. Children fre-
quently owned their own inexpensive cameras, but the 
larger share of family shooting was the obligation of 
the parents. Where photography was the domain or 
special skill of only one parent, women were as likely 
as men to be the primary photographer. Otherwise this 
task was divided informally between husband and wife 
according to areas of specialization or preference. 
Families also relied on professional photographers for 
baby pictures, wedding photography, portraits, and 
class pictures. 
Those depicted in family albums may include a 
range of family, friends, and relatives. As a family 
ages, however, the range generally narrows because 
relatives are included with less frequency and the im-
mediate family, most especially the children, becomes 
the primary focus. Significantly, it was found that fol-
lowing the birth of children the on-camera participa-
tion, or visibility of husband and wife in the family's 
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collections, frequently dropped dramatically, often to 
near exclusion. When questioned, most parents 
claimed that the idea of pointedly photographing each 
other seemed irrelevant or unnecessary. They there-
fore appear only infrequently through the bulk of their 
collections, possibly resurfacing as individuals and as 
a couple (as in prechildren albums) when the children 
leave home and especially when they travel. 
The determination of who is to be on each side of 
the camera works demonstrably to shape the nature of 
the entire picturetaking process and its subsequent 
products in this mode. In a picturetaking situation 
which may be particularly laden with conventional pre-
scriptions for behavior, as in studio photography or in-
stances in which a group poses in a traditional man-
ner, the influences of the interaction among 
participants will be diminished, but not eliminated. 
However, when an event becomes less rigidly defined 
in candid, spontaneous, and surprise shooting, photo-
graphs and photographic behaviors become increas-
ingly responsive to the nature of the interactions 
among participants both on and off camera. Yet these 
photographic behaviors still frequently take a highly 
regularized form, as in the common ritual of children 
"sneaking" pictures of appropriately indignant par-
ents, in the requirements imposed on a husband/pho-
tographer by a wife/subject, and the tendency of a 
child to "mug" for one parent more than the other. 
Such interactions may become as stable and practiced 
as those institutionalized within a family or any fixed 
group of people. 
In the editing events, different forms of display (of-
fice photos or wedding albums, for example) obviously 
will be viewed by different audiences. Pictures on dis-
play in public rooms may be seen by any visitor, but 
generally only relatives and the closest family friends 
will view the albums or extended sections of the family 
collection. The viewing event is again primarily an ac-
tivity of the immediate family. 
The pattern of participants described in the home 
mode collection is that of a select group of individuals 
which tends to narrow as families age. This limitation 
yields a closed network of social relationships which 
impose a variety of restrictions and influences on the 
performances and behavior of each of the photo-
graphic events. 
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Figure 8 (a. b. and c) Local topics: new possessions. (Courtesy 
of George and Helene Dargaty; John and Arlene Westphal) 
Topics 
The content and significance of an image are by no 
means certain. The resonances associated with most 
photographs extend far beyond any single notion of 
topic or content. This discussion of topics draws not 
only from the "denotative" contents of home mode 
pictures but also from the myriad connotations associ-
ated by family members with their images. Thus while 
some description of dominant topics is called for, this 
discussion makes no pretence of tapping the infinite 
nuances of personal subject matters. 
Most families stated an intention to produce a per-
sonalized record or history of family life; yet the topics 
of home mode shooting events were found to be rela-
tively consistent and limited. This was most immedi-
ately indicated when informants were asked what they 
photographed. Their descriptions (often preceded by 
claims to shooting "the usual " or the "regular rou-
tine") provided a consistent paradigm of topics to be 
covered. Most families explained that they would not 
normally consider it appropriate to photograph every-
day events; the subject matter of family photography 
was thought to be special events and people. Families 
readily and regularly listed the events of the home 
mode repertoire as children, vacation/trips, family 
gatherings, family activities, Christmas, birthdays, 
graduations, and weddings. The scope of shooting, of 
course, varied-some families covered only Christmas 
and a few other family events, while others shot stead-
ily throughout the year. Yet even among the most vora-
cious photographers, most shooting was consistent 
with a common model of family topics. 
An informal survey of the family collections shows 
holidays, vacations, and special events to be a major 
and consistent spur to shooting throughout family life. 
Christmas (as a secular event) seemed the most com-
mon occasion for shooting, while Thanksgiving and 
Easter or other religious holidays (depending upon the 
group) were also regular topics. Certain key aspects of 
these events were photographed routinely each year, 
such as the giving of gifts, new clothes, and the gath-
ering of the family. These aspects, as with other spe-
cial events, were a dominant focus of family shooting 
because of (1) their "extraordinary" nature; (2) the 
significance families associated with them (and, con-
versely, the role of picturetaking in communicating or 
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conferring significance upon the events); and (3) be-
cause of their presumed appropriateness as subjects 
for photograping and recollection. Other such "impor-
tant'' events included births, birthdays, graduations, 
weddings, and family visits. This category of special 
events may become meaningful, however, only if it is 
explored comparatively in future research so that con-
ceptions of what constitutes "special" and "impor-
tant'' can be linked to particular social and cultural 
groups. 
Vacations and trips were a particular order of spe-
cial event. Travel photos inspired the most self-con-
scious attempts at "documentation" of any home 
mode shooting, emphasizing places, buildings, local 
practices, and the unusual. By contrast, photographs 
of vacations in fixed and/ or familiar locales seemed to 
stress people engaged in activities and, as with most 
family shooting, sharply minimized the photographing 
of places and objects. Local activity around the home 
was photographed, though, only as the unusual in-
truded, and this was most often the first area where 
photography fell into neglect. Included here would be 
new or valued possessions, pets, a family football 
game, "catching the big fish," or occasional eviden-
tiary shots of fire damage and successful gardens 
(Figures 8a, b, and c). 
People are overwhelmingly the subject matter of the 
home mode. Any of the topics just discussed may find 
their most common realization in the simple depiction 
of a person or group, quite often without any detailed 
or recognizable visual context. As people become the 
specific topic, however, the pictures are increasingly 
directed toward, and evaluated in terms of, their quali-
ties and effectiveness as likenesses. In studio or por-
trait photography, for example, the event, the photog-
rapher's intent, and the subsequent use of the 
photograph are defined by the effort to portray the 
person. With the addition of candid, spontaneous, or 
surprise techniques, the efforts at portrayal are typi-
cally extended toward "catching" or documenting the 
individual in activities ranging from the special to the 
banal; yet these photographs do not, to their users' 
sensibilities, incorporate the everyday as a topic of the 
mode. 
The use of candid techniques for portraiture also 
serves to extend certain general notions of appropriate 
subject matter. The subject matter of the various home 
mode topics is generally patterned and guided by con-
ventions of propriety regarding presentation {partici-
pants should look "good") and of activities or occa-
sions for shooting (subjects should not be depicted in 
activities considered obscene, embarrassing, or in 
some other way socially objectionable). Generally, 
topics are limited to public or family activities and to 
the best presentation of the person. However, with the 
candid and, particularly, the surprise photograph, 
people may be photographed seemingly at any time. 
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Emphasis is frequently placed directly on violating nor-
mal shooting conventions to photograph people when 
they least want to be shot, when they are looking bad, 
or when they are engaged in an activity directly em-
barrassing to them or embarrassing as a photographic 
subject. Thus we frequently see in such shots semi-
nude persons, mothers in curlers, and people vomit-
ing, urinating, or passed out (Figure 9). In this way, 
topic conventions have essentially provided for anal-
ternative topic and treatment form inasmuch as home 
moders may employ these "improper" alternatives to 
produce "extraordinary" or "outrageous" portraits in-
tended to tease, embarrass, anger, or amuse one an-
other. 
Family photographers may, therefore, prove rela-
tively versatile in the use of the camera as they photo-
graph their accustomed selection of people. However, 
it was found that most families brought a basic shared 
conception of prescribed topics to their photography 
and that the bulk of their shooting remained within this 
structure. The pattern is clarified a bit more when the 
topics shunned by the family photographer are real-
ized. The negative aspects of family life such as pain, 
death, anger, and sorrow are not seen; work, school, 
church services, and daily events such as cleaning, 
eating, watching television, or rising and dressing in 
the morning are not shown. The "family document" 
seems to present a highly selective and exclusive sam-
pling from the events and activities of the family's life. 
Figure 9 A surprise photo. 
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Settings 
This component incorporates both the settings photo-
graphed and the locations in which home mode activi-
ties occur. A review of home mode photography re-
veals a patterned approach to and conceptualization 
of "place" among family photographers. As men-
tioned earlier, many events, occasions, and places 
find their portrayal in the depiction of people, fre-
quently without other visual contextual data. Christmas 
or Thanksgiving may be represented through shared 
icons (Christmas trees, for example); however, the ma-
jority of settings and events are realized in "context-
free'' pictures of smiling people in lawn chairs, adults 
hugging children, and so on. Home mode photogra-
phers in fact rarely actively considered or sought to 
depict elements of the setting but rather shot where 
subjects "were" or sought to control the setting as a 
backdrop. Here they might attempt to avoid back-
ground distractions or meet such technical needs as 
lighting or locating children strategically. But the 
"sense" and substance of setting was nonetheless re-
stricted to that which was located within the frame and 
surrounding the subject. 
It was primarily only as settings became less famil-
iar, most often in travel and vacation photography, that 
they received attention as objects for conscious repre-
sentation. At these times visual aspects of the set-
tings- panoramas, architecture, monuments, and so 
on-were identified and isolated for depiction or in-
clusion as people were posed and associated with 
them. It is only at this point that home moders com-
mented on their shooting as an unfortunate, if neces-
sary, selection from an environment, or recognized 
their photographs as discontinuous or discrete and 
disembodied fragments of the world. 
Settings were occasionally incorporated with sym-
bolic intent as a matter of identification or aesthetic 
appreciation by families who considered themselves 
"outdoors people." However, it is generally only as 
setting elements transcend the typical and everyday or 
hold out the interest of the unfamiliar that family pho-
tographers even begin to attend to them. Most shoot-
ing occurs in familiar locations, often in and around the 
house itself (often the kitchen or living room, but not 
bathrooms, and rarely in bedrooms), with minimum at-
tention to the location. However, a significant pattern 
in this local shooting was found in the informal estab-
lishment of "ritual locations" in which subjects would 
be placed for pictures. These settings were generally 
defined more by traditional usage than by conscious 
choice, and they most commonly incorporated what 
family members considered the ''nicest'· features of 
the home (a fireplace, staircase, or piano, for example) 
as a positive reflection of both the family and the par-
ticular subjects. 
Consistent with the selection of home mode topics, 
everyday life is rarely photographed, and settings per 
se are most often incorporated only as they host the 
"special" or themselves become unusual or unfamil-
iar. Shooting away from home does not extend freely 
to the rest of the world-we do not see laundries, sub-
ways, or supermarkets. The selection of home mode 
settings is patterned and restricted broadly by conven-
tions regarding appropriate settings as well as by fun-
damental orientations to the relevance and signifi-
cance of surroundings to the purposes of family 
photography. 
Documentation and Communication in the 
Home Mode 
The analysis and description of family photography in 
this paper suggests that what the home moder does 
with his camera and photographs is delimited and 
sharply focused by a system of conventions and rules. 
What seems to emerge is a structure of conventional 
usage which circumscribes and to some extent 
specifies the events and components of the process 
while allowing for significant variation in each family's 
participation. This research has further indicated that 
home moders do not employ the photographic code in 
any uniform or shared system of signification. The im-
plications of these findings for both our assumptions 
about the nature of family photographs as "docu-
ments'' and the function of family photography in proc-
esses of communication are fundamental. The exami-
nation of these assumptions and their grounding in 
empirical data are primary to the formulation of any re-
search utilizing these materials. 
The communicational properties of these docu-
ments might most readily be characterized in terms of 
the articulatory and interpretational processes through 
which they are produced and used. As characterized 
here, the processes of articulation are shaped by pat-
terns and routines both in the selection of subject mat-
ters and in the use of the camera. Notions of the "ap-
propriate" or "desirable" appear to guide the choice 
of topics and participants for shooting, and therefore 
generally circumscribe and regularize the contents of 
the family collection. Family photographers, for ex-
ample, expressed the goal of recording the "growth 
and development of the family,'' and yet in common 
practice they sought almost exclusively to record their 
children. Parents appear only infrequently in these col-
lections, so that the collections become scant docu-
mentations of adult life and only incomplete represen-
tations of family life. 
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Figure 10 "This was the World's Fair in Montreal." (Courtesy 
of FUchard and Martha Perkins) 
Routines and patterns in picturetaking work simi-
larly to structure these materials. Among those already 
mentioned are the frequent practice of documenting 
recurring events, like Christmas, through a regular set 
of shots; the conventional use of a limited and restrict-
ive range of camera styles; the tendency to record 
events without incorporating contextural information 
(Figure 1 0); and, finally, long-term trends in family 
shooting which establish a pattern of broadest docu-
mentation in the family's younger years followed by an 
increasingly narrowed account of events over time. 
Seemingly all phases of home mode use are funda-
mentally based in what Sekula (1975:37) has termed a 
"realist folk myth," through which photographs are 
conceived by home moders as mechanical recordings 
of real events. The processes of articulation accord-
ingly received limited conscious attention from family 
photographers in this sample, and syntactic control 
was generally restricted to a small repertoire of con-
siderations. Many home moders displayed an exten-
sive formal competence with formal elements in dis-
cussing criteria for evaluating photographs; rep-
resentational value, however, rather than aesthetic or 
expressive properties was the primary focus of evalua-
tion. And even among the most sophisticated photog-
raphers in this study, the considerations which finally 
guided picturetaking were limited primarily to center-
ing subjects, getting enough light, controlling back-
ground distractions, and "shooting a lot." 
Symbolic manipulation in the home mode thus fo-
cuses largely on the selection and presentation of on-
camera elements rather than on their mediation, and 
symbolic implication is manifested predominantly 
through these on-camera events: The symbolic articu-
lation becomes a kind of minimal nonevent to the fam-
ily photographer: his goal is reportage, as distinct (in 
his conception) from expression, and he achieves his 
purposes through the simple mechanical re-presenta-
tion that he believes the camera and photograph offer. 
As these images are viewed and interpreted, home 
moders generally assume little or no intent beyond the 
iconi~ referential components, and accountability for 
syntactic manipulations is also minimized. Meanings 
and interpretations are most often based on a belief in 
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the photograph's value as a document of natural 
events and on recognition of its iconic referents. The 
photographic allusion is increasingly expanded, how-
ever, as viewers interact with the natural events de-
picted and draw references and significances from a 
broad range of events, experiences, people, andre-
sponses which they recall, derive from, relate, and at-
tribute to the depicted contents. 
This affective investment or extension of the sym-
bolic reference by the viewer was discussed by Sekula 
(1975:42) in another context. He explains the inter-
pretive strategy: 
More than an illustration [the photograph becomes] an 
embodiment; that is, the photo is imagined to contain the 
autobiography. The photograph is invested with a com-
plex metonymic power, a power that transcends the per-
ceptual and passes into the realm of affect. The photo-
graph is believed to encode the totality of an experience, 
to stand as phenomenological equivalent. 
In similar fashion, the family viewer employs the photo-
graph both as a literal reference to the events depicted 
and as a stimulant to thoughts, associations, and 
memories related to the event. In this sense, as family 
members view and interpret their photographs, the 
iconic reference encodes the ''totality'' of the experi-
ence and assumes a metaphoric significance. 
The meanings and significances associated with the 
home mode photograph are therefore not encoded or 
derived through any articulatable code. Rather, ex-
pression and signification are brought to and invested 
in the family photograph through the processes of in-
terpretation. The use of this symbolic form thus consti-
tutes a process of personal signification and attribu-
tion rather than communication and remains, to a large 
extent, idiosyncratic and inaccessible to others (cf. 
Worth and Gross 1979). 
The use of the home mode seems heavily reliant on 
verbal accompaniment for the transmission of per-
sonal significances. Photographs presented to others 
are typically embedded in a verbal context delineating 
what should be attended to and what significances are 
located in the image, and providing contextual data 
necessary for understanding them. A certain degree of 
structural recognition may be provided for and recog-
nized in the construction of albums or photographic 
series. These orderings may indicate temporal or spa-
tial relations between the elements depicted, or even 
some general form of association. However, the place-
ment of a photograph in the context of a family collec-
tion does not prescribe strategies for its interpretation 
as would the placement of a picture in a newspaper, 
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Figure 11 Woman in mirror. (Courtesy of Sam and Anna 
Fannelli) 
Figure 12 Snowmobile tracks. (Courtesy of John and Arlene 
Westphal) 
for example, where the photo is by convention treated 
as the simple documentation and representation of 
"objective realities." As a meta-communicative con-
text, the placement of the photograph in a family col-
lection implies the investiture of personal significances 
and prescribes attributional strategies for inter-
pretation; it does not provide the viewer with an ex-
plicit system of conventions and rules for decoding the 
home mode message form. 
Family photography and the family photograph col-
lections pose a number of problems for those who 
would understand them as documents of family life. 
Through knowledge of the social behaviors guiding 
their production and use, it would seem that they con-
stitute conventionalized records of selected aspects of 
family life. But when viewers attempt to account for the 
ways in which home moders produce and interpret 
these images, it is frequently found that even the 
iconic references relevant to users cannot be deci-
phered from these photos (Figure 11, for example, is 
valued as a rare image of the woman reflected in the 
mirror, and Figure 12 is a record of snowmobile 
tracks, not a landscape). Similarly, viewers often can-
not determine from a family photograph tMe range of 
contextual data necessary to interpret the events de-
picted, and they clearly cannot anticipate the range of 
significances attributed to the images by their users. 
As such, the researcher /viewer's ability to interpret ei-
ther denotative or connotative significance from the 
images of the home mode in and of themselves is 
sharply restricted. Further, the home mode photo-
graph is not a document of fixed value in family life. 
Because interpretations are based in processes of re-
call, over time the power and value of these images 
may evolve and change or even be lost as memory 
decays (Figure 13). 8 Thus photograph collections as 
documentary resources are perhaps more closely as-
sociated with an oral rather than a written tradition (ct. 
Goody and Watt 1 962). 
That the images of the home mode function in the 
storage and transmission of historical accounts and 
personal beliefs and experie •• ce seems implicit from 
their use in daily life. However, what can be known 
from the photographs themselves seems clearly re-
stricted, as any decoding scheme must account for the 
nature of the encoding process and the nature of sub-
sequent usage. All too often, however, researchers-
even those purportedly dealing only with iconic ele-
ments-overlook such matters as use, context, and so-
cial convention as well as the technical artifacts of the 
photographic process to make unwarranted infer-
ences from these materials (Akeret 1973; Hill 1978; 
see also Chalfen 1975b for comment on Akeret). This 
research has suggested that, to the extent that re-
searchers seek to understand the uses and meanings 
associated with these images (and the mode itself) by 
their users, they must locate them in the social con-
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Figure 13 Differing interpretations: 
Mrs.: "Oh, look at baldy! Here's a picture I posed of Sam with a haircut." 
Mr. : "This is a picture of our new car." 
(Courtesy of Sam and Anna Fannelli) 
texts of their production and use. Home mode photog-
raphy is a communicative activity, and its products, 
rather than being viewed simply as discrete articula-
tions, might best be understood as communicative re-
sources situated within and integrated with ongoing 
processes of social interaction. 
Notes 
Home mode photography can be defined as the body of still photo-
graphs and photographic transparencies produced and accumulated by 
and for family members within the context of family life. These images 
are made for private, as opposed to public or artistic , use and are to be 
distinguished from the latter primarily by the private context in which 
they are used rather than by any technical or formal quality of the im-
ages themselves . 
2 This essay draws on the author 's masters thesis, " Home Mode Photog-
raphy: A Study of Visual Communication and Interaction in Everyday 
Life " (1977) . See also Musella (1979) for a discussion of home mode 
functions. 
3 There are numerous examples of this type of event, but they were found 
only in families for whom photography was an ongoing and established 
process fairly well integrated into the events and customs of family life. 
These include pictures of the first day of school and photographs of the 
entire family gathered on the same porch each year . One intriguing ex-
ample encountered several times was the ' 'last picture.'' This was seen 
with groups of older people and groups who were close to an elderly 
person . They involved posing together at some regular interval in con-
scious anticipation that one of their number might die soon. The image 
would thereby serve as the last picture of that person and the original 
group. 
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4 Sandra Titus (1976) has suggested an interesting basis for these inequi-
ties in family shooting . She suggests that photographs are valuable to 
couples as they reflect and promote transition to parenthood through the 
display and reinforcement of appropriate role behaviors. Photographs 
taken with the first child are as such produced in a transitional period as 
the young couple adopt new roles. The couple may be expected to be 
increasingly acclimated to parental roles with successive children; as a 
result more pictures of the initial transition will be taken , and these will 
tend to show more images of parents holding and feeding the child as 
well as more individual photos of the child. I would add that such an in-
terpretation can be readily extended to the photographic behaviors of 
new grandparents. 
5 Rudisill (1971) has not only suggested that such a catalog of standard 
postures exists but states that they date from the introduction of photog-
raphy to the public via the daguerreotype. At that point, he feels, Ameri-
cans came to adopt a set of standard postures and approaches to the 
lens. What emerged was a " national iconography"-a set of standard 
poses conformed to even as the subjects attested to the medium 's ''ab-
solute reality' ' and '' naturalness. '' That such a set of conventional poses 
exists now seems supported by the sample observed in this study. Such 
speculation should be subjected to a systematic and broad-based sur-
vey , however, before any attempt is made to suggest what these poses 
might be or how they might be classified . 
6 The determination of when individuals edit and assemble their albums 
has significant ramifications for the nature of the family photograph al-
bum as a source of information about family life . Where albums are 
" built " years after the photos were taken , people are probably recon-
structing their past, and since memories associated with the images of-
ten fade as time passes, we may speculate that those which cannot be 
identified would not be included in the collections. Also, as will be dis-
cussed, a tendency to removerepetitive, bad, unfocused, or frivolous 
shots was identified in many families that have reedited or intend to re-
edit their collections. Thus albums put together in later years would be 
documents which are to some extent , sparser and of a different nature 
from those assembled continuously. Each type might well reflect a differ-
ent set of criteria for inclusion and differing notions of what is significant 
and appropriate for storage and future use. 
7 For a consideration of this variation and a presentation of case histories, 
see Musella (1977 , chap. 5) . 
8 While the occasions of some photos are recalled over long periods of 
time with startling clarity , it was often found that a large part of any fam-
ily 's viewing was spent identifying specific individuals, places, occa-
sions, and events depicted in older photographs, and many were simply 
forgotten by their owners . Some informants suggested that these pic-
tures were then " pointless" or "meaningless" to the makers. However, 
in general , the past meanings were transformed by present inter-
pretations. In some instances it was found that , as specific identities and 
contextual information were lost-as in the case of a college prom, for 
example-attentions and attributions directed to the photograph were 
generalized and a more stereotypic significance was derived . The prom 
photos served less as pictures of specific friends, dates, and minute oc-
currences than as broader reminders of events and good times in col-
lege days. 
Alternately, the approach to the images may become less metaphoric 
and more specifically referential. Viewers frequently directed their atten-
tion to the presence and nature of the artifacts of another time. Many 
took note of old clothes and cars in unidentified scenes or marveled at 
how homes were decorated or furnished in these " contextless " photo-
graphs. As such , many older pictures took on a new or differently weight-
ed significance and were highly valued as representations of times past. 
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My Favorite Foods are Dr Pepper, Collard Greens, and 
Pizza. I'm Sure I'll Be a Good Clown. 
Phyllis Rogers 
When you go to the circus you can always recognize 
the acrobats in the show by the kinds of acts they do. 
You can always distinguish the lion tamer from the ele-
phant handler by the kinds of animals each goes into 
the ring with. Then the circus performers parade 
around in the spectacular processional with everyone 
aglitter in shimmering costumes, and you realize you 
can no longer tell who the lion tamer is and who the 
acrobat is because they are all wearing identical cos-
tumes and there are no cues to indicate their circus 
identities-except for one circus performer. No matter 
how he dresses you can always spot the clown. We, 
the audience, always recognize the clown no matter 
what he does, whether or not he makes us laugh; we 
recognize him because his greasepainted face tells us 
he is the clown. 
Our insistence that the person in greasepaint is a 
clown has led to an interesting phenomenon in this 
country, the creation of something called the clown 
school. We do not have a circus school, where people 
are taught to be trapeze artists, animal trainers, or ac-
robats, but we do have a school that trains people as 
clowns. In an eight-week course young people are 
trained how to juggle, ride a unicycle, take slaps, take 
falls, and make a clown costume, but most important 
of all, how to make up as a clown. 
For the past five years I have been studying the 
American circus clown for my doctoral dissertation in 
anthropology at Princeton University. In 1975-19761 
taught an eight-week course at Ringling Brothers and 
Barnum and Bailey's Clown College on the history of 
clowning, but I have spent most of the five years ob-
serving, talking to, listening to, and photographing cir-
cus clowns in their natural environment-the circus. 
When I first started my research, the students had not 
made headway into joining the smaller circuses in this 
country, but within the past four years they have been 
filtering out of the school into every clown Alley in this 
country (the Alley is the area where the clowns make 
up and congregate within the circus). We have 
reached a point at which most of the circus clowns we 
see performing have been trained in the clown school, 
yet we as an audience have taken no notice of it be-
cause we still see only the face of the clown. In its 
short life the school has changed more than the means 
by which a person enters the Alley; it has changed the 
face of the American circus clown. 
,,,, ,,_, ,, ,,_,_,,_,,"'''":::;-.--~~~~~~~----m,.·f·,.,-.'',_ ,=··,_ ,=,-·_·:,'_,,=-·_,,=,'_',',_ ·'.- -',,'···, ,_'_-,· ,= ,,,_,,.:_ ,_'.'.', ,'_'-.', ,','',,''-,',',',·:,,','··.=,,~.-~- • ::::: : :::;::::::::::::::;s::~;~*M - ..  
After working on her doctoral dissertation for several 
years, Phyllis Rogers finally received her Ph.D. degree 
in anthropology from Princeton University. She is cur-
rently working at The American Indian Studies Center 
at UCLA doing research on Indians in Wild West 
shows. 
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In the old days of the circus in this country, which 
we will define as the time before Ringling Brothers and 
Barnum and Bailey's Combined Shows called it quits 
under canvas and went into arenas, anybody could be 
hired as a clown. All you had to do was walk up to the 
circus manager and ask for a job. Even if the show did 
not have any openings in the Alley, there was always 
something an able-bodied man was needed for. If the 
circus did need clowns, which more often than not it 
did, you were told to go to the Alley and ask for the 
Producing Clown; he would decide whether or not to 
give you a job. 
When you found the Alley, you usually had to wait 
until a man or two wandered in, about an hour or so 
before the performance. The Producing Clown as well 
as the rest of the men in the Alley looked you over and 
decided if you would look good in makeup and which 
clown character would suit you best. All the while the 
men kept asking you questions about your circus ex-
perience: Could you juggle, had you ever applied 
clown makeup before, did you own any clown ward-
robe, did you own any clown props? If you passed this 
first round of questions, it was decided that the clowns 
had to see what you looked like as a clown and if you 
were any good in the ring as a performer. One clown 
was chosen by the Producing Clown to make you up. 
First, this clown would study your face; he already 
knew about your lack of circus skills. If you seemed 
graceful, he would suggest a Joey makeup; this is the 
clown with the all-white face who usually wears the 
beautiful sequined costume. If you seemed the least 
bit gawky, he made you an Auguste, with the big red 
nose, baggy outfit, and big shoes. The old clowns pre-
ferred making you up as an Auguste because it used 
up less of their makeup. With a scrap of clothing from 
here and there the clowns constructed a makeshift 
costume while the Producing Clown figured out where 
he could best place you during a routine and which 
props, if any, he should let you use. 
Once in the ring you discovered how chaotic and 
hectic three minutes (the set time for a clown routine) 
could be as you ducked pies and slaps, threw water 
and got wet, and grabbed balloons only to have them 
grabbed back. All the while the clown who made you 
up guided you through the routines, telling you what to 
do and when, and, most important, when to get out of 
the ring. At the end of the performance the Producing 
Clown told you whether this was your first or last per-
formance. Some of the old clowns felt you were lucky 
if you were told to look for work elsewhere, because 
the hours were long, the work was hard, and the pay 
was bad. 
Being given a job by the Producing Clown in no way 
meant that you were accepted into the Alley. That en-
tire first season you were called a "First of May," a 
circus term designating not quite an outsider, but then 
again not a full member of the circus either. This year-
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long limbo was difficult for many of the newcomers to 
accept, with the result that they left the show during 
their first season. For those who stayed the struggle 
had just begun. 
When an untrained person was admitted into the Al-
ley, he was given the bare essentials in make up and 
wardrobe. After the initial lesson he was more or less 
on his own. These First of Mays quickly sensed that 
they had better come up with some kind of suitable 
face or they would be asked to leave. They also 
learned that the last thing a First of May could do was 
watch one of the older men make up. Your face was 
your fortune, and to copy another man's face without 
his permission was theft, punishable by ostracism. 
Every man had some kind of special trick which made 
his makeup look perfect, and these secrets were jeal-
ously guarded. In this world such secrets meant job 
security. It might take years before a new man felt con-
fident about his face, but the management expected a 
clown's face to form the first day he worked with them. 
When Ringling Brothers and Barnum and Bailey's 
Combined Shows decided to split its circus into two 
equally entertaining shows, it naturally required twice 
as many performers. The show's agents had relatively 
little trouble scouting for new acrobatic acts, new tra-
peze acts, new elephants, new cat acts, and new show 
girls; they did have trouble finding new clowns. The 
talent scouts were finding a ragtag assortment of men 
working in the Alleys of various circuses across the 
country, almost none of whom met the standard of ex-
cellence RBB&B set for its clowns. Most of the men 
were old, their wardrobes were shabby, their makeup 
was none too pretty, their routines were none too 
funny, and RBB&B felt that their life-styles were none 
too wholesome. Since the show desperately needed 
more clowns, the show hired as many clowns as it felt 
were salvageable, but Ringling Brothers and Barnum 
and Bailey's Combined Shows did not have nearly as 
many people in the Alley as it wanted, nor did the 
clowns look quite as good as RBB&B had expected. 
In 1968 Ringling Brothers and Barnum and Bailey's 
Circus opened the doors of its Winter Quarters to the 
first class of students in the clown school. There were 
several reasons for the creation of the school. First, 
RBB&B felt that the art of clowning was currently 
dominated by old men; the school, it felt, would bring 
youth and vitality to the art of clowning. Then, for the 
first time, women and minority group members were 
actively recruited into clown Alley. Finally, the school 
would be a source of clowns for RBB&B's Alley, and 
these clowns would look, dress, and perform exactly 
as the Big One wanted its clowns to. 
When the school first started, it is true to say there 
were not many clowns in this country, but throughout 
American circus history there have never been many 
clowns and those who are in the Alley were never chil-
dren. There were still quite a few old men in RBB&B's 
Alley when the school started, but the Alley was not to 
remain the bastion of the old clown for long. As the 
years passed, the school produced more and more 
students who eventually replaced the old men. As the 
old clowns moved out of RBB&B's Alley, they entered 
the ranks of the performers in the tented circuses 
throughout this country, but they were not to remain 
there for long either. Each year the school continued 
to produce more students than it needed, creating a 
glut on the market. Soon there were students asking 
for jobs at the smaller shows, undercutting the false 
security of the old clowns. The students would not only 
add youth and vitality to the Alleys of these small 
shows; they would work for less money than the old 
clowns. Obviously it was to the circuses' advantage to 
hire the student clowns-after all, they were getting 
two for the price of one old clown. Soon the clown 
school graduates began to replace the old clowns in 
just about every circus in the country. There is a great 
deal of animosity in the old clowns who lost their jobs 
to the students. "You can't make somebody a clown!" 
the old clowns say. "Just because you have a pretty 
face, that don't make you a clown." 
What does make you a clown? The old clowns feel 
that the quickest and easiest way for a person to dis-
tinguish between a clown and a person in makeup is 
the clown's ability to make his face move. There is no 
way to tell who will have this ability; for instance, a 
youngster who has been in the school a few weeks can 
display the trait, while an old man who has been 
clowning for over forty years will not have that skill. 
This example is the exception rather than the rule be-
cause more of the old men than the young people pos-
sess the trait. Could this be because the old men have 
more wrinkles, or does it reflect the fact that when the 
old men entered clowning they were given enough 
time to experiment with their faces until they found the 
one that was uniquely their own? Or c·ould it possibly 
be that because there are so few old men left in clown-
ing those with the ability to move their faces stand out, 
making their impact greater than their actual num-
bers? 
Ringling Brothers and Barnum and Bailey's Circus 
knew that the faces, more than any other aspect, of 
their clown students had to be perfect. So, for the first 
several years of the program the old clowns from the 
Alley were brought to the school to instruct the stu-
dents how to apply a face. The first three photographs 
show a clown student under the direction of an old 
clown. The first photograph (Figure 1) is a straight-on 
shot of the made-up face. This makes for a nice pic-
ture which says "clown" to the audience. The second 
photograph (Figure 2) shows the student staring in-
tently into a mirror under the watchful eye of an old 
clown. In the third (Figure 3), he is trying to get her to 
move her mouth; she is trying very hard to produce 
some movement. Note the similarities in the second 
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and third photographs: look very closely at the stu-
dent's face in both photographs and then look at her 
neck. See how much she is straining to get some 
movement in her face in the last photograph, but her 
mouth in the last two photographs is virtually the same. 
The fourth photograph (Figure 4) is a none too flat-
tering portrait of a student out of makeup. This shot 
was taken to show her basic facial musculature. Note 
her arched eyebrows, the lines defining her cheeks 
that help to accentuate her smile. The next photograph 
is the same student in makeup-quite a pretty face 
(Figure 5). Look again at the preceding photograph. 
See where her cheek definition is, where the eyebrows 
arch, and the musculature of her forehead. Now look 
at her made-up face again. Where has she placed her 
cheek makeup? Does the area of makeup coincide 
with the movement in her cheeks? Observe where she 
has placed her greasepaint eyebrows. Will they cover 
the musculature of her forehead? Does her painted 
mouth fit into her mouth lines? When you compare the 
student's unmade-up face with her clown face, you 
can see that she has not totally utilized her facial mus-
culature; that is, she has not used her real face to help 
her create her clown face. 
The student in the next two photographs looks a 
little goofy, but look carefully at the photograph of his 
unmade-up face (Figure 6). See the deep lines around 
his mouth, the sides of his nose; see how the lines de-
fine his cheeks and how they cross his forehead. In the 
photograph of his clown face (Figure 7), see how well 
he has utilized his facial musculature. When you look 
at his unmade-up face after seeing his clown face, you 
feel as if you can almost see his clown face in his 
naked face. 
Figures 8 and 9 show the two students from the pre-
ceding series of prints along with another student. We 
see that the new student's face is in striking contrast 
to those of her fellow students. The new student has 
more areas of white showing in her face, but if we look 
closely we note that she has almost as many markings 
on her face as the student in the middle of the photo-
graph. The face of the student on the left seems more 
bare to us because most of her markings are horizon-
tal, thereby blending them into her face. In Figure 8·the 
students are all smiling. They were then requested to 
move their mouths, the results of which are seen in 
Figure 9. But look at the difference in expression in the 
two prints. The student on the left has opened her 
mouth in the second of the photographs, but her eye-
brows are as high as they were in the previous print. 
Her eyes don't appear to have opened any wider, and 
there has been no change in the white areas of her 
face. The student in the middle has made her eyes ap-
pear more open because as she extended her mouth 
downward she raised her eyebrows, utilizing the verti-
cal markings above and below her pupils. Even though 
she has elongated her mouth, she has retained the 
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same smiling expression she exhibited in the first of 
these two prints. The student on the right has drasti-
cally altered his appearance in the second photograph 
by the simple gesture of moving his mouth. Within a 
matter of seconds he has transformed himself from a 
smiling, happy clown to an unhappy one. Not only has 
his mouth changed expression, so have his eyes. 
All four students in this first grouping of photo-
graphs put on their first clown makeup when they at-
tended the clown school. All had the same clown in-
structors, all had the same number of hours in makeup 
class; yet only one student could change expression, 
or, as the old clowns call it, move his face. Why? 
The old clowns say that anyone can apply 
greasepaint to his face but very few practitioners of 
the art of clowning ever acquire the skill to make their 
faces move. The next series of photographs is of an 
old clown. His character is called a Joey, or the White 
Face Clown. His makeup is of the same genre of the 
students in the first grouping of photographs who 
could not make their faces move. In the first of the 
three photographs (Figure 1 0) the old clown is holding 
his face expressionless. We can see that his makeup 
is as stark as that of the student on the left in the se-
ries of the three students changing expression, and 
that he, like her, has black horizontal lines beside his 
eyes. His mouth is heavily outlined on the bottom lip 
while the top lip is lined as a woman would line her 
mouth with lipstick. Contrast this with the upper lips of 
the three Joeys in the previously presented photo-
graphs. He has blackened the area of his lids, just 
above the eye itself, rather than placing his clown eye-
brows above his real ones or on his forehead, or even 
to the point of having totally excluded them from his 
face. Finally, note that the line he has drawn from the 
triangle shapes just under his eyes gently curve down 
the outer perimeter of his face. In the next photograph 
(Figure 11) the old Joey is smiling; even though his 
eyes are almost closed, they are still highly visible. The 
triangles are smaller under his eyes and the lines have 
become more rounded. Contrast the last photograph 
(Figure 12) of this grouping, in which the old clown is 
registering surprise, with the first two photographs of 
this grouping. His mouth has become a black hole, the 
horizontal lines opposite his eyes are highly visible, 
and his eyes are wider and have become longer, but 
most noticeable is the fact that the curved lines down 
his face are now straight. With a simple gesture of his 
face he has been able to create two distinct ex-
pressions with his face. 
The clown in the last two photographs (Figures 1 3 
and 14) of this portfolio is an Auguste, the same clown 
character as is the student who could make his face 
move. This old clown has been called the greatest liv-
ing clown in the American circus. Even though he has 
not finished applying his makeup, he is able to demon-
strate a remarkable versatility with the movement of 
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his mouth. The first photograph has him smiling 
broadly; the next face is dismayed. The shape of his 
mouth has changed from being broad and open to 
being stretched and shaped like a dog biscuit-a dra-
matic and drastic change in a matter of a second. 
There has always been a place in the circus for the 
pretty clown face; such clowns are called picture 
clowns. Most of these clowns are the ones who beam 
down on us from circus posters. You may ask why I am 
making such a point of a clown's ability to move his 
face if it isn't necessary for all clowns to do it. Ten or 
fifteen years ago there were many more clowns per-
forming in circuses who were able to move their faces; 
now there are very few clowns who can do it. It would 
seem that as the old men leave the circus they take 
their skill away with them. It is not necessary now, nor 
has it ever been before, for every clown to be able to 
move his face, but for those clowns who wanted to be 
most effective in the ring it was an invaluable aid. How 
else could the audience see a change in expression 
from the last row under the big top? Not every man in 
makeup in the old days was a good clown, but those 
who were made our infrequent visits to the circus 
memorable. According to the old clowns, those clowns 
with the ability to change expression were best able to 
make the audience laugh, and, after all, clowns are 
supposed to make us laugh. 
When the circus school opened its doors, the media 
rang the death knell for clowning. They envisioned 
Ronald McDonald-type clowns entertaining us in cir-
cuses, but ten years have proved them wrong in their 
analysis of the school's effect on clowning. Since the 
school's inception, there have been more and more 
young people entering the profession as well as 
women and minority group members entering the ring. 
This was a goal of the school and one at which they 
have succeeded. The school has also been more than 
successful in populating the Alleys of this country. 
Where once a handful of people would apply to a cir-
cus ad for clowns, there are now dozens who apply 
and hundreds who know how to apply a clown face 
and who can look and dress like a clown. That is all we 
as an audience really care about: If a person looks like 
a clown, then he must be a clown. The next time you 
go to a circus look and see if the clowns can make 
their faces move; or is the American circus clown 
you 're seeing just another pretty face? 
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Aesthetics, Aestheticians, and Critics 
Howard S. Becker 
Aesthetics as Activity 
Aestheticians study the premises and arguments 
people use to justify classifying things and activities as 
"beautiful," "artistic," "art," "not-art," "good art," 
"bad art," and so on. They construct systems with 
which to make and justify such classifications as well 
as specific instances of their application. Critics apply 
aesthetic systems to specific art works and arrive at 
judgments of their worth and explications of what 
gives them that worth. 
In this view aesthetics is an activity rather than a 
body of doctrine. Aestheticians are not the only people 
who engage in this activity. Most participants in art 
worlds make aesthetic judgments frequently. Aesthetic 
principles, arguments, and judgments make up an im-
portant part of the body of conventions by means of 
which members of art worlds act together. Creating an 
explicit aesthetic may precede, follow, or be simulta-
neous with developing the techniques, forms, and 
works which make up the art world's output, and it 
may be done by any of the participants in that world. 
Sometimes artists themselves formulate the aesthetic 
explicitly, although they often develop it only implicitly 
through their continuing, daily choices of materials 
and forms. 
In complex and highly developed art worlds, spe-
cialized professionals-critics and philosophers-
create logically organized and philosophically defen-
sible aesthetic systems, and the creation of aesthetic 
systems can become a major industry in its own right. 
An aesthetician whose language foreshadows a socio-
logically based system I will examine below describes 
what aestheticians do: 
Being a member of the Institution of Art ... does not pre-
suppose any explicit knowledge of the constitutional and 
regulative rules of the Institution. To find and formulate 
these is the job of a special kind of officers of the Institu-
tion , the aestheticians or philosophers of art, at least if 
aesthetics is conceived in the modern way as the philo-
sophical discipline that deals with the concepts we use 
when we talk about, think about or in other ways "handle" 
works of art. On the basis of their own understanding of 
the Institution of Art as a whole, it is the task of aestheti-
cians to analyze the ways all the different persons and 
groups talk and act as members of the Institution, and 
through this to see which are the actual rules that make up 
the logical framework of the Institution and according to 
which the procedures within the Institution take place .... 
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Howard S. Becker is Professor of Sociology and Ur-
ban Affairs at Northwestern University. His recent 
work has focused on the use of photography in social 
science, visual sociology, and the sociology of art. 
Within the Institution of Art specific statements of 
fact- results of a correctly performed elucidation and in-
terpretation of a work of art, say-entail specific evalua-
tions. Consitutive rules lay down specific criteria of evalu-
ation that are binding for members of the Institution. 
[Kj0rup 1976:4 7 -48] 
We need not believe that it works so neatly to see that 
art world participants understand the role of aestheti-
cians and aesthetics this way. 
An art world has many uses for an explicit aesthetic 
system. It ties the activities of participants to the tradi-
tion of the art, justifying their demands for there-
sources and advantages ordinarily available to people 
who produce that kind of art. To be specific, if I can ar-
gue cogently that jazz merits as serious consideration 
on aesthetic grounds as other forms of art music, then 
as a jazz player I can compete for grants and fellow-
ships from the National Endowment for the Arts and 
faculty positions in music schools, perform in the same 
halls as symphony orchestras, and require the same 
attention to the nuances of my work as the most ''seri-
ous'' classical composer or performer. An aesthetic 
shows that, on general grounds successfully argued to 
be valid, what art world members do belongs to the 
same class as other activities already enjoying the ad-
vantages of being "art." 
A well-argued and successfully defended aesthetic 
also guides working participants in the production of 
specific art works. Among the things they keep in mind 
in making the innumerable small decisions that cumu-
latively shape the work are whether and how those de-
cisions might be defended on general grounds. Of 
course, working artists do not refer every small prob-
lem to its most general philosophical grounding to de-
cide how to deal with it, but they know when their deci-
sions run afoul of such theories, if only through a 
vague sense of something "wrong." A general aes-
thetic comes into play more explicitly when someone 
suggests a major change in conventional practice. If, 
as a jazz player, I want to give up the conventional 
twelve- and thirty-two bar formats in which improvising 
has traditionally taken place in favor of those in which 
the length of phrases and sections is among the ele-
ments to be improvised, then I need a defensible ex-
planation of why such a change should be made. 
A coherent and defensible aesthetic, further, can 
help stabilize values and thus regularize practice. Sta-
bilizing value is not just a philosophical exercise; I am 
not talking about value in the ordinary sociological 
sense, but rather about attributes and objects people 
find valuable. Art world participants who agree on a 
work's value can act toward it in roughly similar ways. 
An aesthetic providing a basis on which people can 
assign the same value to things in a reliable and de-
pendable way makes regular patterns of cooperation 
possible. When values are stable, and can be de-
pended on to be stable, other things stabilize as well: 
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the monetary value of works and thus the business ar-
rangements on which the art world runs, the reputa-
tions of artists and collectors, and the worth of institu-
tional and personal collec~ions. The aesthetic created 
by aestheticians justifies the selections of collectors 
by providing a theoretical rationale for their activity. 
From this point of view, aesthetic value arises out of 
a consensus of the participants in an art world. With-
out that consensus, or just to the degree that one does 
not exist, value does not exist in any sociologically 
meaningful sense. (By this I do not suggest a sociolog-
ical imperialism over theories of value, but rather the 
notion that judgments ot value not held jointly by mem-
bers of an art world cannot provide the basis for col-
lective activity which assumes those judgments, and 
thus do not affect their activities significantly, if at all.) 
A work is deemed good, therefore valuable, through 
the achievement of consensus about the basis on 
which it is to be judged and through the application of 
the agreed-on aesthetic principles to the particular 
case. 
But many styles and schools compete for attention 
within an organized art world, demanding that their 
works be shown, published, or performed in place of 
those produced by adherents of other styles and 
schools. Since the art world's distribution system has 
a finite capacity, all works and schools cannot be pre-
sented by it and thus be eligible for the rewards and 
advantages of presentation. Groups compete for ac-
cess to those rewards, among other ways, by logical 
argument proving why they merit presentation. Logical 
analysis seldom settles arguments over the allocation 
of resources, but participants in art worlds, and espe-
cially the people who control access to distribution 
channels, often feel that what they do must be logically 
defensible. The heat arising in discussions of aesthet-
ics usually occurs because what is being decided is 
not only an abstract philosophical question but also an 
, allocation of valuable resources. Whether jazz is 
''really'' music or photography ''really'' art, whether 
free-form jazz is "really" jazz and therefore music or 
fashion photographs are "really" photography and 
therefore art are in part discussions about whether 
people who play free-form jazz can perform in jazz 
, clubs for the already existing jazz audience and 
whether fashion photographs can be exhibited and 
sold in important galleries and museums. 
Aestheticians, then, provide that element in the 
battle for recognition of particular styles and schools 
which consists of making the arguments to convince 
1 other participants in an art world that the work de-
l serves, on logically argued grounds, inclusion within 
, whatever categories that world concerns itself with. 
· The co •• servatism of art worlds, arising out of the way 
( conventional practices cluster in neatly meshed pack-
< ages of mutually adjusted activities, materials, and 
1 places, means that changes will not find an easy re-
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ception. Most changes proposed to participants in art 
worlds are minor, leaving untouched most of the ways 
things are conventionally done. The world of sym-
phonic music, for instance, has not changed the length 
of concert programs very much in recent years, for the 
very good reason that, because of union agreements, 
it would increase their costs to lengthen the programs 
and, because audiences expect eighty or ninety min-
utes of music for the price of a ticket, they dare not 
shorten them very much. (That was not always the 
case. Probably as a result of the unionization of musi-
cians, among other things, concert programs have 
shortened appreciably since, say, Beethoven's time, 
when one concert, for instance, contained two sym-
phonies, a piqno concerto, a concert aria and duet for 
voices, and a period of Beethoven ·improvising on the 
piano [Forbes 1970:255].) Nor has the basic instru-
mentation of the orchestra changed, nor have the tonal 
materials used (i.e., the conventional tempered chro-
matic scale), nor the places in which the music is pre-
sented. Because of all these conservative pressures, 
someone must make a strong argument if some sub-
stantially new practice, even a minor one, is to infil-
trate an existing art world. 
Readers of aesthetic works cannot fail to notice the 
moralistic tone of the writing. Aestheticians take it for 
granted that their job is to find a foolproof formula by 
which things which do not deserve to be called art are 
weeded out from the works which have earned that 
honorific title. I emphasize "deserve" and "earn" be-
cause aesthetic writing insists on a real moral differ-
ence between art and not-art. Aestheticians do not in-
tend simply to classify things into useful categories, as 
we might classify species of plants, but rather to sepa-
rate the deserving from the undeserving, and to do it 
definitively. They do not want to take an inclusive ap-
proach to art, counting in everything that might con-
ceivably add interest or value; they take an ex-
clusionary position, rather, looking for a defensible 
line of reasoning to validate the omission of unworthy 
work. The nature of the enterprise-the bestowing of 
honorific titles-requires them to rule some things out, 
for there is no special honor in a title every conceiv-
able object or activity is entitled to. Since bestowing 
the title "art" involves moral elements, aestheticians 
emphasize a foolproof formula; ideally, there should 
be no ambiguous cases. That aesthetic positions fre-
quently emerge in the course of fighting for the ac-
ceptance of something new does not alter the situa-
tion. Such positions, too, need to show that some 
things are not-art in order to justify the claim that 
something else is. Aesthetics which declare that 
everything is art do not satisfy people who create or 
use them in the life of an art world. 
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Aesthetics and Organization 
The rest of what aestheticians and critics do is to pro-
vide a running revision of the value-creating theory, 
which, in the form of criticism, continuously adapts the 
premises of the theory to the works artists actually 
produce. Artists produce new work in resp~nse not 
only to the considerations of for~al ae~thet1cs but ~l~o 
to the traditions of the art worlds 1n wh1ch they partiCI-
pate-traditions profitably viewed (Kuble~ 196~) as se-
quences of problem definitions and solut1o~~; 1n re- . 
sponse to suggestions implicit in other tra?1t~ons~ as 1n 
the influence of African art on Western pa1ntmg; 1n re-
sponse to the possibilities contained in new technical 
developments; and so on. But an existing aesthetic 
needs to be kept up to date so that it continues to vali-
date logically what has become important art work in 
the experience of audiences, and thus keeping the 
connection between what has already been validated 
and what is now being proposed alive and consistent. 
Since aesthetic principles and systems are part of 
the package of interdependent practices that make up 
an art world, they will both influence and be influenced 
by such aspects of it as the organization of training of 
potential artists and viewers, the organization of finan-
cial and other modes of support, and the modes of dis-
tribution and presentation of works. They will espe-
cially be influenced by a strain toward consistency that 
is implicit in the idea of "art." 
''Art'' is too crude a concept to capture what is at 
work in these situations. Like other complex concepts, 
it really is a generalization about the nature of reality, 
although somewhat disguised. When we try to define 
it, we find many anomalous cases-cases which meet 
some, but not all, of the criteria implied or expressed 
by the concept. In the case of art, we usually mean 
and understand something like this, at a minimum: a 
work possessed of aesthetic value, however that is de-
fined; a work justified by a coherent and defensible 
aesthetic; a work recognized by appropriate people as 
having that kind of value; a work displayed in appropri-
ate places (hung in museums, played at concerts). In 
many instances, however, works have some, but not 
all, of these attributes. They are exhibited and valued 
but either do not have aesthetic value or have aes-
thetic value but are not exhibited and valued by the 
right people. The concept of art suggests that we will 
find all these things co-occuring in the real world; 
when they do not co-occur we have the definitional 
troubles which have always plagued the concept of 
art. I will return to this problem later when I consider 
the institutional theory of art. 
One reason for the mutual influence between aes-
thetic theories and the organizations that make up an 
art world is that some people in art worlds try to mini-
mize these inconsistencies by bringing theory and 
practice into line so that there are fewer anomalous 
cases; others, who wish to upset the status quo, of 
course insist on the anomalies. To illustrate the point, 
consider this question: How many great (or excellent 
or good) works of art are there? I myself am not con-
cerned with fixing a number, nor do I think that the 
number (however we might calculate it) is important. 
But looking at that question will make clear those influ-
ences. 
In 1975, Bill Arnold organized "The Bus Show," an 
exhibition of photographs to be displayed on 500 New 
York City buses (Carlson and Arnold 1978). He in-
tended by this means ''to present excellent photo-
graphs in a public space'' and thus to a much larger 
audience than it ordinarly reaches and to allow many 
more photographers' work to be seen than would ordi-
narily be the case. The photographs were to be dis-
played in the space ordinarily used for advertising; to 
fill the advertising space on one bus required seven-
teen photographs of varying sizes, from nine to sixteen 
inches in height. To fill 500 buses thus required 8,500 
photographs. Arnold intended all of them to be current 
work by contemporary photographers. 
Are there actually 8,500 ''excellent'' contemporary 
photographs which merit that kind of public display? 
Asking that question presupposes an aesthetic and a 
critical position from which we could evaluate photo-
graphs, deciding which ones were or were not of suffi-
ciently high quality. Without attempting to specify the 
content of such an aesthetic, imagine a simplified 
case. Suppose that quality is a unidimensional attrib-
ute so that we can rank all photographs as having 
more or less of it. (In reality, we would find that com-
petent members of the art photography world, even 
those who belong to onaof its many competing seg-
ments, use a large and varied assortment of dimen-
sions in judging photographs.) We can then easily tell 
whether any photograph is better, worse, or equal to 
any other. But we would still not know how many of 
them were worthy of public display, how many merited 
being called "great" or "excellent" or "beautiful," 
and how many were worth being included in a museum 
collection or listed in a comprehensive history of art 
photography. 
To make those judgments requires establishing a 
necessarily arbitrary cutoff point. Even if we decide 
that a substantial "break" at some point in an other-
wise smooth distribution makes it easy to see a major 
difference on either side of it, to use such a break as 
the cutting point would be practically justifiable but 
logically arbitrary. But aesthetic systems propose and 
justify such judgments and divisions of existing art 
works all the time. In fact, the ''Bus Show'' shocked 
people by its implication that the line could justifiably 
be drawn where it would have to be drawn in order to 
fill all 500 buses, and not where it would be more con-
ventionally drawn (if we wanted to have a show of the 
best in contemporary photography, we would find our-
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selves including, if we followed current museum prac-
tice, between 100 and 200 prints). 
If aesthetic systems justify dividing art works into 
those worthy of djsplay or performance and those not, 
that will influence and be influenced by the institutions 
and organizations in which such displays and perform-
ances occur. Institutions have some flexibility in the 
amount of work they can present to the public, but not 
much. Existing facilities (concert halls, art galleries 
and museums, libraries) have finite amounts of space; 
existing canons of taste limit the use to which that 
space can be put (we no longer feel it appropriate to 
hang paintings floor to ceiling in the manner of the 
Paris Salon); and audience expectations and conven-
tionalized attention spans impose further limits (more 
music could be performed if audiences were used to 
sitting through six-hour instead of two-hour concerts, 
although the financial problems, given current union 
wage scales, would make that impossible anyway). 
Existing facilities can always be expanded, but at any 
particular time there is only so much space or time, 
and only so many works can therefore be displayed. 
The aesthetic of the world which has such facilities 
at its disposal can fix the point on our hypothetical one 
dimension of quality so as to produce just the number 
of works for which there is exhibition space. It can fix 
the standard so that there are fewer works to be dis-
played or rewarded than there is room for (something 
of this sort happens when a prize-awarding committee 
decides that no work is worthy of a prize that year). Or 
it can fix the standard so that many more works are 
judged adequate than there is room for. Either of the 
latter two situations produces difficulties, throwing into 
doubt the adequacy of the art world's institutional ap-
paratus, the validity of its aesthetic, or both. There is, 
thus, some pressure for the aesthetic to operate on a 
standard flexible enough to produce approximately the 
amount of work for which the organizations have room 
and, conversely, for the institutions to generate the 
amount of exhibition opportunity required by the works 
the aesthetic certifies as being of the appropriate qual-
ity. These numbers come into further rough agreement 
when artists devote themselves to work for which there 
is room, withdrawing their effort from media and for-
mats which are ''filled up.'' 
When new styles of art emerge they compete for 
available space, in part by proposing new aesthetic 
standards according to which their work merits space 
in existing facilities. They also create new facilities for 
display, as in the c~se of the "Bus Show." Art worlds 
differ in their flexibility, in the ease with which they can 
enlarge the number of works which can easily be 
made available for public inspection in conventional 
facilities. Modern societies have relatively little trouble 
accommodating vast amounts of printed material in li-
braries (although not in easily accessible bookstores 
[Newman 1973]). Music can similarly be distributed in 
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recorded performances in large amounts. But live per-
formances of musical works of various kinds have so 
few outlets that it becomes reasonable for people to 
begin to compose music solely for recording, even to 
the extent of relying on effects which cannot be pro-
duced live, but require the mechanisms of an elabo-
rately outfitted recording studio. 
If aesthetic systems in fact move flexibly so as to 
continue to have the relationship I have just described 
with the mechanisms of distribution which characterize 
an art world, then even the most absolute of them, 
those which most resolutely draw a strict line between 
"art" and "not-art," have in practice a kind of relativ-
ism which defeats that aim. The problem so created is 
spoken to in an interesting way by the institutional the-
ory of aesthetics. 
An Institutional Theory of Aesthetics 
This paper, focusing as it does on questions of social 
organization, does not attempt to develop a sociologi-
cally based theory of aesthetics. In fact, from the per-
spective just sketched of the role of aesthetics in art 
worlds, it is clear that an aesthetic developed in the 
world of sociology would be an idle exercise, since 
only aesthetics developed in connection with the oper-
ations of art worlds are likely to have much influence in 
them. (See Gans 197 4 for an interesting attempt by a 
sociologist to develop an aesthetic, especially in rela-
tion to the question of the aesthetic value of mass me-
dia works.) Ironically enough, a number of philosphers 
have produced a theory that, if not sociological, is suf-
ficiently based on sociological considerations to let us 
see what such an aesthetic might look like. Worth in-
spection on that account alone, analysis of its prem-
ises and of the problems that have arisen in con-
nection with it will also clarify some issues considered 
earlier. 
Textbooks in aesthetics typically distinguish and 
describe several differing, sometimes contradictory, 
theories by which one can decide what is art, what is 
not, what is beautiful, what is not. The coexistence of 
these theories in the texts is not at all surprising, in-
dicating that no one has demonstrated finally, to uni-
versal satisfaction, a foolproof way of making those 
distinctions and that aesthetic theories, like ethical 
theories, continue to be debated. We might expect 
what is roughly true, that new theories-rivaling, ex-
tending, or amending previous ones-arise when 
older theories fail to give an adequate account of the 
virtues of some work which has been widely accepted 
by knowledgeable members of the relevant art world. 
When an aesthetic theory cannot legitimate logically 
what is already legitimate in other ways, someone will 
construct the theory that does legitimate it. (What I say 
here should be understood as pseudohistory, in-
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dicating in a narrative form some relationships which 
may or may not have arisen exactly as I say they did.) 
Thus, putting it crudely, for a long time works of vi-
sual art could be judged on the basis of an imitation 
theory, according to which the object of visual art was 
to imitate nature. At some point that theory no longer 
explained well-regarded new works of art-Monet's 
haystacks and cathedrals, for instance, even if they 
were rationalized as experiments in capturing the rela-
tionship between light and color, or Van Gogh's late 
works. A theory of art as expression then found the vir-
tues of works to reside in their ability to express and 
communicate the emotions, ideas, and personalities of 
the artists who made them. That theory in turn had to 
be repaired or replaced so that it might deal with geo-
metric abstraction, action painting, and other works 
that could not be understood in those terms-just as 
neither theory nor their analogs would be able to say 
anything useful about aleatory music, for instance. 
The institutional theory aims to solve the problems 
raised by works that outrage both commonsense and 
finer sensibilities by showing no trace of the artist at 
all, either in skill or intention. Institutional theorists 
concern themselves with works like the urinal or the 
snow shovel exhibited by Marcel Duchamp, their only 
claim to being art apparently lying in Duchamp's sig-
nature on them, or the Brillo boxes constructed and 
exhibited by Andy Warhol. The commonsense critique 
of these works is that anyone could have done them, 
that they require no skill or insight, that they do not im-
itate anything in nature because they are nature, that 
they do not express anything interesting because they 
are no more than commonplace objects. The critique 
of those with finer sensibilities is much the same. 
Nevertheless, those very works gained great re-
nown in the world of contemporary visual art, inspiring 
many more works like them. Confronted by this fait ac-
compli, aestheticians acted boldly to develop a theory 
that placed the artistic character and quality of the 
work outside the physical art object itself. They found 
those qualities, instead, in the relation of the objects to 
an existing art world, to those institutions and organi-
zations in which art was produced, distributed, appre-
ciated, and discussed. 
Arthur Danto and George Dickie have presented the 
most important statements of this theory. Danto con-
cerned himself with the essence of art, with what in the 
relation between object and art world made that object 
art. In his famous statement of the problem, he said: 
To see something as art requires something the eye can-
not descry-an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge 
of the history of art: an artworld. [Danto 1964:580] 
The theory out of which the idea of making the Brillo 
box arose, the relation of that idea to other ideas about 
what makes art works art and to other objects those 
works inspired-all of these create a context in which 
the making of the Brillo box and the box itself become 
art exactly because that context gives them that sort of 
meaning. In another version: 
The moment something is considered an artwork, it be-
comes subject to an interpretation. It owes its existence as 
an artwork to this, and when its claim to art is defeated, it 
loses its interpretation and becomes a mere thing. The in-
terpretation is in some measure a function of the -artistic 
context of the work: it means something different depend-
ing on its art-historical location, its antecedents, and the 
like. And as an artwork, finally, it acquires a structure 
which an object photographically similar to it is simply 
disqualified from sustaining if it is a real thing. Art exists in 
an atmosphere of interpretation and an artwork is thus a 
vehicle of interpretation. [Danto 1973:15] 
Dickie deals with the organizational forms and 
mechanisms. According to his perfected definition: 
A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact, 
(2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it 
the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or 
persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the 
artworld). [Dickie 1975:34] 
A sizable and interesting secondary literature has 
grown up around this point of view, criticizing and am-
plifying it (Cohen 1973; Sclafani 1973a and b; Blizek 
197 4; Danto 197 4; Mitias 1975; Silvers 1976). Sociol-
ogists will undoubtedly see a family resemblance be-
tween the institutional theory of art and the various so-
ciological theories that make their subject matter the 
way social definitions create reality (e.g., the so-called 
labeling theory of deviance), for both make the charac-
ter of their subject matter depend on the way people 
acting collectively define that character. 
There is a difference, however, and not a surprising 
one. Philosophers tend to argue from hypothetical ex-
amples and with stripped-down references to reality. 
Thus, the '' artworld'' referred to by Dickie and Dan to 
does not have a great deal of meat on its bones, only 
what is minimally necessary to make the points they 
want to make, and the criticisms made of their posi-
tions do not make much reference to the character of 
existing art worlds or ones which have existed, but 
rather to matters of logical consistency in the con-
structs used in the theory. None of the participants in 
these discussions develop as organizationally com-
plicated a conception of what an art world is as I have 
elsewhere (Becker 197 4, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1979), 
although I do not think my description is incompatible 
with their arguments. If we make use of a more ex-
tended and empirically based notion of what an art 
world is, however, we can make headway on some 
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problems the philosophical discussion has bogged 
down in, thus perhaps being helpful to aestheticians 
while simultaneously deepening our own analysis. 
Who? Who can confer on something the status of 
candidate for appreciation, and thus ratify it as art? 
What person or persons can act on behalf of that cer-
tain social institution, the art world? Dickie settles this 
question boldly. He describes the art world as having 
core personnel: 
... a loosely organized, but nevertheless related, set of 
persons including artists ... producers, museum direc-
tors, museum-goers, theater-goers, reporters for newspa-
pers, critics for publications of all sorts, art historians, art 
theorists, philosophers of art, and others. These are the 
people who keep the machinery of the artworld working 
and thereby provide for its continuing existence. [Dickie 
1975:35-36] 
But he also insists: 
In addition, every person who sees himself as a member of 
the artworld is thereby a member. [Ibid.] 
That last sentence, of course, alerts aestheticians; 
Dickie's approach will probably not satisfy their feeling 
that it is necessary to be able to distinguish the de-
serving from the undeserving and this definition is 
therefore going to be too broad. They cannot accept 
the implication of Dickie's remark, which is that the 
representatives of the art world who will be conferring 
the honorific status of art on objects are self-ap-
pointed, and express their discontent in a rash of hu-
morous examples. What if a zookeeper decides that he 
is a member of the art world and, in that capacity, con-
fers the status of candidate for appreciation, and thus 
of art work, on the elephant he tends? That could not 
really make the elephant a work of art, could it? Be-
cause, after all, the zookeeper really could not act on 
behalf of the art world, could he? We all know the an-
swers: The elephant just isn't an art work (Dickie 
1971; Blizek 197 4). 
But how do we know that? We know it because we 
have a commonsense understanding of the organiza-
tion of art worlds. A relevant feature of organized art 
worlds is that, however their position is justified, some 
people are commonly seen by many or most interested 
parties as being more entitled to speak on behalf of the 
art world than others; the entitlement stems from their 
being recognized by the other participants in the coop-
erative activities through which that world's works are 
produced and consumed as people who are entitled to 
do that. Whether other art world members accept 
these people as capable of deciding what art is be-
cause they have more experience, because they have 
an innate gift for recognizing art, or simply because 
they are, after all, the people who are in charge of 
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such things and therefore ought to know-whatever 
the reason, what gives them the ability to make the dis-
tinction and make it stick is that the other participants 
agree that they should be allowed to do it and that this 
agreement is one of the routine and interdependent 
activities that make up the art world. 
Sociological analysts need not decide who is enti-
tled to decide that things are art (or, to use Dickie's 
language, to confer the status of candidate for appre-
ciation). We need only observe which people members 
of the art world treat as capable of doing that and al-
low to do it, in the sense that once those people have 
decided something is art, the others act as though it 
were in whatever ways might be appropriate. 
Some common observations made in art worlds 
show that the philosophical desire to be able to make 
definitive distinctions between art and non-art objects 
cannot be satisfied by the institutional theory. For one 
thing, there is seldom complete agreement on who is 
entitled to speak on behalf of the art world as a whole. 
Some people occupy institutional positions which give 
them the de facto right to decide what will be accept-
able. Museum directors, for instance, had the power to 
decide whether photography was an art because they 
could decide whether or not to exhibit photographs in 
their museums. They even had the power to decide 
what kind of art (e.g., "minor" or whatever the oppo-
site of that is) photography was by deciding whether 
photographs would be exhibited in the main galleries 
in which paintings were ordinarily exhibited or whether 
they would be confined to a special place with less 
prestige in which only photographs were shown. But 
some people might argue that museum directors are 
incompetent to make the judgments they do make, that 
in a better world they would not be allowed to make 
such judgments because they are ignorant, prej-
udiced, and influenced by extraneous considerations. 
Some might think they are too avant-garde and do not 
give proper attention to established styles and genres; 
others, just the opposite (Haacke 1976, passim). 
Art world members also disagree over whether the 
decisions of occupants of certain positions really make 
any difference; this disagreement reflects their ambig-
uous position in the art world. It is frequently not clear 
whether a particular critic's decision has any con-
sequences or whether the activities of others will be 
conditioned by that decision; very often that will de-
pend on a variety of conting.encies arising from politi-
cal shifts and struggles within the art world. Insofar as 
art world members find this process ambiguous, the 
status of such people as critics, dealers, and members 
of prize and fellowship committees will likewise be am-
biguous, as will the status of whatever pronounce-
ments they make. The ambiguity is not remediable by 
philosophic or social analysis; it exists because the 
people whose deference would ratify the status defer 
sporadically and erratically. 
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Thus, we cannot make the an-or-nothing judgments 
aestheticians would like to make about whether works 
are or are not art. Since the degree of consensus 
about who can decide what art is will vary greatly from 
one situation to another, a realistic view reflects that 
uncertainty by allowing "art-ness," whether or not an 
object is art, to be a continuous variable rather than an 
all-or-nothing dichotomy. 
Similarly, we can see that art worlds vary in the 
kinds of activities carried on by their members that em-
body and ratify the assigning of the status of art to an 
object or event. On the one hand, material benefits, 
such as the award of fellowships, prizes, commissions, 
display space, and other exhibition opportunities (pub-
lication, production, etc.), have the immediate con-
sequence of helping the artist to continue producing 
work. On the other hand, such intangible benefits as 
being taken seriously by the more knowledgeable 
members of the art world have indirect but important 
consequences for artistic careers, placing the recipi-
ent in the flow of ideas in which change and develop-
ment take place in the world's concerns and providing 
day-to-day validation of work concerns and help with 
daily problems-rewards denied those who are merely 
successful in more conventional career terms. 
What? What characteristics must an object have to 
be a work of art? The institutional theory suggests that 
anything might be capable of appreciation. In fact, in 
response to a critic who says that some objects-
, 'ordinary thumbtacks, cheap white envelopes, the 
plastic forks given at some drive-in restaurants"- just 
cannot be appreciated (Cohen 1973: 78), Dickie says: 
But why cannot the ordinary qualities of Fountain [the uri-
nal Duchamp exhibited as a work of art]- its gleaming 
white surface, the depth revealed when it reflects images 
of surrounding objects, its pleasing oval shape- be appre-
ciated. It has qualities similar to those of works by Bran-
cusi and Moore which many do not balk at saying they ap-
preciate. Similarly, thumbtacks, envelopes, and plastic 
forks have qualities that can be appreciated if one makes 
the effort to focus attention on them. One of the values of 
photography is its ability to focus on and bring out the 
qualities of quite ordinary objects. And the same sort of 
thing can be done without the benefit of photography just 
by looking. [Dickie 1975: 42] 
Can anything at all be turned into art, just by some-
one's saying so? 
. . . it cannot be this simple: even if in the end it is suc-
cessful christening which makes an object art, not every 
attempt at christening is successful. There are bound to 
be conditions to be met both by the namer and the thing to 
be named, and if they are completely unsatisfied, then 
saying "I christen ... "will not be to christen. [Cohen 
1973: 80] 
Cohen is right: not every attempt to label something art 
is successful. But it does not follow that there are, ac-
cordingly, some constraints on the nature of the object 
or event itself which make certain objects ipso facto 
not art and incapable of being redefined in that way. 
The constraints that undoubtedly exist in any spe-
cific art world on what can be defined as art arise from 
a prior consensus on what kinds of standards will be 
applied, and by whom, in making those judgments. Art 
world members characteristically, despite all their doc-
trinal and other differences, produce quite reliable 
judgments about which artists and works are serious 
and therefore worthy of attention. Thus, jazz players 
who disagree over stylistic preferences can never-
theless agree on whether a given performer or per-
formance "swings," and theater people likewise make 
quite reliable judgments of whether a particular scene 
''works.'' Artists may disagree violently over which 
works and their makers should receive support, and 
marginal cases (especially those in styles just being in-
corporated into the conventional practice of the art 
world or those on the verge of being thrown out as no 
longer worthy of serious consideration) will provoke 
less reliable judgments. But most judgments are re-
liable, and that reliability reflects not the mouthing of 
already agreed-on judgments but rather the system-
atic application by trained and experienced members 
of the art world of similar standards; it is what Hume 
(1854) described in his essay on taste, and it is similar 
to the way a group of doctors, confronted with a set of 
clinical findings, will arrive at a similar diagnosis (anal-
ogies can be found in every area of specialized work). 
In that sense, not everything can be made into a 
work of art, just by definition or the creation of con-
sensus, for not everything will pass muster under cur-
rently accepted standards in the art world. But this 
does not mean that there is any more to making some-
thing art than, to use Cohen's term, christening it. It is 
also a matter of christening if the entire art world 
agrees on standards that, if they are automatically ap-
plied, some works clearly meet, so that their classifica-
tion as art is self-evident, and others as clearly fail to 
meet; the consensus arises because reasonable mem-
bers of the world will have no difficulty in classifying 
works under such circumstances. Constraints on what 
can be defined as art exist, but they constrain because 
of the conjunction of the characteristics of objects and 
the rules of classification current in the world in which 
they are proposed as art works . 
Further, those standards, being matters of con-
sensus, change. Much of the running dialogue of art-
ists and other participants in art worlds has to do with 
making day-to-day adjustments in the content and ap-
plication of standards of judgment. In the early 1 930s 
jazz players, critics, and aficionados all agreed that 
electrical instruments could not produce real music. 
Charlie Christian's performances on the electric guitar 
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convinced so many people that they were having the 
same sort of experience from his playing that they did 
from music played on a nonelectric instrument that the 
canon was quickly revised. 
How much? Aestheticians, both the institutionalists 
and their critics, worry about the effect of aesthetic 
theorizing on artists and art worlds. They express the 
fear, for instance, that an aesthetic theory which is too 
restrictive will be unnecessarily depressing to artists 
and might perhaps unduly constrict their creativity. 
This overestimates the degree to which art worlds take 
their direction from aesthetic theorizing; the influence 
probably runs in the other direction. But the institution-
alists draw one important implication from their analy-
sis: Practicing artists, if they want to have their work 
accepted as art, will have to persuade the appropriate 
people to certify what they have done as art. (While the 
basic institutional analysis suggests that anyone can 
do that, in practice these theorists accept the existing 
art world as the one which has to be persuaded to do 
the job.) But if art is what an art world ratifies as art, 
then I might suggest an alternative strategy, one I have 
analyzed in more detail elsewhere (Becker 1975, 
1979)-the strategy of organizing an art world de 
novo, which will then ratify as art what one produces. 
In fact, the strategy has been used often and with con-
siderable success. Others have tried it and failed, but 
that does not mean it is not a reasonable possibility. 
Several difficulties arise in creating a new art world 
to ratify work which has no home in already existing 
art worlds. Resources (especially financial support) 
will probably have been allocated to already existing 
artistic activities, so that one needs to develop new 
sources of support, new pools of personnel, and new 
sources of materials and other facilities (including 
space in which to perform and display works). Since 
existing aesthetic theories have not ratified the work, a 
new aesthetic must be developed and new modes of 
criticism and standards of judgment enunciated. To 
say that these things must be done, however, raises an 
interesting question of the definitional kind that philo-
sophical analysis provokes. How much of the appa-
ratus of an organized art world must be created before 
the work in question will be treated seriously by a 
larger audience than that supporting the original group 
that wanted to create the new world? What it takes to 
convince people will vary a great deal. Some will re-
quire an elaborate ideological explanation. Oth-
ers-theater managers, operators of recording stu-
dios, printers-will ask only for guarantees that their 
bills be paid. 
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This question need not, indeed should not, be an-
swered by enunciating criteria. Rather, we should real-
ize that the activities involved can be carried on by 
varying numbers of people, and without the full-blown 
institutional apparatus of such a well-equipped world 
as that, for instance, which surrounds contemporary 
sculpture and painting or symphonic music and grand 
opera. When we speak of art worlds, we usually have 
in mind these well-equipped ones, but in fact paint-
ings, books, music, and all sorts of artistic objects and 
performances can be produced without all the support 
personnel these worlds have and are dependent on: 
critics, impresarios, furnishers of materials and equip-
ment, providers of space, audiences. At an extreme, 
remember, any artistic activity can in principle be done 
by one person, who performs all the necessary activi-
ties (Becker 1976); this is not common and not a con-
dition many artists aspire to (though one they some-
times yearn for when they have trouble with their 
fellow participants). As the number of people involved 
grows, a point is reached at which some stable nu-
cleus of people cooperates regularly to produce the 
same sort of work; as the number grows larger than 
that, a point might be reached at which individual art-
ists can produce work for a large audience of people 
they do not know personally and still have a reason-
able expectation of being taken seriously. Call that 
first point of organization an esoteric world, and the 
latter an exoteric one. The names and cut-off points 
are not so important as the recognition that these are 
more or less arbitrary, the reality being a variety of 
points that vary along several continua. 
How many? Neither Dickie nor Danto is very clear 
as to how many art worlds there are . Dickie says: 
The artworld consists of a bundle of systems: theater, 
painting, sculpture, literature, music, and so on, each of 
which furnishes an institutional background for the confer-
ring of status on objects within its domain. No limit can be 
placed on the number of systems that can be brought un-
der the generic conception of art, and each of the major 
subsystems contains further subsystems. These features 
of the artworld provide the elasticity whereby creativity of 
even the most radical sort can be accommodated. A whole 
new system comparable to the theater, for example, could 
be added in one fell swoop. What is more likely is that a 
new subsystem would be added within a system. For ex-
ample, junk sculpture added within sculpture, happenings 
added within theater. Such additions might in time develop 
into full-blown systems. [Dickie 1975:33] 
Blizek (197 4) sees that there is an empirical question 
in this but also sees that the definition of '' artworld'' is 
so loose that it is not clear whether there is one art-
world, of which these are subparts, or a number of 
them, possibly unrelated; further, that if there are a 
number of artworlds they might conflict. Several ob-
servations are relevant here. 
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1 Empirically, we can see that not only are there the 
worlds of various art media, but that these may be sub-
divided at times into quite separate and almost non-
communicating segments. I have spoken of schools 
and styles as though they competed for the same re-
wards and audiences, but often they do not. Instead, 
members of one group develop audiences and other 
sources of support from sectors of society that would 
not have supported those other art world segments 
with whom they might compete. Thus, many painting 
worlds rely on the same suppliers as recognized con-
temporary artists for materials, but have quite sepa-
rate, and often very successful, arrangements for ex-
hibiting, distributing, and supporting their work. The 
Cowboy Artists of America, for instance, produce 
paintings for people who would like to buy works by 
Charles Russell and Frederick Remington, genre 
painters of the American cowboy West whose work is 
exhibited in "real" museums, but cannot afford them 
or cannot find any to buy: 
Despite determined inattention by Eastern art critics, cow-
boy painting and sculpture are so popular that their prices 
are inflating faster than intrastate natural gas. Cowboy art 
has its own heroes, its own galleries and even its own pub-
lishing house. [Lichtenstein 1977:41] 
Regional segments are not so isolated as this, tending 
to be oriented to the metropolitan centers of the "big" 
art world (McCall1977). Their participants suffer from 
a lack of exhibition opportunities but even more from 
the sense that success in their region will do them little 
or no good in the larger world they aspire to but which 
is almost totally unaware of them. 
2 If we define art worlds by the activities their partici-
pants carry on collectively (Becker 197 4), we can ap-
proach the problem of a general art world by asking 
what activities a general art world-one which encom-
passes all the conventional arts- might carry on col-
lectively in such a way that we might want to refer to it 
as one art world. I can think of two. On the one hand 
the various media-oriented subcommunities suffer ' 
from many of the same external problems. Thus, a de-
pression might make it harder for all the specific art 
forms to secure financial support (although the experi-
ence of the Great Depression in the United States 
does not wholly bear this out). A common situation is 
one in which the government imposes censorship on 
all the arts in a similar way, so that the experience of 
people in one arena can be read as a sign of what one 
can expect in another. Thus a theatrical designer 
might make his own professional decisions on the 
basis of what the censors might do about a play he is 
interested in, arriving at the assessment by hearing 
about what they have done about a recording by a 
popular singer, a recent novel, or a new film. Insofar as 
the participants in all these worlds share experiences, 
interpretations, and predictions vis-a-vis the censors, 
they might be said to be engaging in a form of collec-
tive activity and thus to constitute an art world. 
In another direction, artists in various media-
oriented worlds may find that they want to achieve sim-
ilar kinds of things in their work and share ideas and 
perspectives on how to accomplish that. For example, 
during periods of intense nationalism, many artists 
may see it as their job to somehow symbolize the char-
acter and aspirations of their country or people in the 
works they create. To do that, they have to find im-
agery and techniques which will convey the ideas and 
feelings they have in mind as well as finding the ideas 
and feelings themselves. Insofar as participants in var-
ious worlds debate these questions across media 
lines, they might be said to be participants in one gen-
eral art world. 
3 Particular artistic institutions often use people from 
other fields as support personnel for the work that is 
central in their own field. Thus, visual artists create 
settings for theatrical and dance performances, writers 
produce librettos for operas, musicians compose and 
play backgrounds for films, and so on. Insofar as these 
activities bring people together across subworld lines, 
they might be said to be participating in a general art 
world. Furthermore, because of these possibilities, 
people from worlds not already connected in this way 
may find it interesting to contemplate new forms of col-
laboration, thus creating further links in the general art 
world. Finally, participants in specific art worlds often 
come from a limited sector of the environing society, 
for instance, the educated upper middle class or petty 
aristocracy. They will thus have connections with eacn 
other by virtue of having attended school together or 
coming from families connected by kinship or friend-
ship, and these connections will serve to create a gen-
eral art world or, at least, to provide the basis in regu-
lar associations which might enable them to 
collaborate in the kinds of activities already men-
tioned. 
The analysis of this problem makes clear that 
speaking of art worlds means using shorthand. ''Art 
world," remember, is just a way of talking about 
people who participate in the making of art works in a 
routine way. The routine interaction is what constitutes 
the art world's existence, so questions of definition 
can generally be resolved by looking at who actually 
participates with whom in doing what. In that way, the 
logical and definitional problems of the institutional 
aesthetic theory (which has a strong empirical com-
ponent) can be resolved by knowledge of the facts of 
any particular case. 
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The institutional theory of aesthetics, as we have seen, 
itself illustrates the process analyzed in the first part of 
this paper. When an established aesthetic theory does 
not provide a logical and defensible legitimation of 
what artists are doing and, more important, what the 
other institutions of the art world-especially distribu-
tion organizations and audiences-accept as art and 
as excellent art, professional aestheticians will begin 
to provide the required new rationale. If they do not, 
someone else probably will, although the rest of the 
participants might just go ahead without a defensible 
rationale for their actions. (Whether one is required 
depends on the amount of controversy, engendered by 
what they are doing and what they are confronted 
with.) When earlier theories of art and beauty failed to 
explain or give a rationale for the enjoyment and cele-
bration of contemporary works widely regarded as ex-
cellent, given the amount of argument and competition 
for space and other resources and honors in the world 
of contemporary art, and given the number of profes-
sional philosophers who might find the problem in-
triguing, it was a certainty that something like the insti-
tutional theory would be produced. 
By shifting the locus of the definitional problem from 
something inherent in the object to some relation be-
tween the object and an entity called an art world, the 
institutional theory makes it once again possible for art 
world participants to find justification for their activi-
ties, and to be able to answer the kind of question lev-
eled at their work that is philosophically so distressing; 
that is, the question predicated on the failure to find 
any trace of skill or beauty, thought or emotion, in the 
works regarded as excellent, and the questions asking 
if the same works could not have been produced by a 
chimpanzee, a child, an insane person, or any ordinary 
member of the society without particular artistic talent. 
The latter example-that anyone could do it-is per-
haps the most damaging. It suggests that artists have 
no special gift or talent, and thus that the rationale for 
regarding them as special members of the art world (or 
the society), entitled by virtue of the display of that tal-
ent to special rewards, is fallacious. The institutional 
theory allows art world participants to define that spe-
cial talent in the new way, as, for example, the ability 
to invent imaginative new concepts, thereby conferring 
legitimacy on the artist's special role and rewards. 
Looking at the institutional theory adds some 
nuances to the description of art worlds. We see that 
art world officials have the power to legitimate work as 
art, but that power is often disputed, so that there is 
room for argument. As a result, the aesthetician's de-
sire for definitive criteria ·by which to distinguish art 
from non-art, insofar as those criteria might be found 
in or be expected to be congruent with the actions of 
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art world officials, cannot be satisfied. That is of some 
interest because aestheticians are not the only ones 
with such a desire. In fact, sociologists often insist that 
fields such as the sociology of art or religion or sci-
ence settle on some definitive criterion of their subject 
matter. If that criterion is expected to be congruent 
with either popular or official conceptions of art, the 
sociological wish for a definitive criterion is likewise 
unsatisfiable. 
We see too that, in principle, any kind of object or 
action can be legitimated as art, but that in practice 
every art world has procedures and rules for making 
those distinctions which, while not clearcut or fool-
proof, nevertheless make the success of some can-
didates for the status of art work very unlikely. Those 
procedures and rules are contained in the conventions 
and patterns of cooperation by which art worlds carry 
on their routine activities. 
Finally, we see how it might be possible to speak of 
all the arts as comprising one big art world. Insofar as 
members of specialized subworlds cooperate in some 
activities related to their work, that cooperative activ-
ity-be it vis-a-vis government censorship, the devel-
opment of nationalist art, or whatever-can be seen as 
the operation of one big art world. Such cooperation 
may be relatively uncommon, and probably is most of 
the time in any society, so that we might want to say 
that the operative art worlds are those of the particular 
media; but this question, like the others, is empirical, 
and its answer will be found by research. 
Note 
An earlier version of this paper was given at the Fifth Annual Conference 
on Social Theory and the Arts , Syracuse University) April 1978. It will 
appear in a slightly different form in my forthcoming book, Art Worlds 
(tentative title}, to be published by the University of California Press. 
Some ideas referred to briefly in this paper are explained more fully in 
Art Worlds , and in my earlier papers as noted in the text. 
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Psychological States and the Artist: 
The Problem of Michelangelo 
Jane Kromm 
The reality of Michelangelo's melancholia has in the 
past been a major consideration in the work of schol-
ars attempting to understand the difficult personality of 
this great artist. Interpretations have ranged from an 
extreme, virtually psychotic, melancholia to a general 
melancholic state of mind affected to indicate creative 
suffering. In recent scholarship, however, judgments 
have become more severe. For example, Howard Hib-
bard (1974:175, 179) maintains variously that Michel-
angelo was "ultra-sensitive," "undoubtedly neurotic," 
and subject to "continual depression," in a somewhat 
liberal use of modern psychological terms. Such po-
tentially diagnostic adjectives may be the modern ex-
tension of a long-established tradition aptly summa-
rized by the Wittkowers: 
There cannot be many adjectives that have not, at one 
time or another, been used to characterize his [Michelan-
gelo's] personality. He has been called avaricious and 
generous; superhuman and puerile; modest and vain; vio-
lent, suspicious, jealous, misanthropic, extravagant, tor-
mented, bizarre, and terrible, and this list is far from being 
complete. [1963:72] 
This quantity of adjectives, whose range alone sug-
gests ambivalence, if not ambiguity, raises some con-
cerns about their effect on Michelangelo studies. Spe-
cifically, questions about the function and subsequent 
influence of these descriptive terms come to mind. 
Such usage is, it seems, primarily expressive, an au-
thor's attempt to convey some intangible aspect of the 
artist's work and personality. Such a function is sug-
gested by these observations: ''A tragic, a pathetic 
feeling is found in most of Michelangelo's works, 
... (Weinberger 1967:2), and "Michelangelo's grue-
somest image of rejection is a bundle of shame and 
despair'' (Steinberg 1975a:52-53). Sometimes a seri-
ous attempt is made to assimilate Michelangelo's 
character to modern categories of psychology when 
the suggestion of psychosis is implied: ''The Lives of 
Condivi and Vasari clearly reflect Michelangelo's para-
noid hostility to Bramante" or the contention that Mi-
chelangelo's rivalry with Raphael ''scarred Michelan-
gelo for life and impaired his perception of reality'' 
(Hibbard 1974:92, 144). And even terms borrowed 
from psychological dynamics are recruited in the sug-
gestion that a "gradual catharsis characterizes the de-
velopment of his personality as well as the structure of 
his individual works" (de Tolnay 1960:94). 
Jane Kromm is a Doctoral Candidate, Graduate Insti-
tute of Liberal Arts, Emory University, and a Lecturer 
in Art History, Atlanta College of Art. 
As this last example suggests, characterizations of 
Michelangelo's personality often lead to, and some-
times replace, our critical understanding of stylistic 
problems and anomalies in Michelangelo's art. That 
this tendency is pervasive is seen both in general ob-
servations that' 'works ... translate the passionate 
side of his temperament'' and in specific instances 
such as the David, in which "an ambiguous, unfulfilled, 
emotionally tense moment in the hero's career" is said 
''to correspond to his [Michelangelo's] own mental 
state'' (de Tolnay 1975:2-3, Hibbard 197 4:61 ). Or 
that the strangely antiheroic subject matter of the 
Battle of Cascina gave Michelangelo the ''opportunity 
of projecting ... the emotional stresses of his early 
existence" (Hartt 1964:26). 
Although no one would seriously hold that Michel-
angelo was mad, few are willing to consider his art un-
touched by personal conflict. Remarks about such 
conflict frequently accompany explanations of the dis-
crepancies in stylistic development in Michelangelo's 
early works. Dissimilarities between the Battle of the 
Centaurs and the Madonna of the Stairs are said to 
correspond to ''the need which the young artist felt to 
express in disparate works the contrary tendencies of 
his being: the contemplative, seeking to evoke the 
eternal image of beauty, and the active, seeking to in-
carnate the turbulent forces of his own temperament'' 
(de Tolnay 1975:2-3). The stylistic differences be-
tween the Santo Spirito Crucifix and the San Petronio 
statues are similarly attributed to ''various aspects of 
Michelangelo's unfolding personality, from an extreme 
grace and gentleness to an emotional violence'· pre-
viously formed by Michelangelo's childhood experi-
ences of ''the rivalries of a male-dominated environ-
ment'' (Hartt 1964:20, 17). Such dichotomous 
characteristics and their potential to result in conflict 
are even used to describe Michelangelo's entire artis-
tic career as an expression of "psychic as well as 
overt conflict, a strong sense of frustration" (Hibbard 
197 4:25) so pervasive that it can even be found in Mi-
chelangelo's architectural designs in their "evocation 
of compression and frustration'' (Ackerman 1 966:1 7). 
It would seem not merely coincidental that many of the 
Wittkowers' adjectives take the form of antitheses. In a 
more critical spirit, such antitheses are not always 
seen as reflections of Michelangelo's personality, but 
rather as "metaphors of strength under constraint, of 
individual will overruled" (Steinberg 1975b:37). 
Even though many of the personal qualities as-
cribed to Michelangelo carrying the implication of seri-
ous mental disturbance to modern thinking about per-
sonality have been attributed to the topos of the 
melancholic artist of the Renaissance (Wittkower 
1963:chaps. 4 and 5), the tendency to consider Mi-
chelangelo unstable in a modern sense continues. 
Moreover, it is clear that such interpretations have a 
tendency to become serious avenues by which the 
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style and iconography of Michelangelo's oeuvre are 
often approached. Therefore, in an attempt to clarify 
the problem of Michelangelo's state of mind, this study 
will utilize some of Michelangelo's letters and poems, 
his art, and the biographies by Condivi and Vasari. 1 
Perhaps a clearer notion of the psychological charac-
teristics Michelangelo demonstrated may be ascer-
tained from these primary sources, along with a deter-
mination of whether diagnoses of severe conditions 
such as neurosis, constant depression, and psychosis 
are valid. Considering that melancholia and psychosis 
have not always been so closely allied in the past as 
they are in our century, Renaissance attitudes toward 
both phenomena will also be examined. A major 
source in this aspect of our investigation is Ariosto's 
Orlando Furioso, in which, as it well known, the pro-
tagonist succumbs to madness. In this way it is hoped 
that an understanding of Michelangelo's personality, 
and of the RenaisJ>ance conceptions of melancholia 
and madness, may be more accurately delineated. 
The experiences of Michelangelo that may be con-
strued as evidence of melancholia seem to cluster 
around several characteristic features. These are a 
sense of suffering from the harshness of existence, 
sadness revealed through introspective insight, grief 
and mourning, love, depression, and ruminative or ob-
sessional concerns. 
Suffering from the harshness of existence is a fre-
quent theme in Michelangelo's letters. He refers to his 
"miserable existence" and to his living conditions as 
affording him ·'the greatest discomfort'' (Ramsden 
1963:vol. I, letters 33 and 37). 2 Most of these com-
plaints, however, are directed toward Michelangelo's 
family in circumstances in which their demands upon 
him appear to strain him, and are often completed by 
the phrase that Michelangelo suffers only to help his 
family. A letter of 1509 states: 
For 12 years now I have gone about all over Italy, leading 
a miserable life; I have borne every kind of humiliation, 
suffered every kind of hardship, worn myself to the bone 
with every kind of labor, risked my very life in a thousand 
dangers, solely to help my family; ... [Ramsden 1963: 
vol. I, letter 49]3 
followed three years later by: 
For I lead a miserable existence and reck not of life nor 
honor-that is of this world; I live wearied by stupendous 
labors and beset by a thousand anxieties. And thus have 1 
lived for some 1 5 years now and never an hour of happi-
ness have I had, and all this have I done in order to help 
you, ... [Ramsden 1963:vol.l, letter 82]4 
The theme of victimization is obvious and recurrent. To 
what extent these plaints induced guilt in Michelan-
gelo's family is not ascertainable, but the somewhat 
manipulative and reproachful qualities of the letters 
are less revealing for our purposes than is Michelan-
gelo's poetry when it treats the same subject. 
That a harsh life suits Michelangelo's interpretation 
of life and art is expressed in the following excerpts 
from his poems of 1 532 and 1 54 7, respectively: 
I live on my own death; if I see right, 
My life with an unhappy lot is happy; 
If ignorant how to live on death and worry, 
Enter into this fire, where I'm destroyed and burnt. 
[Gilbert 1963:36, no. 54]5 
No one has mastery 
Before he is at the end 
Of his art and his life. 
[Gilbert 1963:1 73, no. 323]6 
Michelangelo reveals his understanding of the benefits 
such an existence can provide; in fact, several poems 
reveal not only a sense of the positive value of dis-
tress, but an ironic appreciation of the inherent para-
dox: 
I get my happiness from my dejection, 
And these disturbances give me rest; 
To him who asks it, God may grant ill-fortune! 
[Gilbert 1963:150, no. 265; terza rima stanzas, Girardi 
267] 
My honored art, wherein I was for a time 
In such esteem, has brought me down to this: 
Poor and old, under another's thumb. 
I am undone if I do not die fast! 
[Gilbert 1963:151, no. 265; Girardi 267] 
The harsh existence to which Michelangelo has 
subscribed is one of hard work and dedication, ac-
companied by the difficulties which such a course en-
tails, dealing as it does with the extremes of existence. 
That such an interpretation of life is not without its pre-
tensions is acknowledged by Michelangelo through his 
ironic self-criticism. This aspect of Michelangelo's suf-
fering, then, appears to be self-inflicted, satisfying, 
and tied strongly to a sense of striving toward a higher 
goal. The extent to which these features comprise 
melancholia is certainly minimal. It is both a common-
place and long-standing feature of melancholia for in-
trospection to lead to inaction, a view clearly unte-
nable in this instance. 
These examples point toward our next theme, the 
consideration of Michelangelo's insight into his own 
experience. In this vein, Michelangelo adds in a letter 
of 1515 to his father: "I do not go running after fictions 
and am not therefore quite crazy, as you all imagine 
(italics mine)'' (Ramsden 1963:vol. I, letter 1 07). 7 It is 
instructive that this excerpt reveals Michelangelo's 
own conception of madness as a failure to discern the 
truth; that is, a mentality immersed in delusions or illu-
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sions is what he emphasizes in this use of pazzia. And 
that Michelangelo does not think himself possessed of 
this characteristic is suggested in the following letter 
of 1524: 
Yet because they say they find me in some way strange 
and obsessed, which harms no one but myself, they pre-
sume to speak ill of me and to abuse me; which is the re-
ward of all honest men. [Ramdsden 1963: vol. I, letter 
161t 
Michelangelo understands his own difficulty as being 
obsessional in nature, and another letter of 1542 con-
firms the constancy of his point of view: 
I reply that one paints with the head and not with the 
hands, and if one cannot concentrate, one brings dis-
grace upon oneself. Therefore, until my affair is settled, I 
can do no good work. [Ramsden 1963:vol. II, letter 227]9 
Moreover, this passage reveals the obsessional's con-
cern with thought, with the products of thought, and 
with the preeminent position of work and accomplish-
ment in the obsessional character's view of exis-
tence.10 
It is commonly accepted that Michelangelo's insight 
into his own character was remarkable, but that his un-
derstanding of this character as obsessive is rarely, if 
ever, emphasized. A frequently quoted letter of 1525 
reveals this understanding quite emphatically: 
Yesterday evening our friend Capt. Cuio and several 
other gentlemen kindly invited me to go and have supper 
with them, which gave me the greatest pleasure, as I 
emerged a little from my depression, or rather from my 
obsession. I not only enjoyed the supper, which was ex-
tremely pleasant, but also, and even more than this, the 
discussions which took place. [Ramsden 1963:vol. I, let-
ter 170r 1 
From the context of Michelangelo's numerous uses of 
pazzo, it would seem that he considered himself to be 
more obsessed and preoccupied with his thoughts 
than depressed, a state which our other excerpts sup-
port.12 Regarding thought content, however, the differ-
ential between melancholia and an obsession with 
melancholic or sad concerns may be difficult to ascer-
tain. From an analysis of the letters and poems alone, 
it is likely that we may conclude only the coexistence 
of these two major characteristics, the melancholic 
and the obsessional. However, the biographies by 
Condivi and Vasari, which contain information con-
cerning two important variables in this differen-
tial-Michelangelo's habits of daily life and his reac-
tions to the loss of loved ones (both aspects being 
diagnostically significant to the melancholic and ob-
sessional conditions)-will be considered. 
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In their treatment of Michelangelo's life, both Con-
divi and Vasari make generalized statements regard-
ing Michelangelo's character. They explain his reputa-
tion as being eccentric and bizarre to be the result of 
the zeal to which he dedicated himself to art rather 
than some problem within his own personality. Vasari 
also firmly states: ''Art does not permit wandering of 
the mind" (Vasari 1946 ed.:292). Again, the Witt-
kowers, in Born under Saturn, confirm that much artis-
tic bizarrie in this period may be ascribed to a self-
conscious eccentricity to which nearly all Renaissance 
artists conformed, rather than to personality disorders 
(Wittkower 1963:chaps. 4 and 5). 
Vasari and Condivi deal with Michelangelo's habits 
of daily living-in particular, his eating and sleeping 
habits. Although differing somewhat in their ex-
planations, both relate that Michelangelo slept and ate 
little. Condivi attributes this to considerations of 
health, whereas for Vasari it is the necessary sacrifice 
in the life of the hard-working artist. In addition, Vasari 
emphasizes that much which would now be consid-
ered a sign of depression -lack of appetite and sleep 
disturbance-occurred when Michelangelo was still a 
young man and that these behaviors were largely the 
result of adolescent attitudes: 
He has told me that, in his youth, he often slept in his 
clothes, so tired that it did not seem worthwhile to un-
dress only to dress again the next morning. [Vasari 1946 
ed.:294] 
If not due entirely to the carelessness of youth, Michel-
angelo's personal carelessness and his sleeping and 
eating difficulties cannot soundly be ascribed to de-
pression: an important feature in the depressive 
constellation, that of an inability to work, is absent. 
Further, the vital element in melancholia or depres-
sion- inaction- is nowhere mentioned in any account 
of Michelangelo's life. Such inactivity may also be 
found in an obsessional neurosis in "an ever-increas-
ing degree of indecision, loss of energy, and restric-
tion of freedom" (Freud 1963 ed.:260)-qualities simi-
larly lacking in accounts of Michelangelo's life. 
A further area of inquiry pertinent to this study is Mi-
chelangelo's reactions to the deaths of those to whom 
he was close. Condivi relates, after the death of Lo-
renzo de' Medici in 1492: 
Michelangelo returned to his father's house, and he suf-
fered such anquish over this death that for many days he 
was unable to do anything. But then he became himself 
again and ... carved a Hercules. [Condivi 1976 ed.:12] 
Recording Michelangelo's reaction to the death of Vit-
toria Colonna in 1 54 7, Condivi reveals a somewhat 
more serious reaction: ''On account of her death he 
remained a long time in despair and as out of his 
mind" (Condivi 1976 ed.:1 03). However, an excerpt 
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from a letter of the same year indicates that, although 
quite disturbed over Vittoria Colonna's death, Michel-
angelo knew how to deal with it: "You'll say rightly that 
I'm old and distracted, but I assure you that only dis-
tractions prevent one from being beside oneself with 
grief" (Ramsden 1963:vol. II, letter 281 ). 13 Michelan-
gelo's reaction to the death of his servant, Urbina, in 
1555, similarly does not reveal a melancholic reaction: 
Urbino passed from this life to my intense grief, leaving 
me so stricken and troubled that it would have been more 
easeful to die with him, because of the love I bore him, 
which he merited no less; ... [Ramsden 1963: vol. II, let-
ter 408r 4 
And, on the death of his father in the early 1530s, a 
willingness to grieve and to learn from such an experi-
ence is further demonstrated: 
As you depart; so I must separate 
Between the son dying first and you, thereafter, 
Of whom I'm speaking, tongue, pen, and lament. 
By having died my dying you will teach, 
Dear father, and I see you in my thought 
Where the world hardly ever lets us reach. 
[Gilbert 1963:61, no. 84; Girardi no. 86] 
From these few excerpts, it is not unreasonable to 
conclude that Michelangelo's reactions to these 
deaths constitute normal grief reactions rather than 
the more protracted reaction of melancholia. More-
over, the ability to experience grief militates further 
against the development of depression and melan-
cholia (Freud 1957 ed.:126-127). 
In his paper "Mourning and Melancholia," Freud 
defines melancholia, distinguishing it from the just as 
intense, but more transient, experience of grief: 
The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a 
profound dejection, abrogation of interest in the outside 
world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, 
and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree 
that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, 
and culminates in a delusional expectation of punish-
ment. [Freud 1957 ed.: 125] 
Freud states that grief shares with depression all these 
characteristics except for the dramatic loss in self-es-
teem: "In grief the world becomes poor and empty; in 
melancholia it is the ego itself [which becomes poor 
and empty]" (Freud 1957 ed.:127). Further, the 
mourner is conscious of who it is that has been lost; in 
melancholia, however, although the sufferer may be 
aware of whom he has lost, he may not be conscious 
of "what it is he has lost in them" (Freud 1957 
ed.:127). The clinical picture of this disorder "is com-
pleted by sleeplessness and refusal of nourishment'' 
(Freud 1957 ed.:128). We have remarked elsewhere 
that the extremity of this condition eliminates its feasi-
bility as an interpretation of Michelangelo's character. 
In sum, selections from the poetry and letters reveal 
not only that Michelangelo most likely experienced 
grief reactions within the normal range but, more im-
portantly, that he invested much insight into the artistic 
expression of the dynamics (love-death, fusion-sepa-
ration) of this sort of experience. 15 Although clearly not 
suffering from melancholia or reactive depression sub-
sequent to the loss of significant relationships, Michel-
angelo had an investment in situating his artistic prob-
lems within this psychological arena, suggesting that 
this activity as well may function as an antidepressant 
in much the same way as the ability to experience 
grief. In addition to being adaptive strengths, the 
former may be evidence of the obsessive character's 
defense of intellectual control (Salzman 1968:11 ). In a 
poem written at his father's death, Michelangelo ad-
mits that he has had a struggle between intellectual 
control and depression: 
And even though the soul consents to reason, 
It does so stiffly, that I'm filled 
Far more with more depression later on. 
[Gilbert 1963:62, no. 84; Girardi no. 86] _ 
Although Michelangelo is not demonstrably melan-
cholic by modern standards, it is necessary to con-
sider also the distinctive elements of the Renaissance 
conception of melancholia. The melancholic charac-
ter, originally one of the four humors and aligned over 
the years with the planet Saturn, altered in meaning 
during the late Middle Ages and Renaissance. In post-
medieval poetry, melancholy became associated less 
with medical usage and increasingly with an emphasis 
on a subjective and transitory mood (Panofsky et al. 
1964:218). By the beginning of the Renaissance, this 
transitory nature was allied with a brooding withdrawal 
from reality. The heightened self-awareness that such 
a condition implied was tinged with the romantic con-
notation afforded a tragic hero. Moreover, melancholia 
came to be seen as an attractive condition: 
This consciousness became so much a part of self-
awareness that there was scarcely a man of distinction 
who was not either genuinely melancholic or at least con-
sidered as such by himself and others. [Panofsky et al. 
1964:232] 
It is within this perspective that the melancholia as-
cribed to both Michelangelo and Raphael, as well as to 
others in the Renaissance, must be viewed. As the 
Wittkowers conclude: 
In the late fifteenth century a new type of artist emerged 
with distinct traits of personality. The approach of these 
artists to their work is characterized by furious activity 
alternating with creative pauses; their psychological 
make-up by agonized introspection; their temperament by 
a tendency to melancholy; and their social behavior by a 
craving for solitude and by eccentricities of an endless 
variety. [Wittkower 1963:91] 
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The amalgamation of melancholy with artistic 
achievement is not restricted to artists alone, and this 
notion is revived in the Renaissance's resuscitation of 
the "Aristotelian" Problem XXX, in which all men of 
achievement are noted to be melancholic. The accom-
plishment of this revival is established in the work of 
the Neoplatonists, particularly Pica della Mirandola 
and Marsilio Ficino. Whereas Pica's emphasis is in po-
sitioning the melancholic temperament on a narrow 
pivotal point between divinity and animality, Ficino's 
emphasis is ''to identify what 'Aristotle' had called the 
melancholy of intellectually outstanding men with 
Plato's 'divine frenzy' " (Panofsky et al 1964:259). Fi-
cino states in his monograph De vita triplici, which is 
devoted to this subject, that 
Saturn seldom denotes ordinary characters and des-
tinies, but rather men who are set apart from the others, 
divine or animal, . .. [Panofsky et al. 1964:253] 
However, Ficino considers the melancholic temper-
ament an unhappy fate, and the rest of his monograph 
is devoted to suggesting methods of coping with it. Fi-
cino therefore maintains the antithesis, which melan-
choly has come to imply even in the face of its glorifi-
cation in the role of creativity. In this way it would 
seem that 
the many-sidedness of Saturn shrinks to a clear antithesis 
between extreme intellectual disorder and extreme in-
tellectual ability, emphasizing strongly the significance 
and vulnerability of the latter. [Panofsky et al., 1964:252] 
Thus we arrive· at a point where melancholy, with its 
antithetical potential, can be and is affected by crea-
tive men of all sorts in the Renaissance, even in the 
face of its more serious onus, the threat of madness. 
The question to which we address ourselves now, 
therefore, is to what extent did the creatively melan-
cholic man court madness and by what other forms 
was madness recognized in the Renaissance. Michel 
Foucault, in Madness and Civilization, makes note of a 
Renaissance literary form which acknowledges mad-
ness as the result of desperate passion: 
Love disappointed in its excess, and especially love de-
ceived by the fatality of death, has no other recourse but 
madness. As long as there was an object, mad love was 
more love than madness; left to itself, it pursues itself in 
the void of delirium. [Foucault 1965:30] 
Foucault is specifically referring to Shakespeare and 
Cervantes, but it is observed in the World History of 
Psychiatry(Howells 1975:54) that the Italian prototype 
of this literary form is Ariosto's poem Orlando Furioso, 
publrshed in 1516, in which Orlando is driven mad by 
unrequited love. Having come upon certain evidence 
that his loved one belongs to another, what had pre-
viously been an obsession with Orlando begins to 
grow to delusive proportions: 
A victim now of passion unreturned, 
For God and king no longer he's concerned. 
[Ariosto 1975 ed.:ix.1. 286.] 
This withdrawal continues: 
By means of notions so improbable, 
And from the truth departing more and more, 
Although for comfort he has little scope, 
The unhappy Count contrives to build false hope. 
[Ariosto 1975 ed.:xxiii. 104. 719.] 
Three times, four times, six times, he read the script, 
Attempting still, unhappy wretch!, in vain, 
(For the true meaning he would not accept) 
To change the sense of what was clear and plain. 
[Ariosto 1975 ed.:xxiii. iii. 720.] 
The role of delusions in the Renaissance concep-
tion of madness is emphasized by Foucault, particu-
larly in its typically humanistic orientation: 
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There is no madness but that which is in every man, since 
it is man who constitutes madness in the attachment he 
bears for himself and by the illusions he entertains. 
[1965:26] 
Further, as we see happening to Orlando, "In this 
delusive attachment to himself, man generates his 
madness like a mirage" (Foucault 1965:27). However, 
this experience of madness is not entirely related to an 
intelligence which is human, or, in other words, by a 
disorder in thought processes. Foucault emphasizes 
the element of animality in the Renaissance experi-
ence of madness: 
But at the beginning of the Renaissance, the relations 
with animality are reversed; the beast is set free; it es-
capes the world of legend and moral illustration to ac-
quire a fantastic nature of its own. And by an astonishing 
reversal, it is now the animal that will stalk man, capture 
him, and reveal to him his own truth. [1965:21] 
This animality is the next stage in Orlando's madness: 
His grief so swells, his sorrows so amass 
That madness clouds him, in which long he erred. 
On the fourth-day, by fury roused once more, 
The mail and armour from his back he tore. 
His scattered arms mute testimony bear 
To his unhinged and catastrophic mood. 
Then next his clothing he begins to tear, 
... ; unarmed his strength immense is, 
Barehanded, he uproots at the first blow 
A tall and noble pine and lays it low. 
[Ariosto 1975 ed.:xxxiii. 132-134. 726.] 
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In this way Orlando's madness is given over to rage, 
fury, and the destruction of nature. This mistreatment 
is not confined to nature alone, however: Orlando has 
already abused his horse, an apparently criminal act in 
the Renaissance (Ariosto 1975 ed.:xxv). 
In conclusion, revealing his familiarity with the Ren-
aissance notion of the potential for madness in the 
very occurrence of passion (Foucault 1965:88), 
Ariosto speaks at the end of his poem: 
For what is love but madness after all, 
As every wise man in the wide world knows? 
Though it is true not everyone may fall 
Into Orlando's state, his frenzy shows 
What perils lurk; what sign is there more plain 
Than self-destruction, of a mind insane? 
[Ariosto 1975 ed.: xxix] 
Thus animality, rage, delusion, and self-destruction 
are the qualities by which Ariosto describes the expe-
rience of the madness of Orlando. Melancholic attrib-
utes, such as brooding, grief, contemplation, and in-
action, are not included in the delineation of Orlando's 
sorry state, except for one brief stage in his decline: 
The Count requests a bed but will not eat 
Sated with grief, he wants no other meat. 
[Ariosto 1975 ed.: xxxiii. 116. 722.] 
Besides this one reference, it is apparent that 
Ariosto does not utilize the qualities of the melancholic 
temperament to describe the madness of Orlando, al-
though it is probable that Ariosto knew of them. It 
would seem, then, that although recognizing the po-
tential for madness in the melancholic temperament, 
the Renaissance preserved something of a distinction 
between melancholia and madness. The attributes of 
melancholy were originally conceived in the distinction 
of various characters. If Orlando typifies the concep-
tion of madness in the Renaissance, then this confirms 
melancholy's association with character structure as 
opposed to madness. Further, given Michelangelo's 
own inclination to consider himself beset with obses-
sions, it would seem that many of the characteristics 
which the Renaissance attributed to melancholy are 
more properly ascribed to the obsessional character, 
or a character structure in which most defenses are of 
the obsessive variety. Interestingly, Orlando's cure is 
effected through regaining his obsessive defenses-
his reintegration is established through the learning of 
classical balance, proportion, and control. 16 
This distinction between melancholia and madness 
is further upheld by the qualitative difference between 
contemporary accounts of the melancholia of Raphael 
and Michelangelo and those of more seriously dis-
turbed artists such as Hugo van der Goes and Anni-
bale Carracci (Wittkower 1963:chap. 5). In accounts 
of the conditions of the latter two, the inability to work 
assumes a primary importance. This inability to work, 
although a primary characteristic of melancholia, is 
notable in its absence from the constellation of attrib-
utes to which melancholic creative men subscribed in 
the Renaissance. 
Although mindful of the potential for madness in the 
melancholic character, the Renaissance did not really 
confound these characteristics with psychosis or neu-
rosis. The results of this analysis would indicate that 
much of the melancholy constellation may be more 
properly understood as constituting an obsessional 
character structure. That this is true for Michelangelo 
may be seen by observing that, despite being worried 
and beset by troubles, Michelangelo's ability to sus-
tain long periods of concentration and work was never 
impaired, precluding an interpretation of psychosis; 
and there is no recorded onset of any such symptom-
ology, about which Michelangelo would certainly have 
complained. Although Michelangelo dwelt on gloomy 
issues, his thinking, though characteristically rumina-
tive and obsessive, never approaches the extremity of 
a withdrawal from reality. Further, Michelangelo's er-
ratic behavior in social situations is not that commonly 
found in neurosis, conforming instead to the pattern 
characteristic of problems in character structure; that 
is, the ways in which social intercourse is mismanaged 
are reliable, repetitive, stable, and restricted only to 
specified situations. That this character structure may 
best be described as obsessional in nature is con-
firmed by the recurrence of such features as control 
through intellect, omniscience, and other obsessive 
traits. 
Finally, alongside the previously mentioned dis-
tinction between melancholy and madness in the Ren-
aissance, it seems reasonable to maintain that Michel-
angelo's obsessive character is also quite distinct from 
the Renaissance conception of madness as well as our 
own; certainly, little evidence has been found to justify 
the continuing use of severe diagnoses of Michelan-
gelo's personality. Moreover, the tendency to project 
the qualities of serious conditions on Michelangelo's 
art has complicated the art historical assessment of 
his work. In addition to the interpretations cited at the 
beginning of this paper, the tenacity as well as the po-
tential confusion of such psychological interpretations 
may be demonstrated by an instance in which the 
same work of art is claimed to exemplify diametrically 
opposite personality attributes- emotional violence 
and emotional detachment. In his discussion of the 
style of the Rachel and Leah statues, Weinberger 
(1967:279) concludes that "what Burckhardt re-
garded as an indication of coldness is rather a sign of 
that detachment which marks the works of Michelan-
gelo's old age," in answer to Hartt's observation 
(1968:272) that "below this austere surface still pul-
sates the physical and emotional violence of Michelan-
gelo's own nature.'' 
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The paramount importance of this interpretative 
bias for Michelangelo studies is heightened by Leo 
Steinberg's recent revisionist interpretations of Mi-
chelangelo's last paintings. While reestablishing the 
primacy of the visual image, Steinberg is led toques-
tion this tendency to ascribe what is unclear about Mi-
chelangelo's art to his personality, and in so doing he 
arrives at a new understanding of the artist's creative 
procedures. In his introductory discussion in Michel-
angelo's Last Paintings, Steinberg mentions an un-
usual document-the artist's list of three menus with 
accompanying illustrations, which begin in a neat and 
orderly way but eventually cascade down the right 
side and bottom of the paper. First published by de 
Tolnay, this peculiar document was once again attrib-
uted to that so-called unreliable aspect of Michelan-
gelo's personality as another instance of the artist's 
being "carried away by his temperament, ... " (Stein-
berg 1975b:7). Not satisfied with this interpretation, 
Steinberg goes on to remind us that "a temperament is 
complex" and, after further investigation, isolates 
what he believes to be an important aspect of Michel-
angelo's working method and creative process-the 
impulse to construct the broadest referential frame-
work, as the artistic "concept expands against there-
tentive force of some outer limit contracting upon it." 
Rather than speculating on the vagaries of temper-
ament, Steinberg attempts to elucidate the rational, 
structural attributes upon which Michelangelo's work-
ing process is grounded, and in so doing extends our 
understanding of the tendency often observed in the 
artist's work, and sometimes designated as his prefer-
ence for obstacles, which "apparently he liked ... , 
perhaps even sought ... out; ... '' (Ackerman 
1966:20). Clearly, Steinberg has arrived at a theoreti-
cally more productive conclusion than that previously 
suggested by Frederick Hartt. In attempting to fathom 
Michelangelo's preference for the exceptionally em-
phatic frame in his discussion of the Medici Chapel 
and the Tomb of Julius II, Hartt (1968:19) relied on a 
psychological, and distinctly negative, explanation that 
the frames gain prominence as part of Michelangelo's 
"obsessive delight in ornamentation." It is this kind of 
interpretation that militates against the possibility that 
obsessive traits such as control and omniscience may, 
in fact, be put to constructive use i.n the service of Mi-
chelangelo's artistic conceptions. 
Even more revealing is Steinberg's interpretation of 
the Last Judgment, in which supposed pessimism, 
punishment, and masochism are first routed by a reex-
amination of the work itself and then clarified by an un-
derstanding of the artist's religious, though probably 
heretical, beliefs. Although the tradition of viewing the 
Last Judgment as a Dies /rae conforms both to scrip-
ture and primary sources, and has prompted ''the 
ready agreement of most later writers on Michelan-
gelo, who persist in seeing the fresco as a 'wholly 
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punitive manifestation,' '' Steinberg has found evi-
dence to the contrary, thereby revising the widespread 
and long-standing tradition of confounding Michelan-
gelo's iconographic and stylistic intentions with nega-
tive personality traits (1975a:50). The Last Judgment 
can no longer be seen as the result of "Michelangelo's 
conceptions of ancient myths of punishment'' (de Tal-
nay 1960:25), nor can the self-image with flayed skin 
be thoroughly understood as "the artist's inner nature, 
corroded by self-pity so intense as to become an afflic-
tion" (Hartt 1964:144). Even less is the Last Judg-
ment yet another instance of a tendency in the artist's 
late years of a "recurrent masochistic attitude" (Hartt 
1964•156). 
Formulated on a reassessment of the structure and 
imagery of the Last Judgment, accompanied by docu-
mentation and interpretative support-and, signifi-
cantly, by not telescoping the religious guilt of Michel-
angelo's beliefs into personal and neurotic guilt-
Steinberg can approach the optimism of a Last Judg-
ment conceived as merciful. And this despite the fact 
that 
for 400 years, those who gave account of the picture in 
word or image obeyed a compulsion to accentuate what-
ever seemed harsh, to unsee and suppress any tremor of 
exultation or gentleness. The abundance of Michelan-
gelo 's hope was either ignored or turned into its opposite. 
[Steinberg 1975a:60] 
Perhaps the uncritical use by most Michelangelo 
scholars of psychological terminology which prompted 
this study has some justification as an expressive de-
vice. Unfortunately, however, the willingness to con-
flate neurotic and even psychotic traits with artistic ac-
tivity, which then encroach upoA stylistic and 
iconographic interpretations, creates a false impres-
sion of the creative person and his art-an impression 
that is clearly inadequate for an understanding of so 
major an artistic innovator as Michelangelo. 
Acknowledgments 
The author wishes to thank Dr. John Hewett, Emory 
University, and Dr. Leo Steinberg, University of Penn-
sylvania, for their assistance and encouragement. 
Notes 
The present study is not concerned with examining this material in order 
to deduce unconscious sources of motivation or conflict as would be ap-
propriate to a traditional psychoanalytic study of personality; see Condivi 
(1976 ed .) and Vasari (1946 ed.) . For a recent contribution in this vein , 
see Panofsky et al. (1 964) . 
2 See Giovanni Poggi, II Carteggio di Michelangelo. 1:51, letter XXXVI : 
"un chativo essere" ; 1:55, letter XL: "grandissimo disagio." 
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3 See Poggi , 1:96, letter LXVII: " . . e questo e che io son ito da dodici 
anni in qua tapinando per tucta ltalia, sopportato ogni vergognia , patito 
ogni stento, lacerato il corpo mio in ongni faticha, messa Ia vita propria a 
mille peri coli solo per aiutar Ia chasa mia; . ' ' 
4 See Poggi I: 1 41 , letter CVII : · ' . .. , che vivo meschinamente e non curo 
ne della vita ne dello onore, cioe del mondo, e vivo chon grandissime 
fatiche e chon mille sospecti. E gia sono stato cosl circha di quindici 
anni, che mai ebbi un'ora di bene, e.ctucto 6 facto per aiutarvi, . . . " 
5 Gilbert 's translations (1 963) are used throughout, along with Girardi 
numbers (1 967) whenever possible. 
6 Fragments of lost madrigals, Girardi , App. 35 . Quoted in Varchi's lec-
ture of 1 54 7. 
7 See Poggi, 1:1 77, letter CXXXVIII: " lo non vo drieto a favole e non son 
perc pazzo a facto chome voi credete ; . . . " 
8 See Poggi , 111 :27 , letter DCVIII: " . . . poi , sopra qualche mia bizzarria o 
pazzia che e'dichon che io 6, che non nuoce se non a.mme, si son 
fondati a dir male dime e a vituperarmi, che eel premio di tucti 
gl'uomini da bene." 
9 See Gaetano Milanesi , Le Lettere di Michelangelo Buonarroti, letter 
CDXXXV: "lo rispondo, che si dipinge col ciervello et non con le mani; 
et chi non puc avere il ciervello seco , si vitupera: perc fin che Ia cosa 
mia non si acconcia, non fo cosa buona." 
10 See Leon Salzman (1 968) and Sigmund Freud (1 963). 
11 See Poggi, 111 :156, letter DCCIV: " ... iersera el vostro amicho chap-
itano Chuio e certi altri gentilomini volsono, lor gratia, che io andassi 
a.ccena chon loro, di che ebi grandissimo piacere, perche usci ' um 
pocho del mio malinchonicho, o vera del mio pazzo; . ' ' 
12 The Wittkowers point out that in the sixteenth century "pazzia" could 
vary in meaning from madness to strangeness and eccentricity (chap. 
5) . 
13 See Milanesi, letter CDLXV: "Voi direte bene che io sia vecchio e pazo: 
e io vi dico, che per istar sano e con manco passione, non ci trovo meg-
lio che Ia pazzia. " 
14 See Milanese, letter CCLXXXIV: " . . . passe di questa vita Francesco 
detto Urbino, 1 con grandissimo mio affanno; e ammi lasciato molto af-
litto e tribolato , tanto che mi sare ' stato piu dolce il morir con esso seco, 
per l'amore che io gli portavo: e non ne meritava manco; . " 
15 For a thorough discussion of important themes in Michelangelo 's poetry , 
see Robert J. Clements (1 965). Concerning the grief reaction, a recent 
paper of Liebert (1 977) attempts to link Michelangelo 's destruction of 
the Florence Pieta with the dynamics of ambivalence and the death of 
Urbino. 
16 It is important to recall that this aspect of Orlando's return to sanity is ac-
companied by magical as well as religious themes. For example, Astolfo 
must travel to the moon (demonstrating the lunar-lunacy association) 
with St . John and retrieve Orlando's brains, which are contained there in 
a vial. In this way magical and religious elements are retained in addition 
to the more pragmatic and obsessive characteristics mentioned above. 
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E.H. Gombrich. The Sense of Order: A Study in the 
Psychology of Decorative Art. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1979. 411 pp., illustrations. $38.50. 
Reviewed by D.N. Perkins 
Project Zero, Harvard University 
The Sense of Order and the Perils of Explanation 1 
Would Martians have wallpaper? Perhaps they would, 
according to the deliberations of E. H. Gombrich in his 
intellectually and visually impressive new book, The 
Sense of Order: A Study in the Psychology of Decora-
tive Art. Not that Gombrich ever writes about Martians. 
His explicit concern is with the human perceiver and 
maker of decorative design. Nonetheless, if we read 
Gombrich for his essential logic rather than only his 
earthbound subject, he seems to say something about 
Martians, too. 
The first thing to be understood is that The Sense of 
Order undertakes several missions at once. It gives us 
a history of attitudes toward ornament, documenting 
many degrees of approbation and condemnation up to 
the severe verdict of Alfred Laos, who, in a 1908 es-
say, damned ornament as primitive, criminal, and de-
generate and urged that functionalism govern appear-
ance. The Sense of Order provides a tour of the variety 
of decoration, ranging from the simple and subtle 
statement of a Japanese bowl to the numbing intricacy 
of the Alhambra. The book samples the history of or-
namentation, tracking the evolution of ornamental mo-
tifs; for example, the survival and spread of the mod-
eled face of a lion with a ring in its mouth 2500 years 
ago in the mind of a Greek artist. Whatever the theme, 
the points are profusely illustrated by photographs and 
drawings in the text, an extensive section of larger 
black-and-white photographs, and a number of color 
plates. Gombrich is determined to have us see what he 
means. 
But of all these missions, the most vigorous, and the 
one which subsumes the others, is the quest for ex-
planation. Gombrich is a determined explicator. He 
wants to account for our responsiveness to ornament 
in terms of the nature of knowledge and the process of 
obtaining knowledge. He wants to explain the shift 
away from elaborate ornamentation with the advent of 
the machine age, which, by making mechanical repro-
duction possible devalued complexity. He wants to ac-
count for the heights of ornamental elaboration as 
products of an evolving craft rather than as the abrupt 
inventions of individuals. He even tries his hand at ex-
plaining why vertical stripes make for thinness, and 
horizontal for fatness. Gombrich by no means invents 
all such accounts; he often discourses on the ideas of 
others, making a judicious selection. But one way or 
another, his commitment to explanation in an area as 
psychologically messy as the arts is striking. 
In fact, this emphasis suggests an approach to un-
derstanding The Sense of Order better and appraising 
its success: What sorts of explanations are offered, 
and just how adequate are they? Such questions are 
best pondered after a brief explanation of explanation 
itself. Israel Scheffler (1963), in part of his The Anat-
omy of Inquiry, clarifies what an explanation ought to 
accomplish. Here, only the barest sketch can be given. 
In general, explanation means subsuming the event to 
be explained under laws or principles. On the one 
hand, the principles must be sound for a sound ex-
planation. On the other, the principles, plus particular 
conditions specific to the occasion, should deductively 
imply the event. For example, the properties of phos-
phorus, plus conditions on the rate, force, and so on, 
of striking a match on a particular occasion, imply that 
the match would light, and so explain the event. In 
fact, informal explanations often are elliptical, omitting 
some conditions that would be required for strict de-
duction. Sometimes this merely signifies the absence 
of premises that could be provided readily enough; at 
others it signifies a fundamentally incomplete account, 
one which would require serious investigation to fill out 
and finally deny or affirm. Since Gombrich, of course, 
does not write in the formal language of logic, the 
question becomes whether his explanations, bolstered 
by reasonable and ready assumptions, really imply 
what they try to explain. 
Gombrich's Basic Concepts 
This obvious danger in a book with a title like The 
Sense of Order is that no good account could be given 
of so fuzzy-sounding a concept. Indeed, Gombrich 
himself runs shy of stating just what sorts of order he 
means: 
I certainly would not venture. to define the concept of order 
I use in the main title of this book, but I trust it will bring out 
the feature which interests me in decorative design. The 
arrangement of elements according to similarity and differ-
ence and the enjoyment of repetition and symmetry ex-
tend from the string of beads to the layout of the page in 
front of the reader, and, of course, beyond to the rhythms 
of movement, speech and music, not to mention the struc-
tures of society and the systems of thought. [p. x] 
Instead of a definition we get a tour. However, vague 
boundaries or not, Gombrich's sense of order turns 
out to have a more substantial center to it than one 
might at first think. 
Gombrich bases his sense of order on Karl Pop-
per's analysis of scientific inquiry, opening his in-
troduction with a quote from the philosopher: '' It was 
first in animals and children, but later also in adults, 
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that I observed the immensely powerful need for regu-
larity-the need which makes them seek for regular-
ities'' (p. 1 ). In Popper's concept of inquiry, as 
adopted by Gombrich, understanding is a product not 
just of an order-seeking, but an order-presuming, 
process, in which simple orderings are hypothesized 
until disconfirmed by later experience. The world is 
known, so far as it can be known, through active ex-
ploration based on hypotheses revised only as they 
conflict with new data. Furthermore, it seems that or-
ganisms have to proceed in this way most of the time, 
for to behave otherwise would waste too much time 
and energy on needless hypothesizing or would ignore 
counterevidence. A third alternative, to depend on di-
rect knowledge of the world, is ultimately unintelligible, 
no real alternative at all. Gombrich stresses, in com-
pany with contemporary psychologists interested in 
perception-Uirich Neisser and Richard Gregory, for 
instance-that this hypothesis-making, order-oriented 
way of proceeding, and the love of order that accom-
panies it, must operate as much at the perceptual level 
as at the level of extended intellectual inquiry. 
But, paradoxically, while order is precious, so is 
disorder. According to Popper, disconfirmation 
strongly informs, by decisively knocking out hypothe-
ses, that confirmation can never inform by letting pass 
hypotheses which might later prove faulty. To make 
the most of its capacity to presume orderliness, the in-
quiring organism must be predisposed to seek out 
breaks in the order-to put the hypothesis at risk and 
see how it fares. This stands behind what Gombrich 
calls ''the most basic fact of aesthetic experience, the 
fact that delight lies somewhere between boredom and 
confusion" (p. 9). 
Returning to the question of explanation: Are the 
principles of order-hypothesizing and disconfirmation-
seeking, which are founded, on a thoughtful account 
of the nature of knowledge, adequate to explain the 
human attraction to decorative design? No doubt there 
is room for debate, but at least the explanatory prin-
ciples have some backing, and perhaps they do imply 
an attraction to decoration. The intelligent organism, 
like the most ignorant amoeba, will have to proceed 
according to Popper's epistemology. We can assume 
that this intelligent organism will have drives, and ac-
companying emotions, which move it to apply the hy-
pothesis-making strategy perceptually and in other 
ways, else it would never have become intelligent. We 
can assume the intelligent organism will have the 
power to arrange things and make things. So, for any 
intelligent organism, some sort of patterning would be 
bound to stimulate its Popperian mind simply as pat-
tern, and, being intelligent, motivated, and capable, 
the organism would make such things to enjoy them. In 
short, Martians would have wallpaper, or some 
unearthly equivalent, though of course we humans 
might not like it at all. 
Now I'm well aware that some of the assumptions 
leading to this conclusion could be challenged. But the 
important point here is that Popper's epistemology 
does seem to imply Gombrich's sense of order, espe-
cially the responsiveness to pattern that it articulates. 
If the implication is not strict, neither is it far-fetched, 
and Gombrich's sense of order comes closer to satis-
fying the deductive requirement for explanation than at 
first seems probable. 
Another explanatory concept Gombrich employs is 
habit. Gombrich notes that under the influence of habit 
decorations have changed slowiy. Radical invention is 
nonexistent, considerable invention the exception, and 
the gradual evolution of decorative motifs, some of 
which can be traced back for millenia, the rule. 
Gombrich draws an analogy here to the role of sche-
mata in representational art and their gradual develop-
ment, as discussed in his Art and Illusion. But he notes 
a contrast as well. Where the quest for realism gave 
the development of those representational schemata a 
definite direction, the influences on decorative sche-
mata have been much more diffuse, and a unified ac 
count of why decorations have changed as they have 
becomes difficult. Nonetheless, Gombrich explores 
various approaches. 
Although habit extends Gombrich's explanatory ar-
mamentum, it is more a corollary than an addition to it, 
for, as he points out, ''The force of habit may be said 
to spring from the sense of order'' (p. 171 ). Habit 
really amounts to a temporal sense of order analogous 
to the spatial sense of order exhibited in wallpaper and 
fluted columns for example. That today's world will be 
more or less like yesterday's is the hypothesis the per-
ceiver projects, the hypothesis that allows him to make 
sense of a world which otherwise would be cluttered 
and confusing. "In the study of perception," Gombrich 
says, ''the force of habit makes itself felt in the greater 
ease with which we take in the familiar" (p. 171 ). Pre-
sumably, in analogy to the spatial sense of order, this 
hypothesis is also one which the perceiver expects will 
be a little bit disconfirmed. 
But does Gombrich's basic idea really explain the 
role of habits? In particular, does it imply that habits 
are required? Why couldn't some creature-our Mar-
tian, say-instead of relying on a repertoire of stan-
dard schemata, extrapolate the individual experiences 
of the past to directly comprehend current events, 
much as we, in perceiving the symmetry of a design, 
extrapolate from one side of the design to the other? 
The answer is practical, rather than epistemological. 
While the sense of order per se arises because the or-
ganism must, logically, proceed by hypotheses, habits 
arise because the organism must, in all practicality, 
crystallize some of those hypotheses into habits. The 
amount of computation required to match past experi-
ences, unsorted, uncategorized, unschematized, 
against current ones for a "good fit" would be un-
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manageable. Gombrich himself does not make this ar-
gument, but the basic explanatory construct again 
tends to imply the phenomena it is invoked to ex-
plain-the force of habit and, in turn, the gradual evo-
lution of decorative designs. 
Perhaps here is a good place to ask: Why all this 
philosophy? Why spend so many sentences examining 
the abstract force of Gombrich's explanatory appa-
ratus? The reason is that I think this clarifies Gom-
brich's ambition, even though I have made it more ex-
plicit than he. Gombrich is very concerned to offer 
really basic explanations. He persistently tries to ac-
count for the perceptual phenomena associated with 
decorative design in terms fundamental to our under-
standing of what it is to be an intelligent organism. 
Gombrich in effect assaults the barrier between the 
touchy-feely world of aesthetics and the tough busi-
ness of practical intelligence, seeking to root the one 
in the other, as of course other authors have done in 
their own ways. Furthermore, he has not done badly 
at it. 
Some Points of Order 
Of course, not all characteristics of human aesthetic 
response will stem from basic principles of intelligent 
information processing. For one thing, the human or-
ganism seems too much an accident, too much one in-
telligence among possible others that might use the 
same principles in different ways and prove responsive 
to somewhat different patterns. As noted before, the 
Martian's wallpaper needn't please us at all. Gombrich 
is well aware of such limits, and emphasizes how little 
one can predict about the effects on the viewer of a vi-
sual design: Bigger or smaller, chosen to be familiar or 
unfamiliar, presented in times of one fashion or an-
other, the same design may inspire radically different 
reactions. Gombrich could, of course, have said that 
this, too, is part of the sense of order, order over time, 
within culture, and so on. But, laudably, he refrains. 
The problem is that any effects of size, culture, and so 
on could be accommodated just as well as any other. 
This is the same as saying that the implication condi-
tion emphasized earlier fails, the sense of vacu-
, ousness we get from such explanations apparently re-
flecting the failure. 
The existence of such general problems does not 
1 mean that Gombrich refrains from offering ex-
planations for particular phenomena, however. On the 
1 contrary, he usually tries. One interesting example is 
1 his notion of what he calls a ''field of force,'' in me-
l taphorical, but only metaphorical, reference to the 
thinking of the Gestaltists. Gombrich's field of force 
concerils arrangements with a center and a decorative 
I border and emphasizes two effects: those things con-
: stituting a design in the border tend to lose their indi-
, vidual qualities and to direct attention toward the cen-
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ter; those things in the center, on the other hand, tend 
to have their individual qualities emphasized. Gom-
brich illustrates this with numerous examples, perhaps 
most charmingly by a cake decorated with cherries. 
The cherries around the rim seem less flavorful mor-
sels and more a frame. However, "The cherry in the 
centre of the cake is very much a cherry'' (p. 1 56). 
What about our principle of deduction? Does 
Gombrich's field of force concept pass this test of ex-
planatory adequacy? Yes, it does. The field of force 
simply posits general characteristics of situations 
where there are a center and a border and makes de-
ductive predictions in individual cases like the cake. 
The particular is subsumed under and implied by the 
general. Put this way, the field of force is simply a low-
level inductive generalization, much narrower than 
Gombrich's overriding sense of order, and not 
grounded in the basic character of an intelligent orga-
nism. But explanation it still is. 
However, this will not do for Gombrich. He is deter-
mined to relate the field of force to his sense of order. 
His efforts afford a good opportunity both to explore 
cautiously the vertical architecture of his concepts and 
to test whether the details are as sturdy as the broad 
structure seems. So again, we start from the field of 
force. The weakened identity of elements on a border 
is in fact one example of a more general phenomenon: 
the weakened identity of any repeated unit in a large 
design. Gombrich discusses this phenomenon exten-
sively, noting, for example, how the multiple faces of 
Andy Warhol's Marilyn Monroe become drained of 
identity. Gombrich elsewhere asserts a related notion, 
that scanty apprehension of individual parts is inherent 
to the nature of design. ''To expect that we read every 
motif in the Alhambra as we read a book is not only un-
realistic. It is contrary to the spirit of decoration, which 
offers us a feast for the eye without demanding that we 
should taste of every dish" {p. 1 03). Gombrich has this 
to say about how the perceiver normally encounters a 
design: "Faced with an array of identical objects ... 
we rapidly form the preliminary hypothesis that we are 
confronted with a lawful assembly, and we need only 
sample the elements for redundancies by sweeping 
our eye along the whole series and just taking in one 
repeating component" (p. 151 ). All of this, of course, 
relates to the overarching Popperian view. 
Gombrich's conceptual notions certainly relate to 
one another and certainly help us assemble a coherent 
conception of the perceptual response to decorative 
design. However, they do not quite relate to one an-
other in an explanatory way. Consider, for example, 
the connection between the field of force and the more 
general vitiation of identity that comes with patterned 
repetition. The latter implies the weakened individ-
uality of the border elements in the field of force, but 
does not at all imply the enhancement of the center. 
Gombrich makes an effort to bridge this gap, suggest-
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ing that the enhancement of the center might follow 
from the tendency of the viewer to survey the order in 
the most effective way: ''In the kaleidoscope the radial 
symmetry pulls the eye toward the centre from which 
redundancies are most easily surveyed.'' The sugges-
tion seems to be that Gombrich's general concepts, 
plus an efficiency principle, send the eye to the center. 
But are redundancies in fact most efficiently surveyed 
from the center? Symmetries seem most easily sam-
pled by skipping the center and fixating the sides alter-
nately. To sample the redundancies of cyclic repetition 
in the border design, one would best scan around the 
periphery rather than making multiple trips from the 
center to various points on the border. True, the entire 
border is kept in peripheral view best by fixating the 
center. Perhaps that peripheral view provides all the 
sample the perceiver needs, but this is hard to say, 
since nothing in the general concepts predicts how 
much is needed. The pull toward the center referred to 
by Gombrich seems real enough, but not explained by, 
because not plausibly implied by, the aim of efficiently 
sampling the redundant border. 
For another example, consider how the vitiating ef-
fect of repetition in general relates to Gombrich's 
broader point, that we need not and do not inspect 
decorations for their details. Certainly, the latter 
doesn't imply the former. It's not just that we don't 
need to scrutinize the individual elements, but that the 
display resists our doing so, even when we try. Gom-
brich tries to relate this resistance to his general con-
cepts by positing a kind of rivalry: ''There must be a 
conflict, or at least a tension, between the two func-
tions of perception to which we referred at the outset, 
the perception of things and the perception of order'' 
(p. 151 ). But Gombrich's general concepts, even with 
this conflict added, still do not imply the repetition phe-
nomenon, in particular that "thingness" would be the 
loser in cases of conflict. Why ''thingness'' is the 
loser, or indeed whether it always has to be, remains 
uncertain. Furthermore, Gombrich's proposal of con-
flict is confusing in another way. He seems to forget 
here what he maintains in discussing habit, that the 
perception of things also is part of the perception of 
order. The conflict is not between order and thing so 
much as between one kind of order, design narrowly 
taken, and another, familiarity. 
Such difficulties arise not infrequently throughout 
The Sense of Order. Many explanations are not so 
readily filled out to yield plausible deductive accounts, 
and sometimes, as above, we have outright inconsis-
tencies. Although Gombrich's particular and general 
concepts make a coherent overall picture, they do not 
lock together into a seamless explanatory structure. 
Such flaws should not be viewed as ruinous, how-
ever. On the contrary, one would hardly expect a tight 
scientific account of such a complex domain. Gom-
brich no doubt wrote his book somewhat like a decora-
tive design, not to be scrutinized detail by detail any-
way, and even incomplete explanations do valuable 
service in pointing the way to further inquiry. More-
over, a more conservative and cautious Gombrich 
might be one less worth having, if it costs the drive to-
ward explanation, even though not always solid ex-
planation, which so infuses The Sense of Order. And 
Gombrich himself is frank about the limits of what he 
attempts: ''I am fully aware of the fact that specula-
tions, as yet unsupported by controlled experiments, 
cannot qualify as psychological theories. But what 
starts as a mere 'hunch' can sometimes be turned into 
a scientific hypothesis in expert hands, and I have 
been so fortunate as to see this happen with informal 
suggestions I have put forward in the past'' (p. ix). So 
Gombrich has issued this caveat emptor, and the 
reader should take heed. 
A Note of the Explanandum 
The explanandum in an explanation is the thing to be 
accounted for. It is, in Gombrich's The Sense of Order, 
a range of phenomena concerned with decorative de-
sign. But why this explanandum? Is this where we 
would like to see E. H. Gombrich investing his time and 
intelligence? To put the question that way is to show 
how unfair a question it is: Can an author not choose 
his own work? But to address the question anyway is 
to provide a little more perspective on what The Sense 
of Order attempts and what it eschews. 
One thing Gombrich does not attempt is an account 
of aesthetic excellence in design. True, he describes 
the different attitudes which have prevailed toward 
such matters as functionalism, or as flatness versus 
three-dimensionality. True, he takes as central to qual-
ity a provocative balance between order and disorder. 
Certainly the abundant illustrations present to the 
reader many lovely examples of decoration. Yet 
Gombrich never tries to argue that this is superb and 
that abysmal according to the logic of his concepts. If 
Gombrich instructs us in the connoisseurship of deco-
ration, it is in terms of what effects to see, not what val-
ues to apply. Some might consider this an appalling 
neglect of what is really important. But, instead, it 
might be considered the wisdom of explaining what 
can be explained and letting the rest go hang. As 
quoted earlier, Gombrich specifically acknowledges 
the difficulties of any general aesthetics of design. To 
this reviewer's mind, Gombrich is right: Particular dif-
ferences in aesthetic quality defy any ready ex-
planation by general principles. Rules of thumb can be 
given, of course, but as explanation, they fail the test 
of implication emphasized here, being too subject to 
exception. 
Another thing Gombrich does not attempt is a gen-
eral account of the visual phenomena of abstract art. 
True, Gombrich notes that the theories behind twenti-
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eth-century abstract painting draw considerably on the 
debates about ornament in the nineteenth century. 
True, he occasionally offers contemporary abstrac-
tions as examples of some of the effects discussed . 
However, Gombrich draws a fundamental distinction 
between such matters and his aim: " Remembering my 
own normal reaction to decoration before I had em-
barked on this investigation, I was tempted to call this 
book 'The Unregarded Art.' ... Painting, like speaking, 
implicitly demands attention whether or not it receives 
it. Decoration cannot make this demand. It normally 
depends for its effect on the fluctuating attention we 
can spare while we scan our surroundings'' (p. 116). 
So Gombrich, no great fan of abstract painting (1963), 
has chosen to complement his study of realistic repre-
sentation in Art and Illusion with a study not of those 
abstractions and semiabstractions that hang on the 
important walls of important museums and mansions, 
but of the ones that hug coffee spoons and archi-
tectural columns, the ones we take for granted. 
One could regret this. I confess myself to a moment 
of regret when, halfway through The Sense of Order, I 
happened to visit the Fogg Art Museum at Harvard 
University. On display was a Calder piece, standing on 
the floor about chest high, its top a horizontal gesture 
of wires and metal plates pivoting on the base. For 
some reason, I found it wholly engaging. Not only did it 
allow, even compel, my regard, but it departed strik-
ingly from the perceptual armamentarium of ornamen-
tal design. There was little repetition in a narrow 
sense. There was calculated asymmetry. The curvilin-
earities were complex, but within the reach of vision to 
know them one by one and all together, a feast for the 
eye where one could consume every dish, to reverse 
Gombrich's expression. "This," I said to myself, "has 
nothing to do with the sense of order." 
But in the end there were no regrets. The old saying 
about gift horses seems relevant here. E. H. Gombrich 
has made us his gift, and there is no need to grumble 
about how he could have done this or could have done 
that. He has, in fact, chosen a neglected corner of our 
vision and sought to illuminate it for us. The point is 
nicely made by the way he frames his discussion-
with a discussion of a picture frame. At the close of his 
introduction, Gombrich has a few remarks to make 
about an elaborate picture frame, circa 1700, sur-
rounding the Madonna della Sedia by Raphael. 
Gombrich says, in part, '' ... on the face of it, it seems 
an extraordinarily pointless activity to expend so much 
skill and labour on carving and gilding these festoons 
with laurel leaves and berries, stretched between fic-
titious curly brackets of extraordinary elaboration, 
which fasten them between shell-shaped forms'' (p. 
15). 8-~t by the end of the last chapter, Gombrich is 
ready to return with his readers of more informed per-
ception to this same frame. "To the reader who has 
shared this journey with me it should have looked pro-
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gressively less puzzling. We recognize in it a version of 
the cartouche with four animated motifs oriented to-
ward the field of force they enhance. They are proge-
nies of Gorgon's heads ... "And so on. Yes, the 
frame has become more meaningful, one's vision less 
naive, in consequence of the rite of passage imposed 
by The Sense of Order. 
Note 
1 This review was prepared at Project Zero , Harvard Graduate School of 
Education, with support from the Spencer Foundation . The opinions ex-
pressed here do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of sup-
porting agencies. 
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University of Pennsylvania 
That there is an essentially metaphorical component in 
many diverse realms of symbolic behavior has become 
a popular, and even fashionable, concept, and thus it 
seems particularly timely to consider some of the phil-
osophical implications of the concept of metaphor it-
self. The publication of this latest collection of essays, 
which had originally appeared as an issue of Critical 
Inquiry, should serve to alert scholars to the richness 
of contemporary thinking on metaphor that can gener-
ally benefit discussions of symbolic phenomena. While 
much of the debate in this volume is aimed explicitly at 
problems in literary communication, this approach 
should not prevent a fruitful extension to related issues 
in other fields. Furthermore, the concept of metaphor 
is not only relevant to the objects we seek to under-
stand but sheds considerable light on the very process 
of analysis. Metaphor, then, seems doubly relevant: It 
clarifies the structure of certain forms of symbolic 
communication and theories about communication as 
well. 
Many readers, however, may encounter some diffi-
culty in reading these essays: A good deal of knowl-
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edge about metaphor as well as philosophy is by and 
large assumed; the reader approaching this book as 
an introduction will occasionally be both frustrated and 
baffled. On the other hand, the greater one's exposure 
to the history of the debate on metaphor, the more cer-
tain is the feeling that the present collection does not 
significantly broaden the scope of that debate. Given 
the Foreword's promise, one might have hoped that a 
truly interdisciplinary perspective would emerge. Such 
a perspective would gain theoretical sophistication 
and force from the recent contributions of theories on 
play, humor, ritual, and linguistic anthropology, to 
name but a few potentially exciting resources. Without 
in any way diminishing the value of aesthetic and liter-
ary theory to the subject of metaphor, it is fair to say 
that the exclusion of divergent points of view restricts 
the boundaries of the discussion. True, there are offer-
ings from developmental psychology, art, and theol-
ogy, but in crucial ways these accept the basic logic of 
the philosophical debate and do not change its shape 
in the way that, for example, Bateson's communica-
tional theory does (Bateson 1972). For that matter, 
certain philosophical objections to theories of meaning 
and literal language would gain momentum from re-
cent developments in sociolinguistics, where notions 
of ordinary language have been attacked (cf. Kir-
schenblatt-Gimblett 1976). 
The collection can be thought of as addressing 
three basic, and not unrelated, questions. The first 
asks to what extent, and in what manner, metaphor 
can be said to possess cognitive content. This issue is 
best encountered in the essays by Paul Ricoeur and 
Donald Davidson, whose views stand in opposition to 
one another, but reverberations of it are heard 
throughout all the essays. In part, the second question 
forms a response to the first: To what extent can meta-
phor be best explained by its contextual use in social 
discourse? Here we find suggestions from psychology, 
philosophy, and rhetoric that much is to be gained 
from a context-dependent notion of metaphorical 
meaning. The other essays can be seen to explore the 
consequences that various root metaphors have in 
their respective disciplines and to pose the related 
question of whether there can exist a discourse not 
fundamentally permeated by metaphor. 
Historically, the first question has been the crucial 
one, with centuries of scholars expelling metaphor 
from the province of cognitive discourse. Vico and the 
romantic movement posed the first vigorous challenge 
to this traditional prejudice, insisting that language's 
original roots are primarily metaphorical and further-
more claiming a primacy of the poetic function in re-
vealing the world as it is experienced; however, the ro-
mantic view still retained the traditional exclusion of 
metaphor from intellectual activity, even if it reversed 
the priority of that activity. It was in this century, per-
haps when scientific discourse became increasingly 
self-conscious about its use of explanatory models, 
that the role of metaphor in cognition earned legiti-
macy. Most would locate the pivotal text as Max 
Black's Models and Metaphors, in which the inter-
action theory of metaphor was proposed, claiming, 
among other things, that metaphor was not reducible 
to literal assertions and that metaphor does not so 
much formulate an antecedent similarity as create it. 
In this intellectual era the notion of truth as created 
rather than discovered has found ready acceptance. 
Still, the status of such newly generated "meaning" or 
"truth" does remain problematic in relation to conven-
tionally accepted, or literal, truths. One can reject 
metaphor in a way that is clearly forbidden with literal 
assertions, and the grounds on which one rejects the 
two differ in important ways. To participate in an imagi-
native vision is perhaps to gain certain insight, but 
tempered by the understanding that such insight may 
be rejected. Donald Davidson's essay insists that we 
not confuse such insight with meaning. His claim is 
that there is no hidden message in metaphor apart 
from its literal meaning. Theories of metaphor have 
mistaken the effect of the metaphor, which is to stimu-
late and invite comparison, for an encoded content. 
"The common error," claims Davidson, "is to fasten 
on the contents of the thoughts a metaphor provokes 
and to read these contents into the metaphor itself." 
Such a hard-headed stance certainly makes a star of 
Davidson, prompting heated responses from such wor-
thy opponents as Nelson Goodman and Max Black. 
The predictable problems of the ensuing dialogue re-
sult, in part, from highly divergent notions of "mean-
ing" as well as "cognitive content." Karsten Harries's 
neat reminder that certain slang expressions ("He's an 
ac-dc") clearly do express cognitive content disposes 
of part of Davidson's argument. Harries is subtle 
enough to realize, however, that to the extent that Da-
vidson is dealing with more complex examples of po-
etic metaphor, he may indeed be onto something, 
since the "aboutness" of such metaphors is always 
elusive (cf. Sperber 1977). 
Paul Ricoeur takes the position that metaphor does 
have the capacity to provide untranslatable informa-
tion and yield true insights about reality, and that it has 
this capacity by virtue of certain psychological proc-
esses, those of imagination and feeling. His thesis, in 
brief, is that the metaphoric form of "split reference" 
is structurally analogous to the processes of imagina-
tion and feeling, which themselves constitute the com-
plete metaphorical process. Both imagination and feel-
ing involve a "suspension" of literal systems of 
reference and emotion by which we are able to main-
tain the tensional viewpoint required by metaphor and 
assimilate new meanings. The metaphorical process 
allows us to actively shape and participate in the crea-
tion and articulation of meaning in ways denied us by 
ordinary language, whose meanings have already 
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been given to us. In metaphor, the new semantic con-
gruence is both "felt" and "seen," that is, "We are in-
cluded in the process as knowing subjects'' {p. 154). 
Through this, we become aware of aspects of reality 
''which cannot be expressed in terms of the objects 
referred to in ordinary language' ' (p 156). While Ri-
coeur's debt to Heidegger is clear, his theory also 
bears interesting similarities to Michael Polanyi's the-
ory of knowledge in The Tacit Dimension, and a com-
parison of Polanyi's "tacit knowing" to Ricoeur's me-
taphorical process might further illuminate the 
question of how metaphor functions in cognition. 
So intriguing are the structural properties of meta-
phor that they have overshadowed other aspects of 
the picture. Recently, however, theorists have shifted 
from a purely semiotic approach to one focusing on 
contextual features and the relationship between the 
speakers, touching upon the interrelationship between 
systems of signification and communication. The es-
says by Cohen, Davidson, and Booth reflect this trend 
with varying degrees of success. 
Ted Cohen's essay reflects the problem alluded to 
earlier, that of a philosophy unaided by theoretical po-
sitions on human communication. He is vulnerable to 
this charge for the simple reason that his analysis, 
dealing with the establishment of intimacy through 
metaphor, might have benefited greatly from such the-
ory. Cohen finds metaphors like jokes in that they both 
presuppose prior knowledge on the part of the speak-
ers, and both serve to establish a sense of bonding 
from the acknowledgment of such knowledge. Litera-
ture on humor enlightens us as to the multiple com-
plexities of such relationships, making Cohen's analy-
sis seem oddly narve (Fry 1 963). 
Wayne Booth's discussion of metaphor from the tra-
ditional approach of rhetoric is a refreshing reminder 
that the functional perspective on language did not 
arise with speech act theory; furthermore, his defini-
tion of metaphor as "all symbolic inventions that are 
intended to be taken non literally'' permits him an ad-
mirably broad vision of the subject (p. 50). 
The power of contextual factors is given empirical 
support from developmental studies of metaphorical 
competence. Howard Gardner and Ellen Winner sug-
gest that children's understanding of metaphors is en-
hanced by embedding them in a situational context 
rather than drawing upon prior lexical knowledge. Also 
of interest are their studies of brain-damaged patients, 
which raise intriguing possibilities. Asked to match 
simple tropes with appropriate pictures, aphasiacs 
were able to make the correct selection while remain-
ing incapable of paraphrasing the same metaphor; 
right-hemisphere patients, on the other hand, dis-
played the opposite tendency and offered accurate 
paraphrase with no corresponding ability to select the 
appropriate picture. Gardner and Winner conclude 
that ''the neuropsychological evidence suggests that 
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both the pragmatic and featural perspectives, taken 
together, have some validity, with the crucial variable 
being the kinds of tasks posed and responses re-
quired'' (p. 138). 
The remainder of the essays illustrate how meta-
phor permeates different realms of social discourse. 
Paul de Man's reading of Locke, Condillac, and Kant 
finds their philosophical positions on metaphor fraught 
with figurative language. Analyzing these metaphors 
as a result of particular rhetorical strategies, he con-
cludes that philosophy ''to the extent that it is depen-
dent on figuration" is literary, and cannot be under-
stood properly unless such repressed metaphors are 
laid bare. Karsten Harries similarly calls attention to 
Heidegger's writings on the ways metaphor shapes 
philosophy, making "explicit the fact that philosophi-
cal texts refer us less to reality than back to other phil-
osophical texts'' (p. 83). 
It should be emphasized that to admit the metapho-
rical component in disciplines such as science or phi-
losophy does not impoverish the theories they gener-
ate. Granted, the presence of repressed metaphor 
alerts us to certain normative commitments, but this 
should not diminish our appreciation of the ex-
planatory function of models in general. Nor should it 
commit us to the hapless relativism that scientific theo-
ries are, at best, arbitrary fictions. As Karsten Harries 
argues, the modern recognition of the impossibility of 
an unmediated reality does not render the belief in ob-
jectivity itself meaningless. On the contrary, the very 
ability to identify, analyze, and evaluate individual per-
spectives leads us to pursue a viewpoint which would 
permit a truly objective means of encountering reality. 
Lacking any belief in this possibility would undermine 
the basis of scientific knowledge altogether (Polanyi 
1967). Furthermore the commitment to objectivity de-
mands that we explore scientific models in terms of 
what they can reveal and explain about observed phe-
nomena (Hesse 1966:162). By affirming the legitimate 
role metaphor plays in intellectual activity, we can bet-
ter understand the insights and achievements of scien-
tific theory, not confusing theory with literal descrip-
tion or carelessly rejecting it in the name of relativism. 
The role of metaphor is further clarified by David 
Tracy's detailed account of religious and theological 
use of metaphor. Although a reader's unfamiliarity with 
contemporary theology may make Tracy's a particu-
larly difficult essay, it is worth reading for its success-
ful integration of the interaction theory of metaphor 
with concrete textual analysis. Arguing that the study 
of metaphor is central to the understanding of religious 
experience and thinking, Tracy notes: 
The statement "God is love" does not say literally what 
God is, but produces a metaphorical meaning for what 
God is like. In this redescriptive sense, the statement de-
fines who, for the Christian, God is. [p. 1 03] 
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Tracy convincingly demonstrates that a view of meta-
phor that refuses its capacity to generate new mean-
ings cannot do justice to the role metaphor plays in re-
ligious thinking. 
Caution must be taken, though, in extending 
Tracy's analysis to a more general notion of the truth 
value of metaphor. In the case of Scripture, it seems 
clear that metaphor does indeed help to establish a 
world. But, one is forced to wonder with Karsten Har-
ries, ''to what extent does the scriptural paradigm help 
to illuminate poetry in general and, more especially, 
the poetry of this godless age?" (p . 172). Harries ar-
gues that contemporary poetry as well as art stands in 
a radically different relation to reality than do the 
words of Scripture, consequently producing a different 
use of metaphor. His discussion traces some of the 
movements in notions of poetic unity and metaphor. 
He locates the telling moment in the transition from the 
traditional mimetic theory, which viewed art as about 
reality and saw its object as potentially transcending 
human understanding, to the aesthetic view of art, 
which insists that art be autotelic and resistant to mim-
esis. Referentiality, according to the aesthetic view, 
threatens the telos of the work of art insofar as it re-
lates to a reality outside art. Thus, the purpose of art is 
to be a "thing" in the world, to resist its own inherently 
metaphorical structure. The work of art is always at 
once a material object and a communication, but the 
pursuit of presence seeks, in effect, to repress the lat-
ter. Insofar as referentiality seems to be unavoidable, 
the pursuit of such presence inevitably creates a ten-
sion, which Harries relates to the prevalence of colli-
sion metaphor in modern poetry, where ordinary 
meanings of words are subverted altogether. The 
paradoxical reversal of this is that as poetry, as well as 
art, approaches this extreme denial of meaning 
it may acquire a revelatory power all its own: from the 
ruins of literal sense emerges not a new semantic con-
gruence but a silence that is heard as the language of 
transcendence. [p. 172] 
Furthermore, Harries's hermeneutical account makes 
it clear that metaphor is not always best confined to 
the domain of pragmatics and the "overly restricted 
theory of meaning on which it rests' ' (p. 169). A theory 
of meaning that denies that sedimentation of rich 
meanings that attach themselves to words and sym-
bols also denies us access to the potentialities of artis-
tic and poetic works. There is a peculiar process at 
work when these associations are declared somehow 
less "real " than univocal meanings. It is important to 
note that such deliberations about meaning do not 
have merely philosophical consequences, especially 
for those of us who are interested in artistic in-
tepretation. Not only is the potential meaning of a text 
a fundamental presupposition upon which acts of in-
terpretation rest; it is also the case that textual analy-
sis, by suppressing the availability of multivocal inter-
pretation, is restricted and, in many cases, unjustified. 
Our commonsense notions inform us that we can 
"miss the point" of a metaphor, a film, or a painting, 
and we believe that additional information and knowl-
edge can enlighten us. Lacking such notions, art his-
torical intepretation becomes absurd. Thus, the ques-
tion of metaphor is inevitably drawn back into the 
larger issues of meaning and communication which 
must support it. 
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Nadia Chilkovsky Nahumck. Introduction to Dance 
Literacy: Perception and Notation of Dance 
Patterns. Transvaal: International Library of African 
Music, 1978. 95 pp., diagrams, notated staves, practice 
staves, bibliography, glossary. No price (cloth). 
Reviewed by Diane C. Freedman 
Temple University 
As the interest of social scientists in the expressive 
forms of culture increases, new methods are needed 
to analyze these forms on a scientific basis. Research-
ers in dance and body movement have such a tool in 
Labanotation, a rigorous and highly developed system 
for the analysis and notation of all forms of movement. 
Labanotation (Hutchinson 1954) is the trade name 
for a system of movement notation developed by Ru-
dolf Laban, a dance educator-scholar born in Bratis-
lava in 1879 (Thorton 1971 ), who revolutionized the 
dance world through both his philosophy of movement 
and his pragmatic approaches to movement-related 
problems. Nahumck has presented us with an in-
troduction to this system designed for dancer and re-
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searcher. Her book is divided into two sections: a brief 
description of the basic symbols of Labanotation and 
how they are used, and a discussion of ways to per-
ceive overall patterning in dance. I aim to evaluate the 
goals and accomplishments of these sections and ex-
plore some theoretical implications of the concept 
"dance literacy." 
After a brief history of dance notational systems, 
Nahumck describes the use of the vertical staff of 
Labanotation and the symbols which simultaneously 
convey information on direction, level, and timing of 
movements: 
This section is designated as an introduction for dancers, 
choreographers, researchers-all dance interested people 
who are beginning to recognize the urgency for moving 
the study of dance out of the "oral" tradition and into a lit-
erate one. [p. 1 0] 
My inference from this and other statements is that it 
should be possible for an interested researcher who 
has never before seen a page of Labanotation to pick 
up this book and become "literate" in dance, even 
though Nahumck encourages further study for those 
desiring expertise in the system. If this is indeed the 
goal of the book, it does not quite succeed. And while 
it is true that the reader can learn a great deal about 
the structure of Labanotation from this book, it is not 
sufficiently explicit for a novice to learn to manipulate 
this complex system. 
The major reason for this problem is Nahumck's 
lack of attention to the nature of Labanotation-that it 
is a movement-based system with categories concep-
tually derived directly from movement experi-
ence. The logical outcome of this fact is that to learn 
Labanotation one must not only read it but also move 
it: without direct kinesthetic experience the concepts 
of Labanotation cannot be mastered. My assumption is 
that Nahumck, because of her experience in teaching 
Labanotation, understands this problem. Yet the omis-
sion of any discussion of the need for movement expe-
rience as a basis for gaining "competence in the tech-
niques for recognising dance patterns'' (p. 9) has 
seriously weakened her presentation. 
The elegance of Laban's system is a result of the 
precision with which the movement-based concepts 
are defined. Nahumck's book encourages the reader 
to begin practice-writing before providing an adequate 
base for the understanding of this conceptual preci-
sion-a major flaw. For example, in the early stages of 
learning Labanotation, an important distinction must 
be made between writing in terms of motion (a move-
ment away from a starting point) and destination (a 
transition to an established point in space) (Hackney 
et al. 1970). The lack of attention to this conceptual 
distinction would confuse readers who, seeing the 
same symbols used in different columns, have no 
basis for understanding the difference in their inter-
pretation. 
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The second part of the book is concerned with the 
formation of movement patterns along five dimensions: 
rhythmic patterns, ground paths, kinetic patterns, ef-
fort patterns, and space-consequent shapes. This part 
is derived not only from Labanotation but touches also 
on other parts of Laban's theory (1947, 1966). It em-
phasizes the perception of movement patterns and the 
necessity for acquiring skill in this perceptual ability 
for accurate notation to be possible. By using such far-
ranging examples as childrens' street games and eth-
nic dances from Spain, Africa, and the Philippines, 
Nahumck demonstrates how Labanotation fits with a 
musical score and how the system is sufficiently de-
tailed and flexible to deal comprehensively with move-
ment styles, such as African, that are totally different 
from those with which its creator was most familiar. 
As a workbook this section presents some prob-
lems. Each chapter is equipped with a detailed sum-
mary which aids in clarification. Following this are 
questions for review, most of which are designed to 
test readers' understanding of the material. Some, 
however, are research questions for the reader to put 
to his own data source, and their inclusion in a review 
section is confusing. Practice staves are also present 
in these chapters. They would be more useful accom-
panied by graded excersises so that the reader could 
attempt some specific task and measure his perform-
ance in some way. Another problem may arise as the 
reader tries to work through some of the notated ex-
amples. There is no sequential presentation of the 
symbols which would allow the reader to assimilate 
them in a logical order. Instead, each symbol is 
defined below the score in which it is first used. The 
result of this is that the examples seem more complex 
than they are, and are difficult for a beginner to follow 
even though they are accompanied by a verbal de-
scription of the movement. 
Since Nahumck directs her book in part tore-
searchers, it must also be evaluated through the use of 
criteria of theoretical importance to this group. In par-
ticular, her use of the term ''dance literacy'' and its im-
plications should be of interest to all communication 
researchers. She defines dance literacy as 
competence in the techniques for recognizing dance pat-
terns-physical shapes, rhythms, spatial patterns, dynam-
ics-as combinations of basic elements which, in infinite 
variations, produce the magical symbolic "statements" 
that transform ordinary movements into dance. The term 
also includes skill in reading and writing choreography in 
its own symbolic language without interposition of verbal 
descriptions. [p. 9] 
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Nahumck's reason for using "dance literacy" remains 
unclear. She may be intending a metaphoric inter-
pretation referring to the ability of Labanotation tore-
cord movement in written form. But the term "literacy" 
commonly applies to a specific skill, whereas in 
Nahumck's usage a whole series of operations and 
abilities seems to be implied. For instance, the reader 
cannot be sure from the text whether practitioners of 
other notation systems, such as Benesh, are consid-
ered to be "dance literate." The term thus raises more 
problems than it can solve and does not appropriately 
represent the conceptual system to which Nahumck 
refers. 
From a theoretical perspective, the term "literacy" 
posits an analogy between the systems of dance and 
language that is more significant than comparing only 
the notational systems devised for each. This analogy 
leads directly to the implication that a linguistic model 
is appropriate for the study of dance and, by exten-
sion, all movement. While this notion is not a new one 
in studies of either dance (Kaeppler 1972) or body 
movement (Birdwhistell 1970), it is still arguable. 
Nahumck's lack of comment on the implications of her 
terminology may indicate a lack of interest in broader 
theoretical concerns. But it is clearly necessary for 
communication theorists to deal with these issues. 
The analogy between language and dance must be 
qualified by an understanding of each as a separate 
mode of communication in which the symbolic mean-
ing of one mode is not directly translatable to another. 
Gross (1973) defines a mode of symbolic behavior as: 
a system of potential actions and operations (external and 
int~rnal) in terms of which objects and events can be per-
ceived, coded cognitively for long term storage andre-
trieval.' su~jected to transformations and orderings, and 
orgamzed 1nto forms that can elicit meaningful inferences 
(of whatever level of consciousness) by the creator and/or 
others who possess competence in the same mode. 
[1973:191] 
He distinguishes five primary modes of symbolic be-
havior: th~ lexical, socio-gestural, iconic, logico-
mathematlcal, and musical, while allowing for derived 
modes that build on the primary ones, in which cate-
gory he includes dance. In the socio-gestural mode whic~ _is in part based on movement, knowledge of~ 
~pec1f1c gestur~l code is not sufficient for competence 
1n that mode, s1nce other social/interactive symbols 
(such as social conventions) are also involved. Con-
vers~ly, the ran~e of possible experience in the per-
ceptl?n of the kinesthetic sense is not encompassed 
by th1s mode. In fact, the kinesthetic sense is relatively 
neglec~ed in Gross' scheme. I would therefore postu-
late a s1xth mode of symbolic competence-the kines-
thetic. Again following Gross: 
The ability to comprehend symbolic meaning, then, de-
pends upon the acquisition of competence in the mode in 
which that meaning exists. Like all knowledge and skill, 
that competence can only be achieved through action. 
[1975:28] 
Part of the development of competence in the kines-
thetic mode must include an understanding of the indi-
vidual's own body potential: along which axis is he 
most comfortable in moving, and which combinations 
of qualities are most common in his movement reper-
toire. Without this knowledge, total comprehension of 
the movement styles of others is not possible. And yet 
there is no corollary of this necessity in any other sym-
bolic mode. This quality alone should be sufficient to 
distinguish the kinesthetic as a separate, non-
translatable symbolic mode. 
I would argue that movement is a qualitatively differ-
ent system than language, and therefore the concept 
of dance literacy is inadequate. The symbols used in 
Labanotation represent discrete units of a movement 
sequence, but these units are complex composites of 
many dimensions, not at all analogous to linguistic 
phonemes. It is necessary for the movement analyst to 
gain competence in dealing with these units-in isolat-
ing their components and in understanding how they 
combine to form more complex statements. But this 
competence cannot be gained by merely observing 
movement sequences or learning to "read" a symbolic 
transcription which represents these sequences. Com-
petence in dance analysis implies the ability to experi-
ence visually, aurally, kinesthetically, and rhythmically 
the dimensions of a movement sequence. It does not 
mean that the analyst must be a professional dancer, 
for these analytic skills can be learned by anyone will-
ing to spend the necessary time and energy. But 
movement competence does require more than learn-
ing to read symbols. It requires both physical and in-
tellectual participation in the analysis of movement se-
quences into their component units, and a heightened 
self-awareness of one's own movement repertoire. 
If we accept the existence of the kinesthetic mode 
it should be apparent that symbolic understanding ' 
within that mode cannot be gained only by reference 
to a coexistent linguistic code. A semiotic model with 
its focus on the sign system within the mode, wo~ld be 
more appropriate than a linguistic one for analyzing 
meaning in dance. "The 'essence' of a specific sym-
bolic message will only be appreciated within the code 
in which it was created'' (Gross 1 973: 1 93). Thus for 
the analyst a new and fundamentally different form of 
gaining competence in the kinesthetic mode must be 
used. Laban's system has the potential for helping one 
to develop this competence through an active under-
standing of symbolic statements in the kinesthetic 
mode. Thus in a literal sense the label of "dance liter-
acy'' for this system is inadequate to express the un-
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derlying assumptions of the system or the powerful 
analytic capacity that it has. 
Nahumck is successful in this book to the extent 
that she introduces Laban's concepts and gives the 
reader some idea of the scope and conceptual power 
of his system. She clearly documents her belief, which 
I share, in the primacy of Laban's system as the most 
precise one available for analyzing movement in its 
own terms. The book is particularly useful for readers 
interested in a purely structural application of the nota-
tion system independent of the kinesthetic context, 
such as the comparative analysis of the steps of two 
related dance forms. A dancer looking for a shorthand 
for writing choreography would also find this book 
useful, as would a student of another notation system 
looking for comparative material. But it is only through 
rigorous study of Laban's work that its full potential for 
movement research can be realized. 
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Barbara Rosenblum's illuminating study succeeds at 
tying photographic style in specific ways to the social 
organization of photographers at work. Style, shear-
gues, is ''a deposit of the work role'' (p. 113). More-
over, ''distinctive social processes dominate each set-
ting where pictures are made and they affect what 
photographers can and cannot do, what kinds of im-
ages they can and cannot make, what kinds of visual 
data they can include in the picture or leave out' ' (pp. 
1-2). The division of labor, technology, photographer-
client relations, audience expectations, and control 
over work processes interact to fashion largely auton-
omous ''worlds'' (p. 19) of photographic custom and 
practice, worlds to which we gain entry via Rosen-
blum's report of her participant observation at three 
work settings. In her comparison of the ways in which 
news, advertising, and fine arts photographers make 
pictures, ''the relationships between photographic 
style and social structure setting can be seen'' (p. 2). 
In these three spheres neophyte photographers are 
socialized into different work roles (what novices might 
know about picturemaking before this explicit sociali-
zation is not discussed). As apprentices, news photog-
raphers learn to be unobtrusive; they learn to antici-
pate sequences of social action so as to be able to 
plan their next shot; they internalize news values and 
learn to negotiate a fit between their pictures and the 
stories they may accompany. As assistants to estab-
lished advertising photographers, newcomers learn to 
manage shooting situations: where to obtain special 
materials, how to make creases in satin look "right," 
how to keep models relaxed, how to take orders from 
agency art directors and clients. At school fine-arts 
photographers learn that photography is a visual art 
and that, somehow, their pictures should both unveil 
and bear witness to their own individuality. 
We learn a good deal about the ways photogra-
phers go about their work. News photographers on the 
night shift generally cover different sorts of events 
than their colleagues on day work. Rather than the 
prescheduled events of day-press conferences, fash-
ion shows, baseball games-at night "good human in-
terest material. . . the birth of a baby ... 
murder, fire, death" take precedence (p. 49). 
News photographs, too, often function as a record that 
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an event has in fact occurred. As one informant puts it: 
"With a picture, it's either there or not there. No bull-
shit. No reporter making up a story'' (p. 22). ''Getting 
the picture,'' if it is a good picture, means getting the 
story (p. 4 7); and the veracity of the photograph re-
mains pristine even as the photographer is in practice 
subordinated to conventional journalistic storylines. In 
the similarly restrictive domain of the advertising pho-
tographer the chief job is to translate sketches sup-
plied by advertising agencies into conventional photo-
graphic terms. Here creativity is seen to lie in ''the 
solution to a technical problem for which there are no 
standardized solutions" (p. 84): how to shoot a toy 
castle underwater; literally, how to make the product 
shine. Advertising photographers thus derive concepts 
of creativity from their need to produce "original stan-
dard pictures" (p. 81 )-photographs whose technical 
brilliance permits expression of the client's design. 
News photographers, however, may explain creativity 
in terms of a search for new angles when covering 
well-worn faces; and fine-arts photographers use cre-
ativity as a badge of their individuality by finding "orig-
inal," often difficult or dangerous shots, or by printing 
in unexpected ways. 
Style ''is not the outcome of the history of the rules 
of a form" Rosenblum observes (p. 111 ), and her 
study reinstates a valuable empirical emphasis on the 
actual processes through which cultural forms are 
hammered out. If I find some problems with Rosen-
blum's conceptualization of style (which I will discuss 
below), they are secondary to her substantial contribu-
tion to our knowledge of the structured practices of 
photographers in American society. 
We might have learned more from this book had a 
larger number of illustratipns been included. A few 
photographs, chosen to exemplify broad stylistic dif-
ferences between news, advertising, and fine-arts 
photography, find their way into the text. Yet there are 
many occasions where visual information is pertinent 
and some where the argument is damaged by its ab-
sence. The reader is too often shut off from good eth-
nographic data, and omission of illustrative resources 
obliges Rosenblum to shut doors which should have 
remained open. To take one major example, she states 
(p. 43) that ''understanding the differences between 
newspapers, with regard to their definitions of the 
'news,' is the first step in understanding the picture as-
signment process and the picture selection process.'' 
A paper's "general editorial attitude," she continues 
(p. 43), varies in accordance with ''what news fits the 
image of the paper, and what kind of treatment of 
news items the editors think the readers expect of that 
paper.'' But what do these differences actually look 
like? How, specifically, does "general editorial atti-
tude" impinge on the production and style of photo-
graphs, and how does its impact vary as one moves 
from journal to journal and from one end of the generic 
style ("news photography") to another? Might not the 
tabloid and the prestige press, for example, diverge 
along a photographic dimension, as they so evidently 
do across conventional axes of content and visual 
form? Unaccompanied by photographic illustrations, 
Rosenblum's single example, a grisly murder, cannot 
provide an answer. 
More serious, Rosenblum relinquishes any attempt 
to link such generic variation to the pattern of social 
stratification which pervades American society. Might 
not the styles of picturemaking employed by different 
newspapers be related to social structural differences 
between their publics? Can work practices not be seen 
as unfolding a graded series of photographic styles in 
relation to disparate audiences? 
Rosenblum acknowledges that '' 'the specificity of 
the audience' is a very important variable, one which is 
based on structural features of social systems'' (p. 
125). However, she then asserts that for news and ad-
vertising photographers a "primary audience" is com-
prised of "significant others," who make the "stop-
and-go decisions along the distribution channel" (p. 
118) and who, therefore, take analytic precedence 
over the "general public." In brief, the audience and 
its expectations are incorporated into the work organi-
zation itself: One produces for colleagues and editors, 
or for an ad agency art director and the client, rather 
than for any ultimate public. This is a valid and impor-
tant argument, which has been developed at greater 
length in recent work on the production of news (Gold-
ing and Elliott 1979; Schlesinger 1978). It under-
scores the insight that in systems of industrial cultural 
production the interaction between producers and au-
diences tends to be uneven, with power held asymmet-
rically at the producing end. Nevertheless, it is worth 
pointing out that circulation and sales managers, with 
their market research staffs, are far from blind to the 
"demographics" which herald the interaction between 
style and audience penetration. Abolishing the au-
dience by fiat segregates the newspaper from the con-
text which, ultimately, underpins much of its cultural 
meaning. 
Inattentiveness to the audience, therefore, allows 
style to become what it patently is not: a thing, "a de-
posit of the work role'' (p. 113). As social structure 
disappears, work role and, by extension, style itself 
become pure expressions of organizational or institu-
tional requirements. 
In actuality differences exist between individual 
practitioners, or between subgroups, even in the most 
bureaucratic and routinized organizations-and these 
differences may be substantial. Among news people, 
for instance, Janowitz (1975) has argued that ''gate-
keepers" and "advocates" are disposed to project 
distinct journalistic styles: factual, objective, or neu-
tral, on the one hand, and committed or partisan on the 
other. Cantor's (1971) study of Hollywood TV pro-
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ducers is similarly able to isolate divergent types, the 
bases for which are sought in past career history and 
experience. Are there really no photographers at any 
of Rosenblum's three settings who oppose dominant 
concepts of creativity? Are there none who cling to al-
ternative, but still acceptable, styles of picturemaking, 
be they residual or emergent (Williams 1973)? What 
are the patterns and bases of variation within the work 
role, and how do these interact with style? 
Work role grants too much weight to the reality of 
an ideal typical photographer's experience. Not only 
does this tend to blur individual differences, it also ac-
cepts the perspective of the individual photographer 
as the most valid analytical standpoint. For the lone 
photographer working in a complex organization, how-
ever, much that may seem to be immutable may in fact 
be organizationally contingent. To imply, for example, 
that ''technology' '- in this case automated photo-
graphic processing equipment used by newspapers-
does not encourage the news photographer to trouble 
about printing his own pictures, or to worry much 
about their final appearance, may be correct, but it ob-
scures a somewhat different structural reality. As Ro-
senblum notes, it is deadlines that favor the use of 
high-speed photoprocessing equipment capable of 
churning out reproducible images in a matter of min-
utes. Deadlines, though, themselves express the 
newspapers' economic character. Contrary to Rosen-
blum's argument, news certainly is not the newspa-
pers' " main product" (p. 41 ); news is news because it 
is necessary to have something to fill the space be-
tween the advertisements which are slotted en masse, 
in advance, into each day's projected paper (cf. Tuch-
man 1978: 15-16). As Fazey (1977: 6) explains, dis-
play advertising 
is all-important in its effect on the type of newspaper that 
is produced. Advertising market considerations, in fact, 
create the large, multi-section newspaper, where the ad-
vertisers' perception of the editorial function is condi-
tioned by the need to turn the reader onto the page which 
the advertiser has bought almost in its entirety. A three-
quarter column turn from page A 1 fills this need admira-
bly. 
Although ''technology is always enmeshed in an eco-
nomic, political and ideological system" (p.115), it is 
vital to ask and to find out how. 
Reliance on work role is, finally, symptomatic of 
a troubling tendency to gloss over the fundamental 
distinction between collective and individual or craft 
production. Indeed, a number of crucial concepts-
creativity, alienation, and style-are skewed 
uncritically toward individual rather than collective 
modes. Alienation, for example, is seen to result from 
a lack of control over work, from start to finish, from 
conceptualization to execution to ultimate audience 
reception. Well and good. "Control" itself, however, is 
89 
too automatically referred back to isolated actors: 
" ... individual labor, not social labor, is a necessity 
for artistic production because it insures the possibility 
of working in a craft mode, in which thinking and doing 
are united" (p. 124). Why is such unity to be required 
only by artists? And might not thinking and doing ever 
be united in collective production? Rosenblum's an-
swer is a retreat across a full century of practice and 
discussion. The use of craft production as an ideal 
points up fine-arts photography as a relatively attrac-
tive current style of work, and Rosenblum seems to in-
sinuate that collective production itself may be the 
source of alienation, in the form of "aspects of modern 
work organization such as deadlines or routinization" 
(p. 124). Deadlines, I have pointed out, at least in 
newspaper offices, express a specific form of collec-
tive organization, and must not be confused with col-
lective production per se; and it is far from clear in 
what ways routinization, taken alone, could engender 
alienation. Again, Rosenblum does not hesitate to as-
sert, in support of fine-arts photography, that " unregu-
lated competition may stimulate the creation of in-
novative imagery' ' (p. 1 20), because the free market, 
with its relatively diffuse expectations concerning 
works of art, permits "a greater possibility of imposing 
one's unique vision and one's own aesthetic prefer-
ences on a work of art'' (p. 1 27). Has the author not 
permitted the obsessive concern for individuality 
evinced by many of her fine-arts photographers to dic-
tate the boundaries of her own discussion? Diffuse ex-
pectations, in any case, are not identical to elastic or 
tolerant or far-ranging ones, as Rosenblum herself 
soundly shows: " ... the strength of the market's influ-
ence is evident when we realize how few photographic 
traditions are defined as fine art, compared to the vast 
number of original portfolios that are submitted to 
curators and gallery owners each month" (pp. 1 08-
1 09). Before she praised the free market, might it not 
have been advisable for her to find out what proportion 
of fine-arts photographs actually are sold through gal-
leries and what proportion manage, in a not-so-very-
free market, to elude these powerful arbiters of taste? 
How do we know that the diversity of style in fine-arts 
photography, along with the monolithic style of news 
photography, is not apparent only, a mere artifact of 
the author's enchantment with individual production 
and individual experience? 
Three main weaknesses, therefore, afflict the con-
cept of style advanced by Rosenblum. First, its stress 
on work role obscures our view of individual differ-
ences and, occasionally, structural contraints within 
organizations where photography is practiced. Sec-
ond, style embraces neither generic nor inter-
organizational variation nor, again, the distinction be-
tween individual and collective forms of production. 
Finally, the relationships between such variation and 
the social location of work practices are not examined; 
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style is not viewed as an interaction between organiza-
tions and the people outside them. Objections aside, 
however, Photographers at Work makes photography 
a more comprehensible practice. 
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Mass-Mediated Culture is a useful book, but perhaps 
not in the way the author intended. As an effort to syn-
thesize a vast literature on a mass communication and 
culture, the book touches on a number of issues basic 
to the study of complex society and mass communica-
tion. In doing so, it demonstrates the importance of de-
veloping an anthropology of mass communication and 
media. 
The book is an ambitious undertaking. In 280 pages 
Real proposes a theoretical framework for the study of 
mass-mediated culture, which he defines as ·'ex-
pressions of culture as they are received from contem-
porary media, whether they arise from elite, folk, pop-
ular or mass origins'' (p. 14), summarizes much of the 
literature on mass culture, describes and justifies his 
methodology, presents several case studies, and ex-
horts the reader to create a setting in which the "liber-
ating potential" of media could be realized. The core 
of his argument is that mass-mediated culture is a cru-
cial link between the material setting and institutional 
structure of a society and the character of con-
sciousness and symbol system of that society. To sup-
port and illustrate his contention Real presents case 
studies of Disneyland, the Super Bowl, medical pro-
grams on television, a Billy Graham crusade, a presi-
dential campaign, and an Aymara fiesta in the Andes. 
He justifies this choice of topics, arguing that they are 
''focused on a specific event or person as a dominant 
and widespread cultural expression that continues 
over a period of years, represents a major institutional 
area or subsystem of society and is significant as an 
expression of a total cultural system" (p. 37). 
In a brief section of three pages, Real describes the 
"methodologies" of functionalism, structuralism, and 
aesthetics and says that all three are necessary for an 
adequate understanding of mass-mediated culture. He 
then, just as briefly, characterizes his approach-
without, however, integrating in any systematic way 
the proposed theory, methodologies, and research 
techniques. He labels his approach ethnographic, ex-
egetical, typological, cross-cultural, critical, and policy 
oriented. 
Ethnography . .. identifies an experience in exact detail 
together with historical and other necessary factual back-
ground .... Exegis ... identifies the precise meaning of 
the experience both intensively in itself and extensively in 
its association. When well executed, the two define what 
an individual case typifies about a culture. The cross-cul-
tural comparisons are most evident in the Aymara study, 
which compares and contrasts characteristic structures of 
a non-mediated culture with the culture represented in the 
other case studies. Critical procedures seek precise un-
derstanding of subtle associations, implications and prob-
lem areas. They seek both positive appreciation and nega-
tive sensitizing to potential exploitation and unconscious 
excess .... A final procedure in these studies points 
beyond understanding only and suggests appropriate and 
constructive responses. [p. 38] 
The six case studies follow. While Real uses a wide 
range of approaches, cites an extensive literature, and 
has chosen varied topics, the results are limited and 
repetitive. Each chapter hammers home the theme that 
mass-mediated culture "primarily serves the interests 
of the relatively small political-economic power elite 
that sits atop the social pyramid." Disneyland repre-
sents "utopian typifications" and instructs through 
"morality plays that structure personal values and ide-
ology." The study of the Super Bowl approaches it as 
a mythic spectacle, emphasizing dominant American 
institutions and ideology. Televised medical programs 
are examined by use of the concepts "genre" and 
·'formula.'' A major conclusion is that the programs 
support cultural notions of health, glorify and protect 
the interests of doctors, and fail to make available to 
the public useful information on health and illness. The 
following chapter on a presidential campaign con-
cludes that the current political communication system 
represents an "authoritarian use of mass-mediated 
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culture to manipulate and mislead people.'' The study 
of Billy Graham again emphasizes how mass-mediated 
culture supports dominant institutions and ideology. 
The final chapter on the Aymara Indians is offered as a 
contrast to mass-mediated culture, within the conven-
tions of contrasts between traditional and modernized 
societies, updated with references to communication 
and forms of consciousness. Real, not surprisingly, 
finds that his case studies support his "hypotheses" 
that mass-mediated culture "reflect[s] the political 
economy, channel[s] popular tastes, and cause[s] indi-
vidual and social effects" (p. 248). Needless to say, 
such hypotheses are uninformative. 
Finally, Real argues for the development of what he 
calls "cultural studies," following Carey (1975) and 
Williams (197 4). Such studies would avoid the errors 
of positivism and scientism that have characterized the 
dominant trend in American research on mass commu-
nication. Culture is to be viewed as ''expressive,'' and 
with this orientation Real contends that we can exam-
ine the ways in which expressive forms are related to 
historical and social conditions and the ways in which 
they create patterns of meaning and significance. Hu-
man behavior is to be read as a text in context: 
The text of cultural studies is human action and symbols 
broadly conceived; the context is the set of historical and 
institutional arrangements that structure action and sym-
bols in a particular way in a given society. [p. 240] 
He concludes with suggestions for the development of 
a critical theory of mass communication which can 
lead to an emancipated use of media, as opposed to 
the current predominantly repressive use. 
Real makes reference to a vast literature and spe-
cifically cites the work of several anthropologists. The 
citations generally occur, however, when Real is at-
tempting to justify the notion that places, perform-
ances, and programs have mythic or ritualistic func-
tions. He also makes use of what might be called 
aspects of an anthropological perspective in that he 
does attempt to be theoretical and systematic in his 
conception of the workings of a sociocultural system. 
His general failure to do so accounts for the superfi-
ciality and misleading character of his work. 
It should not be necessary to describe and justify an 
anthropology of media or mass communication at this 
late date; indeed, one can hardly be said to exist. An-
thropologists, with few exceptions, have fundamentally 
avoided joining virtually all the other disciplines rele-
vant to the study of mass communication. There are a 
number of reasons for this which are worth mentioning 
since they have implications for the general orientation 
of anthropology in the future. The following observa-
tior, was made over ten years ago: 
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Viewed in a broader context ... mass communication is 
by no means an exclusive feature of modern life, but 
merely a new form and further development of social com-
munication, present in every culture. But this phenomena, 
as such, has also been virtually ignored by traditional an-
thropology. It is either regarded as an intrinsic element of 
culture that need not be considered as a separate aspect, 
or else it is taken for granted as a 'universal' without sig-
nificant intercultural variation. That latter standpoint is 
particularly dubious. [Peck 1967: 68] 
In large measure, the failure of anthropologists to 
grasp the significance of the study of mass communi-
cation is part of a larger failure to deal with communi-
cation as a social activity. Anthropologists have 
tended to focus on language, its structure, or its rela-
tionship to culture and thought (Hymes 1967), with the 
exception of early work by Mead and Bateson. 
Sociolinguistics and sociovidistics (Chalfen 197 4) can 
be understood as recent efforts to correct this failure. 
Anthropologists have also tended to overlook 
change via the mass media, as well as change in gen-
eral, as they described or, better, created the "anthro-
pological present'' and/ or used functional ap-
proaches. From such a perspective mass media and 
communication would be disruptive or corrupting to 
the ideal or idealized traditional way of life (Peck 
1 967). Perhaps an analogous tendency in the study of 
complex societies has been to romanticize the mar-
ginal people we tend to study. There has been little 
systematic research on mass communication and the 
uses of communication media in traditional societies. 
Two exceptions are Keesing's study of a Samoan elite 
cited in Peck (1967) and Powdermaker's study of me-
dia use among Africans working on the Copperbelt of 
northern Rhodesia (1962). 
With respect to the study of communicators in com-
plex society, Powdermaker's (1950) study of Holly-
wood film production stands alone. It is interesting to 
note that the study was one of the first by any type of 
social scientist to consider carefully the role of the 
communicator in context. Also, there is Mead and Met-
raux's The Study of Culture at a Distance (1953), 
which is a compilation of content analyses undertaken 
to determine cultural and character patterns and their 
interrelationships. Recently there have been signs of a 
renewed interest in mass communication content, with 
several studies approaching mass communication 
content as myth (Denby 1971; Maranda 1972; Land-
ers 197 4), and a call for the study of mass communi-
cation and media use (Worth 1974; Eiselin and Topper 
1976; Chalfen 1978), but little follow-up. 
1 suggest that anthropologists can contribute to the 
study of mass communication by using Mass-Mediated 
Culture as an example of the unsuccessful and in-
complete use of an anthropological perspective. Such 
a perspective involves a set of interrelated conceptual 
and methodological assumptions and constructs which 
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provide an ideal set of tools for the study of mass and 
mediated communication. Fundamentally, the per-
spective involves (1) a generalized framework of bio-
cultural or sociocultural systems and/ or evolution; (2) 
the theoretical development of the concept of culture; 
and as a result of these primary orientations, (3) an 
emphasis on cross-cultural studies of (4) natural sys-
tems of behavior, which (5) rely on participant obser-
vation and (6) reflect the awareness of the character-
istics of culture in a distinction between native and 
observer's viewpoints. An integral element is the use 
of ethnographic research to develop a cumulative and 
wide-ranging body of data for the development of hy-
potheses and their support or refutation. The per-
spective, in my view, allows anthropologists to study 
both objective and subjective dimensions of behavior 
and add to an increasingly powerful and precise set of 
statements relating meanings and their settings. 
The relevance of such a perspective is apparent 
when Real proceeds with the study of mass-mediated 
culture without first distinguishing the problematic 
relationships between symbolic and social systems. 
The existence of mediated symbolic communication 
and variegated publics and producers renders any re-
ductive orientation misleading. The degree of concep-
tual and methodological confusions is evident in Real's 
discussion of his study of the Billy Graham campaign. 1 
choose this example, not simply because it involves a 
mistaken notion of ethnography, but as an illustration 
of why and how the anthropological compilation of eth-
nographies of communication is imperative. Real la-
bels his approach "ethnographic," but he actually re-
lied upon six one-hour Graham telecasts that were 
videotaped. His defence of his use of the videotapes 
as ethnographies exposes his oversimplification of the 
communication process. To the objection that video-
taped telecast is not a ''direct expression of human 
behavior but only a record of an edited and dissemi-
nated partial version of behavior'' he answers that all 
behavior is "edited" and contact with mediated com-
munication has an influence or impact "directly paral-
leling direct personal contact.·' He goes on to make 
the following case: 
Moreover, the customs, rituals, and culture portrayed in 
the sounds and moving images coming from speakers and 
screens, because of the pre-editing to fit the tastes of and 
to link together millions, are themselves virtually ethno-
graphic reflections of cultural regularities. A second ob-
jection is that the telecast itself is not completely self-ex-
planatory and that only the study of the people making 
(sic) television or receiving it is genuine social science. It 
is true that intention and social context are important. Nev-
ertheless, _the f~cus of cultural investigation is obviously 
on th_a~ pomt of 1mpact mediated message .... Popular 
telev1s1on may present a distorted picture of social behav-
ior, but because the most commercially successful dis-
tortions are always toward the mass norm, television of-
fers a view of social behavior that is more, not less, 
representative of the tendencies and regularities of a so-
ciety. In that sense, ethnographic records of mass-medi-
ated culture are at least as valid as ethnographic records 
of nomediated individual [sic] and group culture. [p. 171] 
I have difficulty in following Real's argument, but he 
seems to argue that the content of the videotape pre-
sentation is similar to the nonmediated behavior or 
events it is "about" -both are edited, both have an im-
pact, both are characterized by regularities. Therefore 
we can use the videotaped presentation as we would 
the observations made of the non mediated behavior 
the assumption being that the differences between the 
two are insignificant! As part of the same argument 
Real goes on to say that television may present a dis-
torted picture of social behavior, but that the dis-
tortions are "toward the mass norm," thus representa-
tive of the "tendencies and regularities of a society." 
What he means by a "distorted picture" and "toward 
the mass norm" are unclear to me. When he contends 
that what is presented on television is both distorted 
and representative of the behavior the programs are 
about, it is difficult to resolve the contradiction. Again, 
we are asked to take the videotaped performance as a 
''reflection'' of the behavior the presentation is about 
but with the proviso that the picture is distorted. How it 
is distorted and what it is a distortion of is never made 
clear. 
Real then goes on to dismiss the study of context 
and intention by stating that our focus of study should 
be on the "point of impact media message." What he 
means by the phrase is again unclear to me but he im-
plies the impact of the communication is in the text it-
self as if the message can be determined independent 
of the symbolic interactional process. To do so is to 
deny the active role of the viewer or user of a presen-
tation and the importance of the strategy of inter-
pretation that is used (Worth and Gross 197 4) and to 
oversimplify the processes involved. Also, Real ap-
pears to_ hav~ ignored his own argument by stating that 
context IS ummportant for studying the meanings of 
messages, when in his concluding chapter he makes a 
case for studying texts in the context of a set of "his-
torical and institutional arrangements.·' 
To identify the content of a program with the non-
mediated behavior it is about is to confuse the picture 
with the thing, assume what has to be demonstrated 
and deny the active, complex processes involved in' 
symbolic communication. Real deserves credit for at-
tempting to sketch out an overall framework for the 
study of mass-mediated culture. In part, the success of 
such an undertaking depends upon the ways sociocul-
tural systems _are i_maged. While Real notes the impor-
tan_ce of the h1ston?al and institutional setting, at most 
he mtroduces fashionable assertions about mass-me-
diated culture and the conditions of its creation. For 
Reviews and Discussion 
example, he states he has supported the hypothesis 
that mass-mediated culture ''reflects the political 
economy," but he presents little evidence for his as-
sertion. An example of a recent book which does pro-
vide empirical support for the " reflection hypothesis" 
is Gaye Tuchman's The TV Establishment: Program-
ming for Power and Profit" (1973). She draws to-
gether a number of studies which examine the ways in 
which mass-mediated fare is produced so that the 
reader can see the ways in which programs are manu-
factured to fit the requirements of the larger society, 
particularly the requirements of political and economic 
interests. 
While a framework which does justice to the char-
acter of various historical and institutional settings 
must be created, we also need ethnographies of com-
munication which get at the ways people actually 
make and use mass-mediated culture. Two studies 
that demonstrate the worth of such a strategy are 
Tuchman 's News, the Newsman 's Rea/ity(1969) and 
Gans' chapter on how Italian Americans use mass 
communication in The Urban Villagers (1962). We 
need systematic studies of the relationships between 
mass-mediated culture and elite, folk, popular, and 
mass culture and the ways in which each is produced 
or used by variegated producers and publics. 
Real's attempt to synthesize a number of theoretical 
and methodological orientations will invite criticism on 
a number of counts. For those who like their discipline 
boundaries maintained and their theory "pure, " the 
book is bound to be irritating; Real's theorizing and 
case studies will seem simplistic. For those who see 
the aim of such a book as illuminating experience, the 
book will seem another example of social science re-
stating the familiar or the interesting in a way that ren-
ders it less significant. And for those who see the aim 
of academic study clearly separated from a concern 
for social policy, the book continually violates that 
norm. With the exception of the last statement, I find 
the book disappointing on every count. What is miss-
ing is a framework that more satisfactorily accounts for 
the complex, problematic relationships between social 
and symbolic systems, particularly for systems in-
volving both mediated and nonmediated communica-
tion. 
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